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ABSTRACT
The research question of this study is whether or not companies can improve the 
relationship with their investors by voluntarily extending the scope of their risk 
disclosure. The novel aspect of this research is that it analyses the relationship 
between companies and investors in a unique crisis situation.
This thesis explains and tests the relationship between listed European insurance 
groups that disclose risk information in their annual financial statements and the 
reaction of the capital market during the recent sub-prime loan crisis. It covers the 
disclosure periods 2007 and 2008 of thirteen insurance groups that file their financial 
reports according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Based on 
literature it is assumed that during a crisis situation Investors estimate the value of the 
company they have invested in and decide whether or not they sell their shares or hold 
on to them. Research studies indicate that investors demand company-specific 
information about the investment risk, measurement of financial instruments and 
forecasts that are up to date and specific to the crisis situation.
To analyse the relationship between listed companies and investors the thesis 
measures their disclosure performance and the capital market response towards it. A 
self administered risk disclosure performance index is used that is based on 
accounting disclosure requirements and specified to the crisis. It measures the 
discretionary disclosure of companies about mortgage portfolio-based financial 
instruments. These instruments caused financial distress of banks that spread to a 
global economic crisis. The thesis measures the reaction of the capital market towards 
the disclosed risk information by applying the event study methodology at the peak of 
the crisis situation.
The statistical analysis of the relationship indicated that voluntary risk disclosure is not 
well recognized by investors as reported in the literature. It found out that investors had 
recognized those listed European insurance groups that have been most severely 
affected by the financial crisis. Investors came to that conclusion even before the 
researched companies disclosed risk information about their financial instruments in 
annual group financial statements.
The statistical research has been extended using structured-interviews with experts 
that represent significant users of financial information. This qualitative approach seeks 
to verify and explain the statistical results.
The results of the interviews with professional users of financial information such as 
financial analysts, managers of rating agencies and bankers have shown that they do 
not depend on risk information from annual financial statements of respective 
companies. They seek to get risk information in the event of a crisis by directly 
addressing the management of insurance groups. This enables them to gain 
comments on the impact of upcoming problems in the financial market from these 
managers.
These results imply that theories about the relationship between disclosing companies 
and the capital market are different in crisis situations when psychological factors 
influence the behaviour of both companies and the capital market. These factors are 
difficult to separate and need further research.
Practical implications of this research study arise for regulators and standard setters. 
Regulators should be aware that communication between management and 
professional users of financial information exists that exclude private investors during a 
crisis situation and deprives them from company-specific and recent information. This 
information disadvantage of private investors is amplified by the difficulty to understand 
the business model of the insurance industry. Therefore detailed and understandable 
information that explains the aftermath of the financial crisis on the insurance company 
should be made freely and promptly available. Regulators should require the insurance 
industry to do so because their discretionary risk disclosure is not sufficient to enable 
private investors to make snap-shot financial decisions.
Based on the evidence that insurance groups have hesitated to disclose their risk 
positions during a crisis, it is questionable whether they will comply with upcoming 
financial standards that require the disclosure of sensitive data about the fair market 
values of assets and liabilities. These data can be considered equally sensitive to listed 
insurance groups as information about their risk position on financial instruments. Such 
hesitation may be critical in other crisis situations when discretionary disclosure is 
necessary from an investor point. Accounting requirements cannot add the necessary
information because they cannot be modified quickly enough to force companies to 
disclose risk information that is critical in each individual crisis.
Regulators and accounting standard-setters should not rely on listed European 
insurance groups disclosing sufficient risk information during a crisis voluntarily. They 
should enhance incentives for insurance groups to disclose information about their risk 
position to create a level playing field between institutional investors with easier access 
to crisis relevant information and private investors that lack such information in crisis 
situations. Investors should reward discretionary risk disclosure of companies by 
investing in them.
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C h a p t e r  1
1. Introduction
The subject matter of this research is the relationship between listed European 
insurance groups that disclose accounting information and the reaction of the capital 
market towards this information.
Under normal business circumstances companies disclose information about their 
business activities and the results they have achieved during the last financial period. 
Although the frequency of financial reports has increased with quarterly financial 
statements their function as a detailed analysis of the previously achieved financial 
result has not changed. With a background as an accountant in the insurance industry 
the researcher wanted to find out to what extent financial statements provide forward 
looking information which can be used by investors to take current financial decisions. 
Therefore it is the aim of this research study to analyse the content of disclosed 
information as well as the structure and efficiency of the relationship between 
disclosing insurance groups and the capital market in the light of the recent financial 
crisis situation.
Is the capital market able to determine the market value of listed European insurance 
groups based on the information provided by them in their annual group financial 
statements? Accounting requirements applied in these financial reports are supposed 
to provide information according to IAS 1 par. 9 so that investors can predict 'the 
entity’s future cash flows, their timing and certainty’ (lASB, 2003) and be able to 
summarize them in a present market value. But is it right that the share price changes 
with the extent of disclosed information (Bealy et al, 2006) especially in a crisis 
situation when investors make snapshot decisions to hold or sell the share of a 
troubled company?
From the perspective of the company preparing financial statements, when and to 
what extent do insurance companies disclose information about the risks they own in 
the form of structured financial instruments based on mortgage portfolios which have 
been felt to increase the financial distress during the financial crisis that lasted from 
2007 to 2010 (Scharpf and Schaber, 2009)? Previous empirically proven research has
shown that discretionary disclosure - defined as voluntary disclosure that exceeds the 
requirements set by accounting standards (Core, 2001) - reduces cost of capital for the 
disclosing company (Welker, 1995, Sengupta, 1998, Healy et al, 1999, Botosan and 
Plumlee, 2002). However, all these studies used a discontinued US disclosure index 
and were performed under the assumption of normal market conditions such as a 
functional market and rationally acting shareholders. All these assumptions do not 
meet the conditions of the recent financial crisis which has the underlying characteristic 
that fair values of certain mortgage portfolio based financial instruments dropped 
significantly and remained low for more than one financial period of listed companies. 
The drop of fair value in these financial instruments affected the insurance industry, 
which is a pool of investments by its business model, most severely and uniformly 
whereas the effect on banks depended on their degree of activities in the securitization 
of mortgages that differed according to their location and business activities. By 
focusing on the risk disclosure performance of listed European insurance groups this 
research closes a research gap because financial institutions are often excluded from 
disclosure research studies as a result of their specific accounting requirements.
By focusing on a crisis scenario the objective of the research is to eliminate other 
confounding factors that influence the relationship between disclosing companies and 
the capital market reaction expressed in their share market value. This research 
approach will deal with criticism by Healy and Palepu (2001) who hold that relationship 
models between disclosure and capital market are too simple and contain too many 
restrictions and assumptions.
Another way to focus on a crisis situation is current research by Baek et al. (2002) that 
studied how companies disclosed their bad risk and how the capital market reacted in 
the 1997 Korean finance crisis. These researchers found out that Korean firms with 
higher disclosure quality suffered less in their share value during the crisis. The 
research question is whether or not this reaction of the capital market has continued in 
the recent global financial crisis. However Baek et al. (2002) used simple proxies to 
measure disclosure performance. Another objective of this research is to measure the 
disclosure performance with self-administered risk disclosure performance indices that 
can be considered scientific standard as applied by Kajüter and Winkler (2003), 
Bungartz (2003), Vielmeyer (2004) and Khana et al. (2004) instead of proxies.
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Therefore this disclosure research is performed using more specific disclosure 
measurement methods and recognizing better risk disclosure performance by listed 
companies due to the application of a risk-related accounting standard ‘financial 
instruments: disclosure’ IFRS 7, (lASB, 2005).
The recent sub-prime loan crisis offers a unique opportunity to analyse the effect of 
disclosure on investment / divestment decisions that financial market participants make 
during a period of time which is characterized by a uniquely non-transparent risk 
situation of financial companies (Baetge et al., 2008). Baetge et al. (2008) blame the 
spread of a regional crisis to a world-wide crisis on the chosen tentative step-by-step 
disclosure by banks of their financial distress. This lack of transparency leads to a 
world-wide crisis of trust between banks themselves and between banks and investors. 
Although insurance companies had not been directly affected by the sub-prime loan 
crisis, in the aftermath of the crisis they nonetheless had to cope with investors’ 
anxieties and indirect effects on the valuation of their investments as the crisis 
continued. Therefore it is to be examined whether or not risk disclosure during the 
crisis has become a dominant factor that influenced the capital market.
Can companies improve investors' trust in them by voluntarily extending the scope of 
their financial disclosure? Disclosure is regulated by German national and international 
accounting rules for listed companies. Originally only German accounting rules 
required extended corporate information about risks in a separate management report 
but international accounting rules have also adopted this approach recently (Kraft and 
Nolte, 2005). Do German national and international regulations provide a sufficient 
level of disclosure in order to compare risk disclosure of companies from different 
national backgrounds? Are there economic reasons that motivate companies to 
exceed their mandatory disclosure requirements?
When disclosing information about their own risk position insurance companies fear 
that this would be viewed critically by the financial market and their customers, i.e. as a 
sign of weakness in their business model (Meyer et al., 2004). This understanding has 
been influenced for the better or worse by the sub-prime loan crisis. When it peaked 
during 2008 investors were unsure about the extent to which financial institutions were 
involved in that crisis. Without sufficient information about the risk exposure of the 
companies in which they owned shares or about the financial consequences for each
11
company the share market failed to provide fresh capital so that banks and insurance 
companies in need of capital had to first look for sovereign wealth funds instead 
(Anonymous, 2008a) and then for governmental aid that few of them received.
Although the relationship between disclosure and the capital market can be considered 
a mature research field according to Verrecchia (2001) the research objective to 
analyse the empirical effect of disclosure on the share performance of companies has 
rarely been explored due to declining data-bases, changing accounting standards, 
industry-specific regulations and excessive cost or improper computer tools to analyse 
qualitative data in financial statements (Daske and Gebhard, 2006). That is why this 
thesis analyses risk disclosure requirements and searches for incentives to exceed 
them, both for the company as information provider and for the investor as the user. To 
broaden the previous, predominantly economic approach, psychological motivations 
are embedded into this research to explain investor behaviour during times of crisis. 
The novel aspect of this thesis is to apply existing theoretical and empirical studies to 
the recent sub-prime loan crisis situation.
Existing studies of investors’ behaviour in crisis situations are either rare or restricted to 
regional markets (Baek et al, 2002) or certain institutions like US-Banks (Jain and 
Gupta, 1987). This thesis intends to close this research gap of risk disclosure and its 
effects on the capital market by applying different research tools to a sample group of 
listed European insurance companies during the recent market crisis. There are, 
however, a few observations to be made in respect of the scope of this work. Due to 
frequently changing disclosure requirements, this study is restricted to a relatively short 
time period with stable disclosure requirements and it is focused on a special industry 
that has been uniformly affected by the sub-prime loan crisis. These restrictions limit 
the sample size of analyzed companies in order to compare their risk disclosure 
performance with scientific diligence.
The researcher acknowledges the validity of the content and of the measuring 
instruments as defined by Drucker-Godard et al. (2001) in this study. Through various 
sources of literature the variables that influence the risk disclosure behaviour of listed 
European insurance groups and the reaction towards it by the capital market have 
been indentified. The measurement process of the variables has been made 
transparent by disclosing every measuring step in the appendices of this study. The
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results of this research study can be generalized based on the restrictions that only 
listed companies of a certain industry have been analyzed. In regard to the willingness 
of companies to disclose ‘sensitive’ information the insurance industry can be 
considered as a good proxy for companies from other industries because according to 
Meyer et al. (2004) insurance groups fear that disclosure of risks can be judged 
critically by investors and customers as a sign of weakness in their business model. 
This enables the researcher to identify tendencies of management to detain ‘sensitive’ 
information. These traits can be considered by regulators and standard setters in their 
attempt to provide all investors with relevant information.
Another aspect of validity is that predictions based on one research instrument need to 
be confirmed by another. The statistical analysis of data from a limited sample size can 
lead to misleading results that should not be generalized. This problem has been 
addressed in this research study by holding structured interviews with experts in the 
field of the European insurance industry. The intention was to verify statistical results in 
order to improve the research results by the research concept of triangulation. By using 
two methods to analyse the research question the consistency of findings generated 
by the one method is validated by the other one (Patton, 2002).
The overall objective of this thesis is to provide insight into the relationship between 
risk disclosure contained in the annual group financial statements of 2007 and 2008 
within the European insurance industry, their share performance in contrast to an index 
at the peak of the crisis and the effect the financial crisis had on the insurance group 
using their modified equity ratio as a proxy.
This research objective has lead to the following structure in this thesis: The relevance 
of risk disclosure for insurance companies, investors and future accounting standards 
as well as the definition of terms are set out in chapter 2 ‘Relevance and Definitions’. 
Chapter 3 ‘Literature Review’ analyzes the theoretical aspects and empirical studies in 
the literature on the relationship between disclosing insurance companies and the 
capital market. Chapter 4 ‘Hypotheses’ contains the research question and the 
hypotheses that derive from it. The literature review shows that certain aspects should 
be considered in selecting and applying research instruments. Chapter 5 ‘Research 
Methodology’ sets out the research methods used to analyse the relationship. This 
chapter presents the epistemological standpoint of the researcher and assumptions
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made in this thesis. Additionally the quantification of the variables risk disclosure 
performance, the capital market reaction, the effect of the crisis on companies and the 
degree of institutional investors are described. This chapter also explains the use of 
qualitative research methods. In chapter 6 ‘Results and Discussion’ the results of the 
quantitative and qualitative research instruments are presented. Chapter 7 
‘Conclusions and Implications’ sets out the findings, limitations of this thesis and 
includes impulses for disclosing companies, standard setters and regulators as well as 
investors.
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C h a p t e r  2
2. Relevance and Definitions
The purpose of this chapter is to show the relevance of the recent financial crisis for 
the insurance industry by answering the two following questions: What has been the 
key effect of this crisis and why has the insurance industry been affected more than 
other ones by this crisis? The next step analyzes the type of information required by 
investors during a crisis. This is based on influential studies and leads to the definition 
of terms used throughout this thesis. The results of this chapter are used to analyze 
how the effect of the crisis is disclosed in the financial statements in subchapter 3.1.3. 
Based on this the risk disclosure performance of insurance groups is measured in 
subchapter 4.3.1.
According to Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) a crisis is characterized by a major decline in 
economic performance for an extended period of time. The origin of the financial crisis 
that is the topic of this thesis consisted of deferrals of payments in mortgage loans of 
financially weak private individuals in the United States of America during the years 
2007 and 2008 (Scharpf and Schaber, 2009). This led to financial troubles of US 
mortgage financial institutes. Also affecting other US-banks the crisis extended to the 
share market. The US share market lost wealth of about $8 trillion between October 
2007, when the share market reached an all-time high, and October 2008 
(Brunnermeier, 2009).
Thus, the key effect of this crisis has been a sudden decline of the fair values of 
investments that lasted longer than one financial period. Falling prices of bank shares 
and other equity investments increased the risk of insurance companies as significant 
institutional investors. According to Scharpf and Schaber (2009) investments that were 
first and most directly hit were Asset Backed Securities (ABS), Commercial Mortgage 
Backed Securities (CMBS), Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS) and 
Collateral Debt Obligations (CDO) and other financial instruments directly connected to 
the falling US-housing market. Corporate as well as sovereign bonds were hit indirectly 
by their lower fair value. Lower market prices of investments lead to immediate losses 
in the profit and loss statements as well as reduced equity positions in the balance 
sheets of listed European insurance groups depending on their categorization of
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investments according to the international accounting standard IAS 39. The default of 
bond issuers hit listed European insurance groups because they are required by 
national regulations to hold a part of their investment portfolio in corporate and 
governmental bonds. This situation is characterized as credit risk. ‘Default’ is 
recognized in the financial statements as a loss that is subtracted from equity in the 
same financial period. Additionally markets for certain financial products did not 
function any more so they were unable to value structured financial instruments any 
more (Brunnermeier, 2009). The nature of these instruments and the insecurity about 
their price or about the assumptions that were made in order to calculate their fair 
value by using mathematical models spread the crisis globally and affected the global 
economy.
Why is this financial crisis particularly relevant for the Insurance industry? Insurance 
companies are unique because the handling of risk over a long period of time is the 
main economic purpose of this industry. It shares risks like investment risks with other 
financial institutions, however the distinctive criterion of the industry is covering 
insurance related risk and matching it with investment risk (GroRer, 2001). In order to 
provide insurance coverage insurance companies manage the premiums they receive 
from customers and the claims for which they have to indemnify their customers by 
matching the timing and level of cash inflows from premiums and the cash outflows 
from claim events (Rejda, 1998). They invest cash inflows deriving from insurance 
premiums in short and predominantly long term financial instruments. After the 
occurrence of claims based on an insured event these investments are sold to create 
cash outflows available to settle the claim of the insurance customers. Because most 
likely there is an extended time period between the cash inflow of insurance premiums 
and the cash outflow to settle claims, insurance companies are pools of capital 
investments (Farny, 2000).
The following subchapters link the effects of the crisis such as a prolonged decline in 
the fair value of investments, insecurity about measurement of these investments and 
the future development of companies to the insurance industry. Subchapter 2.1. 
describes three characteristics of insurance companies in order to answer the question 
why the insurance industry has been affected by the crisis. Subchapter 2.2. analyses 
what kind of risk information is important to investors during a crisis situation.
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Subchapter 2.3. distinguishes certain terms used throughout the thesis and puts this 
research in a wider perspective of upcoming accounting regulations that are regarded 
as a paradigm change in the European insurance industry.
2.1. Insurance companies and the financial crisis
According to Schmalenbach (1953) accounting pursues the aim of an income 
calculation on an accrual basis that recognises the financial period to which economic 
effects belong over the timing of payments. Another objective is to present all assets 
and liabilities at a certain point of time to provide a true and fair view on the economical 
situation of the company (Cropper et al, 1949). To accomplish both objectives 
accounting regulations on the recognition, measurement and disclosure of economic 
circumstances were adopted. Especially the measurement and disclosure as part of 
insurance companies' accounting has been influenced by the crisis which is 
characterized by a sudden decline of the fair values of investments.
Insurance companies share the following three characteristics that derive from their 
business model, that are considered in their accounting and that are linked to the 
financial crisis: They are pools of capital investments, they are guarantors of financial 
performance and they have a long term orientation in their business activities.
Starting with the first characteristic the primary focus in the accounting of insurance 
companies are investments that are funded by premiums paid Insurance customers. 
They are bought, measured over the period during which they are owned by the 
insurance company and then sold to provide the necessary cash flow to settle 
insurance claims. The measurement of investments can be either prudent or 
economically focused. Accounting requirements differ in their way to measure 
investments. To demonstrate these differences the thesis lists German and 
international accounting requirements. Whereas for example German national 
accounting regulations allow the valuation at historical cost even when the market 
value of investments increases above their costs according to § 253 and § 255 
German Commercial Code (HGB), international accounting regulations such as 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) prefer that market related increases 
be shown either in the profit and loss accounts or in equity according to IAS 39 par. 46. 
These preferences are documented by the restrictions that are attached to other
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categories for investments with differing valuations. In the opposite case of falling 
market prices national German accounting regulations tend to disclose lower prices 
than historical cost of investments only when the fall in fair values is prolonged 
according to § 253 (2) HGB. International accounting regulations on the other hand are 
faster in writing down the book value of investments to their lower market value (IAS 39 
par. 58).
The risk of a lower book value of investments is epitomized in the market value. The 
market value measurement of investments has a significant impact on the accounting 
of insurance companies. The extent of the impact differs because it can affect yearly 
results as being part of the measuring aspect of accounting or only be a supplemental 
information without earning effects being a disclosure aspect of accounting. This 
accounting treatment differs by German national and international regulations. 
Whereas national German regulations refer to historical costs and present fair market 
values in the notes international accounting regulations such as IAS 32 par. 11 and 
IAS 39 par. 9 refer to the market value with effects on the annual results.
Therefore, the market value of investments can be part of the measurement process of 
assets in the balance sheet or it can be an additional disclosure outside the balance 
sheet and without effects on equity or profit and loss account. Confusingly, both 
accounting ways are named fair value accounting in the literature (Bariev and Haddad, 
2003, p. 387). It is therefore important to distinguish between fair value accounting with 
effects on equity and profit and loss accounts and accounting without them. Therefore, 
this thesis presents special definitions in chapter 2.3.
The measurement of the market value of investments is the responsibility of the 
company, and it can differ according to methods chosen and assumptions made by the 
insurance companies. One assumption made by the standard setters in requiring the 
measurement of assets with their fair market value has been the existence of a 
functioning market that could provide a price at any given point of time for every asset. 
Thus, the risk of incoherent market value measuring increases during a crisis situation 
when companies tend to change their assumptions, be it as part of a change in 
accounting policies or due to the lack of functioning markets and the resulting lack of 
prices provided. This phenomenon of changing assumptions has arisen during the
18
financial crisis. It caused the lASB as an accounting standard setter to publish 
guidance on this topic at the height of the financial crisis (lASB, 2009a).
Aside from market valuation of investments also obligations which insurance 
companies have against their customers can be measured at market value. Although 
these obligations are not traded on active markets so far, their market value can be 
calculated based on mathematical models. This is the idea of an ongoing discussion 
about the accounting of insurance contracts which will be discussed in chapter 2.3.
The second characteristic of insurance companies is their guarantor status. E.g., in life 
insurance contracts companies guarantee future death or surrender benefits to their 
customers. These amounts are calculated based on the assumption of a certain 
investment rate that can be met by the average return on investments of the life 
insurance company. As a guarantee this interest rate is locked in as part of the life 
insurance contract. The life insurance company recognize as a guarantee provided 
and records it as a liability for future policy benefits (Mayr, 1999). If insurance groups 
with such guarantees are confronted with lower investment Income they have to fund 
the difference between higher guarantees and lower generated investment income 
with their own money by lowering their equity ratio. These guarantees - common 
especially in German life insurance contracts - amplify the crisis effect on the equity 
ratio for these insurance groups even more. In a financial crisis these guarantees add 
financial stress to insurance companies because the guarantees are steady expenses 
that are not compensated by fluctuating investment income. The investment income 
decreases because of depreciation and impairments on investments due to their lower 
fair market values that reduce income of the period. Also, investments are harder to 
sell during a crisis so that higher expenses cannot easily be compensated by gains 
that are realized by their sale. This leads to liquidity problems of Insurance companies 
and requires them to use their equity to compensate for the expenses deriving from 
financial guarantees. With a prolonged reduction of equity in a crisis the companies 
can face insolvency.
The third characteristic of insurance companies is their long term orientation. They can 
be held liable for claims from their insured customers even after years. That 
responsibility affects their financial strategy and their time preference in choosing 
investments (Farny, 2000). An accounting implication of this characteristic is that future 
risks are recognized in the accounting for investments of insurance companies as a
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discounted receivable amount. This time-based measurement is an accounting 
treatment that can be influenced by a financial crisis. The long-term perspective 
exaggerates negative effects on the present value measurement because the 
assumptions that are implied in the fair value of long term investments are based on 
recent financial conditions. Therefore in a crisis situation the fair value of long term 
investments decreases more rapidly than short term investments.
Insurance companies are characterized by their investments measured at market 
value, a guaranteed return of life insurance contracts and their future long term 
orientation. As a result the insurance industry is more sensitive to a rapid decline in the 
market value of investments during crisis situations than other industries. The next 
chapter presents three approaches to find out what kind of information is relevant to 
investors during a crisis situation.
2.2. Investors and the financial crisis
The risk situation of insurance companies has been significantly changed by the 
financial crisis with its sudden decline of fair values of investments. This change had to 
be recognized in their financial reporting because due to its characteristics the risk 
position of insurance companies worsens with a prolonged decline in investment value.
What kind of information is demanded by investors during a crisis situation? Three 
approaches can be used to answer these questions:
A regulatory approach analyzes how regulations are altered in response to the credit 
crisis. Such changes indicate what information has not been disclosed by the 
companies. New regulations demonstrate what information were relevant and required 
as the crisis continued.
The long term investor approach searches for types and formats of information that are 
relevant for investors. This approach is based on influential surveys among investors 
that identified perpetual risk information requirements of financial market participants. 
The situational approach seeks to find situational information that is required by 
investors. This thesis tries to find key words from media that provide this type of 
information and are relevant and special to the crisis from an investor point of view.
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The regulatory approach has to focus on international regulations because of their 
flexibility. Unlike German national regulations that have not been altered international 
regulations changed as a reaction to the credit crisis in March 2009 with the 
amendment of IFRS 7 and in May 2009 with the standardization of fair value 
measurement (lASB, 2009a and lASB, 2009b). The amendments required additional 
disclosure of companies about their methods of measuring risk and explicit statements 
about the group's liquidity risk. Such additional information had to be disclosed since 
2008 in the notes of consolidated financial statements. These corporate specific data 
can be considered important for investors because they were additionally required by 
regulators in the financial crisis.
Although these data were situational influential studies by AI CPA (1994) and by 
EFRAG (2009) document that the information requirements of investors are almost 
constant over time. This long term investor approach is based on the assumption that 
information demand increases in importance to investors during crisis situations.
The AI CPA study - later in literature named the Jenkins Report - resulted in 
recommendations to improve US business reporting. It is based on a survey that 
collected the opinions of investors and creditors as primary users of financial 
statements. The users recommend to disclose financial and non-financial measures to 
explain long term developments of companies and rapidly changing situations. As a 
result of these studies it became apparent that users have a high interest in being able 
to identify trends, the substance of transactions and the significance of risks. This risk 
information demand can be seen as a prerequisite for active investors. Provided with 
relevant situational risk information they want to be enabled to make investment or 
divestment decisions in the financial market. As a result they demand risk disclosure 
on uncertainties over the valuation of assets and the economic substance of complex 
capital instruments (Elliott, 2007).
The EFRAG study (2009) is based on a survey of investors, creditors and financial 
analysts. Whereas the Jenkins report was restricted to the USA this study covered a 
sample of European countries. The survey was carried out at the end of 2006 before 
the recent financial crisis. The assumptions of the Jenkins report that investors and 
creditors use risk information in financial statements to make their ‘hold/buy/seir 
decisions have been empirically confirmed by the EFRAG study. Similar to the Jenkins 
report the surveyed user groups of the EFRAG study want more risk information about
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risk management and additional prospective financial information. Empirical support for 
this demand was provided by another corporate reporting survey conducted in 2007 
(PwC, 2007); this survey specifies that investors request risk information about the 
future economic perspective of a company in respect to management forecasts. Along 
with this forecast the PwC survey found out that users of financial statements demand 
risk information about the current investment risk associated with the type and the 
valuation of investments. Summarizing the long term investor approach it can be 
empirically supported that investors demand for certain types of risk information is 
constant and increases during a crisis. The relevant risk information concerns 
prospective developments of the fair value of financial instruments that companies are 
invested in.
The risk situation of every company is different. How can this thesis compare the risk 
disclosure among financial statements issued by various listed insurance companies? 
The situational research approach that analyzes a group of companies must focus on 
risks that are common to all companies. Research by Chen (2007) supports this 
approach by using bank reports to provide key words that are associated with 
investment risk. Using this approach risk information from different companies can be 
compared and analyzed in regard to the frequency of these keywords. This approach 
is supported by findings of Coval et al. (2009) on the recent financial crisis. They found 
out that structured financial products which are the heart of the financial crisis are 
affected by systematic risk factors to an exceptional degree. They found out that risk 
information in the form of corporate explanations on systematic risk factors are 
extensive in financial statements and connected to key words. The situational 
approach states that risk information of companies with the same risk position is similar 
by containing common key words. This characteristic can be used in the research 
methodology to identify and compare risk information.
Based on the aforementioned approaches there is a shared understanding that risk 
information does matter to investors. The information should cover trends and other 
up-to-date developments to companies and the risk that is associated with them. This 
demand can be specified to the recent crisis situation. Risk that derives from certain 
type of financial instruments and the effect of a sharp drop in the fair value of these 
instruments are relevant to investors. This risk has an effect on the valuation of assets
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and liabilities in financial statements. Additionally this effect must be described in the 
notes of consolidated financial statements that are analysed in this thesis. The 
accounting effect occurs because no prices for certain financial instruments were 
provided by the financial markets. To substitute the prices companies relied on 
mathematical models for the valuation of their investments. Consequently investors 
need to be aware of the risk that the valuation of investments might affect the financial 
results of the insurance companies, Coval et al. (2009) point out a characteristic of the 
recent financial crisis that a small error in the assumptions to measure structured 
financial instruments can lead to a great misinterpretation of their probability of default. 
According to IAS 1 par. 118 (lASB, 2003) ‘it is important for an entity to inform users of 
the measurement basis or bases used in the financial statements because the basis 
on which an entity prepares the financial statements significantly affects users 
analysis’. Therefore, the measurement assumptions of financial instruments are 
important factors that need to be disclosed to investors in order to enable them to 
evaluate the likelihood of a decrease of the investments’ fair value and the value of the 
company.
2.3. Relevance of risk disclosure for future accounting 
standards
This subchapter defines risk disclosure specific to the crisis situation analyzed in this 
thesis. The relevance of risk disclosure in the context of upcoming International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) is demonstrated.
In the accounting literature there is no definition of crisis that relates to the overall 
economic situation. From an accounting point of view a crisis is specific to the 
individual situation of the company and the resulting risk situation is defined by Rejda 
(1998) as a significant deviation from the expected outcome of a prediction. Risk 
therefore has a company-specific aspect because expectations vary from company to 
company. To broaden this definition and to ensure a comparability of risk disclosure by 
companies an extended risk understanding needs to be considered than that one of 
accounting rules. This includes risk information that is required and that companies 
provide voluntarily in excess of rules. In order to be comparable risk disclosure can
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only be analyzed from companies within the same industry, with similar business 
interests and a comparable business structure.
In the following the relevance of empirically researched risk disclosure for the 
implementation of future accounting standards is described. To distinguish between 
risk disclosure as the research subject and risk accounting as a subject of future 
regulation by international accounting standard setters these terms are subdivided by 
following definition:
Risk disclosure in this research study is defined as all information disclosed by 
insurance companies, whether required by German national or international 
regulations or voluntarily disclosed, that reveal the financial situation of investments 
and their measuring process as well as the future view on corporate positions of risk 
and chances. Risk disclosure takes place predominantly in a qualitative form. When 
quantitative risk is disclosed it does not have to affect the balance sheet or the income 
statement in order to meet this definition. The definition of risk disclosure for the 
purpose of this thesis differs from the one by Vielmeyer (2003). His general definition 
of risk disclosure based on required accounting information should be extended and 
specified in so far as risk disclosure contains risk information that companies give 
above the required level as well, and it should include information that is specific to the 
changing risk situations of a financial crisis situation.
Risk accounting can be defined as all information disclosed by insurance companies, 
required or discussed by German national or international regulators, that reveal a 
historic, actual or future view on corporate positions of risks and opportunities. This 
definition meets market valuation of balance sheet items, quantitative as well as verbal 
explanations on certain types of risk in management reports and business forecasts 
embedded in financial statements. Risk accounting includes the aspect of valuation of 
obligations arising out of insurance contracts that is discussed in upcoming 
international regulations on insurance contracts (IFRS 4 Phase II). Risk accounting 
therefore has an effect on the income statement and on the balance sheet. A subpart 
of risk accounting is fair value accounting. It includes the market valuation of 
investments and obligations with effects on equity and profit and loss accounts 
according to Penman (2007) as an one line risk indicator. However, it is not required by
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today’s accounting standards but included in standards that are to be applied in the 
future.
Results of this thesis might be useful to support companies that extend the disclosure 
of their risk positions because it may be rewarded by the capital market. Such 
voluntary risk disclosure might convince standard setters to pursue fair value 
accounting as an one line risk indicator (Penman, 2007) which results in higher 
transparency on risk instead of historic cost accounting that hides the effects of risk.
Can existing research studies help to predict how the disclosure of additional risk 
information, as required by fair value accounting, affects listed companies? A study by 
Pape and Schlecker (2009) analyzed the effect of a crisis situation on credit default 
rates as an insolvency proxy depending on the accounting regime of the companies. 
Based on a 1998 crisis it found out that companies with fair value accounting are not 
considered to have a higher possibility of insolvency, although they disclose risk 
information to a higher extent than companies following historic cost accounting. 
Empirical research by Chamberlain and Magliolo (1996) supports this idea by finding 
out that fair value accounting and the accompanying disclosure of risk does not 
negatively affect share prices of insurance companies. Although no positive causal 
relationship between the form of accounting and the companies’ capital market 
performance could be found by Chamberlain and Magliolo (1996) the statement by the 
FASB (2001) that the importance of disclosure is expected to increase in a changing 
business environment affected by the credit crisis is a starting point of this thesis.
The result of this chapter 2 is as follows: Due to its characteristics the insurance 
industry as a pool of investments and a guarantee provider with a long term investment 
horizon is especially sensitive to changes in the fair value of investments that are at the 
heart of the researched financial crisis. Investors in insurance companies demand risk 
information that can be compared between companies. Therefore, risk information 
required by German national and international accounting standards as well as 
voluntarily extended by insurance companies are recognized and measured in this 
thesis. The results of this thesis on the disclosure of sensitive risk disclosure can be 
used to predict behaviour of insurance companies in their future application of full fair
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value accounting. They can provide clues for regulators about how to spread sensitive 
risk information that is relevant to investors in a crisis situation.
The following literature review analyses theoretical and empirical studies on the 
communication and relationship between companies and the capital market. It thereby 
demonstrates different ways to measure corporate risk disclosure in order to find 
implications for the research methodology.
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C h a p t e r  3
3. Literature Review
This research analyses how companies disclose information. This is done because 
Lenz and Diehm (2010) state the prognostic value assumption that investors can 
predict the financial effect a crisis has on a company based on its risk disclosure.
There is a consensus in management literature how companies in crisis situations 
should act concerning disclosure. They should provide accurate information as quickly 
as possible to stakeholders according to Dillenschneider and Hyde (1985) as well as 
Sellnow and Ulmer (1995). Such disclosure behaviour of companies increases the 
credibility of organizations (Williams and Dolnik, 2001). Empirical research by Arpan 
and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2005) shows that the credibility of an organisation influences 
the behaviour of people that receive negative information about the company during a 
crisis situation. In such a crisis situation an organization shall therefore “break the 
news about its own crisis before it is discovered by the media” or investors (Arpan and 
Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005, p. 425).
According to this thesis insurance groups should have disclosed every risk associated 
with their financial instruments that are based on mortgage portfolios already at the 
beginning of the financial crisis in 2007. They should have used every possibility to 
include new risk related information in their group financial statements 2008 as 
knowledge about the extent and its effect on each insurance group evolved.
The reason to research risk disclosure in crisis situations is the ongoing discussion 
about fair value accounting in the insurance industry as a requirement to disclose 
sensitive information in financial statements. The fair market value of insurance assets 
and insurance obligations would disclose a true and fair view on the financial strength 
of the insurance company at year or quarterly end. Such disclosure would reveal 
operational and financial risk by fair value measurement and would empower investors 
to consider this risk in their investment/divestment decisions. However, since fair value 
measurement has only been partially implemented and might be fully applied only in 
future international accounting regulations, the capital market effects of other forms of
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risk disclosure -  in this thesis risk disclosure about mortgage portfolio based financial 
instruments during a crisis - are analyzed in the following literature review.
Disclosure research can be subdivided in theoretical and empirical studies. Both types 
of studies have been undertaken to describe the quality of disclosure (AlCPA, 1994 
and PWC, 2006), to measure and compare it (Armeloh, 1998 and Vielmeyer, 2003) 
and to create and verify economic models that assume a relationship between 
disclosure of companies and the capital market reaction (Verrecchia, 1998, Botosan, 
1997, 2002 and Sengupta, 1998). It has to be acknowledged that literature agrees to 
the statement that the capital market is affected by multiple factors and not only by the 
publication of financial statements and other reports. Researchers critizise that single 
researchers expect too much from disclosure to explain capital market reactions 
(Dobler, 2008) and that models used to explain this relationship are too simple with too 
many restrictions and assumptions (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
This is recognized in the following literature review. This part of the thesis focuses on 
exploring cause and effects between risk disclosure and capital market reactions and 
thus to improve the research design. Based on the definition that accounting is a social 
system that consists of norms and determinants of behaviour (Harrison and McKinnon, 
1986) the influencing factors of this relationship are analyzed as proven significant and 
later included as variables in the research design.
As the research objective is to find and define the relationship between disclosure and 
the behaviour of capital market participants and analyse it during a time of market 
distress, the literature is classified in a way that clarifies the interdependencies 
between regulations, companies and investors. This structure is recommended for 
research on causal analysis (Mbengue, Vandangeion-Derumez, 1999) and has been 
used in one of the leading research contributions to the topic by Vielmeyer (2004). It is 
a three step structure that has been introduced by Verrecchia (2001) and adapted to 
the research topic of company's disclosure. This given structure is extended by one 
additional step, because in a crisis situation additional factors influence the behaviour 
of the capital market participants that are not recognized in the study of Verrecchia
(2001). These factors have not been coherently analyzed in previous disclosure 
research because they assumed a constant economic environment instead of a crisis
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situation. In this additional step the psychological and economic theories about the 
behaviour of capital market participants are analyzed. As a result of this extension the 
literature review is subdivided into four steps:
In a first step the theoretical explanations of communication between companies and 
the capital market that build the relationship between them are described. Followed by 
a review of empirical studies on this topic a distinction is made between required and 
voluntary risk disclosure (Core, 2001, p. 443). In addition literature on corporate 
disclosure measurement and attempts to specify it to situational risk instances are 
documented in chapter 3.1.
In a second step the incentives for the company to disclose information are analyzed. 
Why do companies invest in the cost of better disclosure and have managers and their 
companies a common motivation to disclose information? Theoretical and empirical 
studies on these aspects are analyzed in chapter 3.2.
Why do financial market participants demand disclosure is the third step and how does 
this demand alter in times is the forth -  additional -  step both described in chapter 3.3. 
The behaviour of financial market participants can be explained with economic models 
that assume a rational investor. This assumption is critical during a market crisis 
situation. A more adequate way to explain the behaviour of market participants is to 
take psychological aspects of behaviour into account. In substitution or combination 
with rationality it can be assumed that investors are influenced by two opposing 
emotional factors in their financial decisions under such circumstances. With trust 
through timely and extended risk disclosure companies can build up a reputation that 
might lead the investor to hold on to its shares during distress in the market (Vater et 
al, 2008, p. 2606). The opposite psychological factor of trust is fear that might induce 
investors to be influenced by the behaviour of other investors, who sell their shares. 
This effect caused by opinion leaders like analysts might lead to a mass flight out of 
shares, a reaction undesired by the disclosing company. This crisis specific adaption of 
the general approach by Verrecchia (2001) is specific to this thesis.
As a result of the literature review the research design should be predetermined with 
the unit of analysis, all relevant variables that affect investment / divestment behaviour
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of capital market participants and that affect the risk disclosure of listed insurance 
companies and the measuring procedures of the variables. As far as the information 
being relevant, measurable, publicly available and adjusted to the recent crisis 
situation they are included in this thesis and described in chapter 5 “Research 
Methodology”.
3.1. Communication between companies and the capital 
market
This chapter analyzes the communication between companies and the capital market. 
Theoretical approaches in chapter 3.1.1. and empirical research studies in 3.1.2. are 
structured in order to analyse how they can be used to specify the research design.
In order to analyse to what extent companies can exceed the expectations of the 
capital market with their disclosure it must be known what level of disclosure is 
required by regulations. After analysing the legal accounting requirements on German 
national and international level it is examined how insurance companies can fulfil or 
exceed these requirements in chapter 3.1.3. These steps are prerequisites to 
determine the group of analysis which can be defined as insurance companies that are 
similar enough to be compared in this thesis.
Subchapter 3.1.4. examines how risk disclosure that occurs in different forms like 
earning announcements, or forecasts and in different parts of the financial statements 
can be confined to this crisis situation.
3.1.1. Theories on communication
According to Healy and Palepu (2001) a relationship exists between investors and 
disclosing companies. How this relationship functions and what cause and effect 
models can be drawn from it is in the centre of disclosure theory. To analyse causal 
relationships researchers focus on the addressee of disclosure information and on the 
disclosing companies. They disregard standard setters who stipulate form and content 
of the communication (Vielmeyer, 2004). This is considered as the influence of 
standard setters in changing accounting standards in chapter 3.1.2.
30
Disclosure theory intends to explain and predict accounting practice. The structure to 
solve this task is universal, the theoretical underpinning differs and the conclusion 
about the application of these theories in research is surprising.
Theories try to explain the overall relationship (Watts and Zimmermann, 1978 and 
1986) (Blackwell and Girshik, 1954) whereas empirical studies focus on certain 
decisions investors or companies can make within that relationship. Nevertheless, the 
predictive power of theories is restricted due to the variety of assumptions and 
restrictions connected to them. The general idea is that additional disclosure is 
appreciated by investors based on the assumption that every additional information 
can be analyzed and integrated in the decision making process of the investor 
(Blackwell and Girshik, 1954). Lenz and Diehm (2010) specify this theory to crisis 
situation. They state that crisis relevant information disclosed by companies helps the 
investor to predict the effect such crisis has on the fair value of the company he is 
invested in. This theory is summarized as the prognostic value assumption. Another 
significant assumption of all theoretical models is that every communication between 
investor and company is based on contractual forms of relationship and therefore 
regulated (Watts and Zimmermann, 1978, 1986). But this does not hold true to crisis 
situations with information demands of investors changing on a daily basis and 
companies using other, often unregulated forms to communicate to them.
Thus, the conclusion by Vielmeyer (2004) can be supported that the question whether 
or not additional disclosure is beneficial for investors cannot be conclusively answered 
and should be tested empirically. Such empirical research might provide useful insights 
and allow crisis related adaptations of the research methodology.
3.1.2. Empirical research on communication
Empirical studies on disclosure research vary in their focus. They explain the 
regulatory situation as well as predict and empirically verify behaviour of investors or 
companies vis-à-vis various aspects of accounting and risk. Therefore, the focus of this 
research study is on empirical research that covers capital market reactions to 
regulatory changes as well as on empirical research between the communication of 
companies and capital market reaction towards it.
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Various empirical studies analyse capital market reaction to changes in accounting 
rules. Studies by Gonedes and Dopuch (1974), Leftwich (1981), Barth (1994) and 
Barth et al. (1992) tried to forecast share market performance of companies which are 
affected by regulations that require fair value measurement of assets to different 
degrees. Their results can be summarized that no share price reaction takes place 
unless the adoption of new accounting regulations cause a change in real cash flow. 
Other studies by Barth (1994) and Cornett et al. (1996) contradict these findings when 
researching the share market effect of US-Banks that were required to disclose 
additional fair value information in their financial statements. They found out that 
upcoming regulations that require additional disclosure on fair value and risk 
connected to financial instruments have statistically significant effects on the banks' 
share performance.
Thus upcoming accounting requirements shall be eliminated as an irritating factor from 
the research design. Therefore this research study shall only be performed during a 
period of time when accounting regulations did not change in regard to financial 
instruments such as during the period from January 2007 to March 2008.
Empirical studies on the communication between companies and the capital market 
can be distinguished according to their research method in three categories (Armeloh, 
1998), i.e. descriptive, comparative and marked related studies.
The first category of empirical research is descriptive. Studies that describe what kind 
of information investors demand (AlCPA, 1994, PwC, 2007 and EFRAG 2009) or what 
information companies provide after certain regulations have been changed are 
performed by auditing companies (PwC 2006 and Ernst & Young 2009) or academics 
(Freiling and Wehrle, 2008 and Kruger et al. 2008). In respect to risk disclosure these 
studies explore to what degree new international accounting regulations such as IFRS 
4 and IFRS 7 are applied by listed companies.
Empirical studies that measure and compare disclosure are in the second category. 
Central to these studies is the necessity of an indexation that enables researchers to 
measure and compare the disclosure performance of companies. Most of these 
studies apply indices that are based on classes specified in accounting regulations.
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These classes are weighted and integrated in an index. This index is applied to 
measure disclosure and summarizes the results in a single number that is then used to 
rank companies according to their disclosure performance.
The way the disclosure classes are weighted can be used to distinguish these 
empirical studies of the second category. Empirical studies on risk disclosure 
predominantly use indices that are based on subjectively weighted criteria (Bungart, 
2003, Kraft and Nolte, 2005, Kirchhoff, 2007). Only two empirical disclosure studies by 
Armeloh (1998) and Vielmeyer (2004) are based on objectively weighted indices. In 
order to achieve it these two researchers collected the preference of users of financial 
statements about the decision usefulness of disclosure classes via surveys. This 
required quantitative research using questionnaires that were sent to analysts, auditors 
(Armeloh, 1998) and additionally to preparers of financial statements (Vielmeyer, 2004) 
in the process of their individual research projects. A sub-group of these empirical 
studies uses disclosure indices with objectively weighted classes provided by 
institutions. An index by AIMR frequently used in the literature until it has been 
discontinued was a ready available disclosure index with a country focus on USA. The 
advantage of this disclosure index has been that it was easy to use for statistical 
correlations with variables the represent capital market reaction such as cost of capital 
(Sengupta, 1998) or credit default swaps (Healy et al, 1999).
The third category of empirical research studies extends the measurement of 
disclosure quality and analyzes its effect on the financial market. Whereas empirical 
studies of the second category are predominantly work of German researchers caused 
by the lack of ready to use indices by institutions such as AIMR in the USA empirical 
studies on the market effects of disclosure are performed by American researchers in 
particular. Studies of the third category use the widely published but discontinued index 
by AIMR which is objectively weightend (Welker, 1995, Healy et al, 1999, Sengupta, 
1998) and in more recent empirical studies subjectively weightend indices (Botosan, 
1997, 2002), (Bloomfield and Wills 2000).
After the categorization of empirical research studies two aspects turn out to be 
followed on in order to compare risk disclosure performance in this thesis. The 
disclosure regulations that are crisis relevant must be described in the first category.
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This is done in chapter 4.3.2. to create risk disclosure criteria. The other prerequisite 
for further empirical research is to measure and compare risk disclosure performance. 
To apply it is a major difficulty and a limitation to research studies in this research field 
according to Healy and Palepu (2001). Two methods have been used in empirical 
research studies to measure financial transparency: External indices and self 
administered indices.
External indices have been created by financial analysts or rating agencies. US-based 
research by Sengupta (1998), Lang and Lundholm (1996) and Zarowin and Gelb
(2002) used the published disclosure quality index of the Financial Analysts Federation 
(FAF), a branch of the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) 
later renamed CFA-lnstitute. However AIMR discontinued its disclosure ranking in 
1997, after ranking fiscal year 1995 (Core, 2001). No replacement of this US-oriented 
external disclosure index is in sight. Even a recent study by Shaw (2003) relies on 
these historic data, using FAF disclosure quality scores of the years 1985 -  1989. The 
Standard & Poor's Transparency and Disclosure study United States (S&P, 2002) 
used to analyze companies from Asia-Pacific and Europe by Khanna et al. (2004) was 
not continued after being published for the first time. The index of the Center for 
International Financial Analysis Research (ClFAR) has been used by Hope (2003) but 
has been discontinued as well. Faced with the lack of external indices Hussainey et al.
(2003) suggest a self constructed index approach for future researchers in lack of 
AIMR data for further studies.
Self administered indices are developed by the researcher and requires to weight and 
integrate the disclosure criteria. In order to operationalize these type of indices they are 
processed into a check-list that is applied to analyse and compare published financial 
statements. Yet to apply these auditor type check-lists to individual financial 
statements is labour-intensive so that annual transparencies studies have been either 
discontinued (Daske and Gebhardt, 2006), or applied only to small samples (Core, 
2001).
Self administered indices of overall disclosure performance have been used by 
Botosan (1997), Armeloh (1998) and Miller (2002). Armeloh (1998) presents an 
extended and widely followed approach to create such a self administered overall
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disclosure performance index for German companies. Based on the opinion of auditors 
and analysts he developed a disclosure check-list which he used to evaluate the 
qualitative information disclosed in management reports of German companies 
included in the national share index, Deutscher Aktien Index (DAX) during the 1995 
fiscal year. But the content of that past index cannot be used today because 
accounting requirements have significantly changed from German national to 
international accounting standards for listed companies in Germany within a decade.
His research work is the basis of the only external disclosure index published over last 
two decades and still continued in Germany. The German periodical “manager- 
magazin” has sponsored the work of 40 researchers who annually evaluate qualitative 
data in the financial statements of DAX-and MDAX listed companies using a check-list 
approach since 1994 (Dôhle, Manager Magazin 2004, 2005, 2006..). The check-lists 
that are used by these researchers are published ahead of their annual examination 
process. The check-list is adapted to several industries every year, including the 
insurance industry. An alternative academic approach to administer a disclosure index 
by the German periodical “Focus-Money” was discontinued in 2004 (Daske and 
Gebhardt, 2006).
Self administered indices that focus on risk disclosure have been applied by KajCiter 
(2001), KajOter and Winkler (2003), Bungartz (2003), Vielmeyer (2004), KajUter and 
Winkler (2004), GleiRner et al. (2005), Berger and GleiUner (2007) in studies that focus 
on risk disclosure in Germany and Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) as 
well as Khana et al. (2004) in international studies. Although such a variety of studies 
exists only recent studies by Kraft and Nolte (2005), Freiling and Wehrle (2008) as well 
as Filipiuk (2008) include or focus on the risk disclosure of insurance companies.
Due to the lack of self-evident criteria to categorize risk disclosure and no dominant 
qualitative studies to weighten risk disclosure categories researchers suggest a check 
list that leads to an index. Luo et al. (2006) suggest to include criteria by auditors and 
review relevant literature to include those in the check list in addition to the legal 
requirements. Clustering these criteria in risk disclosure classes will result in a self 
constructed index. Hussainey et al. (2003) suggest to use key words from analysts 
reports in order to find categories of risk disclosure quality in self administered indices.
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Lacking research to weighten risk disclosure criteria subjective ways are needed to fill 
this gap.
This, nevertheless, would induce bias. To reduce bias Cheng and Courtenay (2006) 
recommend statistical calculations to test self constructed indices for internal 
consistency. This could be performed by comparing the results of self administered 
indices with external indices or alternatively by the verification of subjective 
assumptions by external experts. The most promising attempt to create risk disclosure 
criteria is suggested by Kotzle and Grünung (2009) who consider risk disclosure as a 
response to external regulatory pressure and market incentives. They suggest to 
discuss risk disclosure performance on the basis of regulations.
Empirical research on how companies actually comply with legal regulations are 
subdivided according to two time periods. Before 2006 only listed German companies 
were required by German national regulations to disclose risk related data. After 2006 
the introduction of an international accounting standard (IFRS 7) and its uniform 
application since 2007 made the requirements uniformly applicable to European listed 
companies and therefore enlarged their risk disclosure.
Research on disclosure in financial statements before 2006 became standardized with 
the research by Armeloh (1998). Although this research study was neither insurance 
specific nor focused on risk disclosure it became the standard on how disclosure 
quality should be measured in the future. However this standard could not be applied 
directly to risk disclosure. The first risk disclosure related empirical study by Bungartz
(2003) created one self administered index that included corporate governance 
information that Bungartz applied in his empirical work. His work is critizised by Dobler
(2004) for insufficiently explaining his subjectiviy weighted criteria that were integrated 
in the index.
Vielmeyer (2004) improved the methodological approach and created “RDScores” (risk 
disclosure scores) to rate individual risk disclosure performance. Vielmeyer defines risk 
disclosure criteria according to the requirements of the German accounting regulation 
GRS 5-20 that set the risk disclosure of German insurance companies in the time 
before 2006. He weighted these criteria on the opinions of analysts, auditors and
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preparers In order to achieve objectively weightend criteria. Similarities to “Dscores” by 
Botosan (1997) and Botosan and Plumlee (2002) as scoring modules that include a 
longitudinal research approach on risk disclosure based on a ten year historical 
performance review, forecasted infos and management report information provided in 
the annual reports of companies. But the resulting risk disclosure index was based only 
on companies from the machine-manufacturing industry (Vielmeyer, 2003). 
Vielmeyer's research influenced further work on risk disclosure in Germany by Kajüter 
and Winkler (2003) and was applied to the German insurance industry by Kraft and 
Nolte (2005). The later empirical studies of this period show weaknesses of measuring 
disclosure performance using rather simple criteria such as the number number of key­
words or pages of the risk report. Additionally these empirical studies were all 
restricted to Germany.
Research on measuring and comparing risk disclosure after 2006 envisaged IFRS 7 a 
new international accounting standard, which requires specified risk information from 
listed groups in their consolidated financial statements. Instead of analysing the 
disclosure in a country specific way the new regulation allowed research on companies 
from different countries that all require IFRS accounting.
These studies could not find a common opinion about the improvement this standard 
provided to risk disclosure. Krüger et al. (2008) state that risk disclosure is even less 
informative in regard to forecast information with the application of IFRS 7. However 
this research result was based on financial statements of smaller listed companies. It is 
most probable that these companies have not applied IFRS 7 coherently at the time 
the study took place. The reason for this incoherence could be that IFRS 7 has been 
new at the time of the study. First time adoption of the new accounting standards could 
be worsen by lack of appropriate information on the side of disclosing companies. 
Krüger et al. 2008 findings are supported by research from Ernst & Young (2009) on 
companies which comply with IFRS 7 in terms of risk disclosure that reveals that the 
disclosure requirements are only partly met in 2006. On the other hand research by 
Freiling and Wehrle (2008) about the ten biggest insurance companies worldwide, that 
apply IFRS in their 2007 financial statements comes to the conclusion that due to the 
introduction of IFRS 7 and the insurance specific IFRS 4 risk information is more useful 
to financial decision makers and can be employed by them in their financial decisions.
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Summarizing it can be stated that risk disclosure improved due to IFRS 7 in 2007 and 
from there on. As European listed companies are required to apply IFRS the group of 
analysis researched in this study can include listed European insurance groups in the 
period 2007 and after that apply IFRS 7 uniformly in their annual group financial 
statements. A self administered index can be based on the categories of IFRS 7. But 
to weighten these categories can only partially be based on the survey supported 
check-list by manager magazin.
As a result of this chapter it can be stated that theory cannot fully explain the 
communication between companies and the capital market. Empirical studies explain 
only single aspects of the communication. Important conclusions can be drawn from 
these studies in regard to the measuring procedure of risk disclosure. Risk disclosure 
must me measured and compared using IFRS 7 accounting requirements in order to 
create a self-administered index, due to the lack of a risk disclosure index provided by 
institutions. Existing insurance specific check lists that are based on German national 
accounting requirements should be used in addition to IFRS 7 requirements.
3.1.3. Forms and legal requirements of risk disclosure 
The purpose of this chapter is to find and operationalise categories of risk disclosure 
that are relevant to the researched financial crisis. In order to achieve this, risk 
disclosure is categorized and compared in the form of German national and 
international accounting requirements, respectively GRS 5-20 and IFRS 7. The goal of 
this chapter is to find risk disclosure requirements that are useful to investors based on 
their preference analyzed in chapter 2.2. They can be used to build a risk disclosure 
performance checklist that is the basis of a self administered risk disclosure index as 
an integral part of the research methodology.
Disclosure of information by companies can take place in formalized or unstructured 
ways. Formalized ways include annual / quarterly financial statements and ad hoc 
statements that are disclosed to the public and are available via internet. These 
statements related to German national regulations such as HGB, RechVersV and 
WpHG, are supplemented by German national regulations such as GRS 5-20 on risk
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reporting for insurance companies and GRS 15 on management reports and extended 
by international financial reporting standards specified IFRS 4 and IFRS 7.
Unstructured ways of communication are calls to key shareholders, road shows by the 
management, investor days, statements during the annual shareholders' meeting and 
talks to rating agencies. These forms of communication are not regulated or like the 
shareholders' meeting only regulated concerning the sequence.
Risk related information can also be disclosed in formalized or unstructured ways. 
Management is required to describe prospective risk situations such as transactions 
that might have an unexpectedly high negative result and thus might threaten the 
existence of the company to their shareholders at the annual meeting (Kiethe, 2003). 
But such kind of unstructured risk related information about conversations to key 
shareholders are not disclosed. Information from the annual shareholders' meeting are 
open to the public but not documented. Ad hoc statements are disclosed and 
documented. Conference calls investors and experts take part in and can ask 
questions to the management have not been uniformly documented in the past. They 
tend to be documented temporarily on the internet platforms of the companies. 
Nevertheless, content and form are individual to each insurance group.
The content of the balance sheet, profit and loss accounts, cash flow statement and 
equity statement as the major parts of the financial statements that disclose risk is 
formalized. But risk is preponderant future oriented and consequently not reported in 
such historic, back looking statements. According to the results of chapter 2.3. not all 
information disclosed is relevant to investors in a crisis situation. Especially, 
information on investment risk in its three forms of market risk, credit risk and liquidity 
risk as well as measuring risk of crisis relevant mortgage portfolio based financial 
instruments and statements about the forecasted performance of companies can be 
considered relevant to investors. Therefore, the requirements to disclose these five 
information elements are analyzed.
In the following international accounting requirements are stated on the previously 
defined areas of risk disclosure. The purpose of this comparison is to select relevant 
criteria that can be included in a check-list in order to measure the risk disclosure
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performance of listed European insurance groups in their consolidated group financial 
statements during the financial crisis. The legal basis of this comprison are 
international requirements IAS 36, IAS 39 and IFRS 4, IFRS 7. As far as they do not 
sufficiently specify the areas of risk disclosure German national requirements 
RechVersV, HGB, GRS 5-20, GRS 15 are used in a supplementary way.
The comparison starts with the market risk. It occurs when the fair value of assets in 
the balance sheets drops. As a consequence listed European insurance groups are 
required to disclose the fair values in their financial statements. Depending on German 
national and international accounting regulations the disclosure of the assets fair value 
vary in their degree.
Whereas § 54 RechVersV requires the disclosure of the fair value for all investments of 
insurance companies, the international accounting standard IAS 39.45 requires the fair 
value of the categories “available for sale” and “designated at fair value” to be 
published. Assets in the categories “held to maturity” and “loans and receivables” are 
not disclosed with their fair values neither in the balance sheet nor in the notes. 
German national requirements to disclose the fair value of all investments in the notes 
exceed the fair value disclosure of international ones.
Another important risk information for investors is the likelihood of a drop in fair values 
of investments. This information is based on scenarios that the company predicts, the 
consequences for the investments held by the company and are summarized in a 
quantified risk information in the company's notes. German national and international 
accounting requirements differ in how the quantified risk information must be disclosed. 
IFRS 7.39D together with 7.40 requires a sensitivity analysis that tells investors how 
the company is exposed to the market at the end of the financial year according to 
Rockel et al. (2005). To do so international accounting standards require that the effect 
of a drop in fair values on the profit and loss accounts as well as on equity must be 
disclosed. Additionally the assumptions and method used by the management to 
prepare such a sensitivity analysis must be presented to the investor in the notes. GRS 
5-20.29f as the German requirements does not specify the method used to measure 
and summarize the market risk.
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Yet the method used must be a recognized risk-monitoring method such as sensitivity 
analysis or stress test. Both types of regulations allow alternatives: If the risk cannot be 
quantified by management GRS 5-20.31 requires the disclosure of the profit and loss 
accounts and equity effect of a given scenario. The German regulation is a 20% 
reduction of fair values on shares and non-fixed interest securities and a 1% shift in the 
interest curve on the market value of fixed interest securities and bonds. International 
regulations on the other hand do not require the disclosure of a given scenario but 
demand reason about why the management has been unable to apply a sensitivity 
analysis and why the analysis does not make sense according to IFRS 7.42.
The market risk that investments are exposed to must be disclosed in a similar way 
according to national and international regulations. Both kinds of regulations require a 
quantitative risk information that is based on scenarios. These scenarios quantify the 
market risk of a company's investment. Nevertheless, different methods on scenarios 
and the exemption clause in IFRS 7.42 make it harder to compare corporate risk 
disclosure on market risk according to Rippel (2006). Therefore international 
accounting requirements are used as categories in the check-list. The exemption 
clause should not be considered acceptable in that check-list.
The regulations on credit risk as part of investment risk are analyzed next. During a 
prolonged financial crisis bond issuers default on their payments. This credit risk 
significantly affects the financial performance of insurance companies that have to 
record these defaults in their financial statements through depreciation of their 
investments.
German national and international accounting regulations share the duty to disclose 
credit risk disclosure as of GRS 5-20.32 and IFRS 7.34a respectively. However the 
German national requirements allow as an alternative when the management is not 
able to provide a quantification to disclose external disclosure categories of fixed 
interest securities and bonds. It cannot be concluded that IFRS 7.34a together with B7 
do require a quantification of the credit risk, so that qualitative about external ratings of 
investments can be deemed as comparable in regard to the information usefulness of 
investors. International accounting regulations surpass German national ones when
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they demand the maximum credit exposure from financial guarantees granted in 
insurance contracts in IFRS 7.36 according to Rockel et al. (2005).
Comparing both types of regulation it can be concluded that German national 
requirements are less specific about the form. The information usefulness of the 
information differs however, when a qualitative risk disclosure as an alternative to the 
quantitative disclosure is chosen under German national regulations. This informative 
difference is enhanced by the requirement of IFRS 7 to state the quantitative figure of 
maximum credit exposure without risk reducing transactions being considered. 
Because of its focus on quantitative risk information international regulations are far 
more strictly than the German national ones (Rippel, 2006).
Liquidity risk as another subgroup of investment risk affects especially insurance 
groups with a life insurance segment that guarantee a certain interest to their 
customers and cannot receive this level of return from their investments when a 
financial crisis decreases their value and returns. German national and international 
requirements on liquidity risk are specific to the insurance industry.
According to GRS 5-20.26c information about the cash inflow of investments and the 
matching of cash outflows from obligations based on insurance contracts must be 
provided. Similar to this German national regulation these cash inflow and outflow 
information must be provided according to the insurance industry specific IFRS 4.38. 
The specification of IFRS 4 IG 61 for a sensitivity analysis of equity and profit and loss 
accounts on the effect of a change in those factors that influence the liquidity of an 
insurance company most is only a recommendation.
The comparable level of liquidity risk disclosure has been amended in March 2009 with 
an IFRS extension (lASB, 2009a). As a reaction to the financial crisis a maturity 
analysis of all financial liabilities and assets as well as a description how this analysis 
has been calculated has been added by a modified IFRS 7.39. The transparency of 
outflows by the settlement of insurance based obligations has been improved by the 
required disclosure of the earliest demand point of time outstanding insurance based 
guarantees. Guarantees as off-balance items have not been included In the liquidity 
risk disclosure based on the previous IFRS 7.39. Additionally the IFRS extension
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required that all significant deviation from earlier cash-outflow plans that have been 
caused by the crisis must be disclosed according to the modified Appendix B of the 
Application Guidance to IFRS 7.
Both German national and international regulations require quantitative information 
about how insurance companies tune future cash in- and cash outflows. The biggest 
improvement of decision usefulness to investors are the amendments to international 
regulations (lASB, 2009) that require additional information on how the crisis changed 
the liquidity risk. Yet, the amendments are requested for financial statements form 
2009 onwards and are not be considered in this research which is based on the 2007 
and 2008 consolidated group financial statements.
This financial crisis affects markets that measure investments but became 
dysfunctional as an effect of the financial crisis. Regulations on the disclosure of this 
measuring risk of investment products held by insurance companies vary. 
Transparency on how the value of these products is measured is significant to 
investors in times of financial distress to make well informed financial decisions. The 
requirements of German national and international regulations before the IFRS 
extension have been similar requiring qualitative information about the measuring 
methods for financial investments and certain significant financial obligations according 
to § 56 (6) RechVersV and § 268 (5) S. 3 HGB as well as IAS 1.108 together with 
IFRS 4 IG 11. The extension of IFRS in response to the financial crisis and the 
possibility to reclassify financial assets to other categories required the disclosure of 
profit and loss account as well as equity effects caused by this change. This 
requirement for disclosing measuring risk is a positive indication that a listed European 
insurance group utilized the reclassification opportunity provided by the IFRS 
extension.
The way investments are measured must be described according to German national 
and international regulations. This requirement is critical for investments that are not 
priced by markets because the financial crisis led to significant variances on 
investments that had to be measured with mathematical methods based on data form 
inactive markets. Therefore the information usefulness of international regulation in 
regard to measuring risk is significantly higher if reasons for insecurity of measuring
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models are disclosed. The disclosure of the effect of recategorization can be used as 
an indication for insurance groups facing financial distress during the crisis.
A last element of this comparison is the future oriented information. This is relevant in a 
crisis situation, because it relates to the characteristic of the long term perspective of 
insurance companies. This risk disclosure can have different forms in group financial 
statements prepared under different accounting rules.
A separate risk report that includes risk related and forward looking statements is 
embedded as an individual statement of financial statements in Germany. In the UK 
and the US risk related data are disclosed as supplemental information to the balance 
sheet and profit and loss accounts as part of the notes. The same holds true under 
international accounting standards. This difference in form can be attributed to the 
standard setting institutions. The German management report (Lagebericht) the 
operating and financial review (OFR) in the UK and the management report named 
MD&A in the USA are similar in their function but differ in detail (Hartmann, 2006). 
Their regulation density is high and they are set up and enforced by national bodies.
The German management reports stick out in their management forecast 
requirements. The management report became an instrument with special legal status. 
It extends the historic information, processed in the financial statements to include 
future events by delivering a forecast (Lange, 2001). The forecast requirement was 
specified and extended by modifications of the German Commercial Code in 1998 
(KonTraG) and 2004 (BilReG).
These requirements based on German regulations do not have the legal status of law 
but are set by a private standard setter acknowledged by the Finance minister, the 
German Accounting Standard Board. The management report is a unique source of 
information specified by the regulations GRS 5-20 and GRS 15 (GASB, 2001). The 
mandatory part of the management report requires companies to disclose risk 
connected to their business activities within the next two years (Grafer and Scheld 
2005). The German regulations specify risk disclosure categories and adapt them to 
banks and insurance companies. The required disclosure can be either based on
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individual risk measuring methods created by the company or by more robust set up 
as-if-predictions.
International regulations on the other hand came in late and do not require a separate 
report. The lASB released the IFRS 4 Insurance contracts in 2004 and IFRS 7 
Financial instruments - Disclosure in 2006. The legal status of the risk disclosure 
requirements is disputed. The disclosure specifications are not part of the legally 
binding standard, but part of the implementation guide.
The project of the lASB to draw up a standard on management commentary as a 
separate report has developed. An exposure draft as a step ahead of a final 
accounting standard has been published (lASB, 2009c). The reason for being late in 
comparison to German national requirements might be that the lASB has to cope with 
different national backgrounds on risk disclosure and lacks a common enforcement 
institution. The lASB followed another approach instead and requires companies to 
disclose risk related information about their financial instruments as supplemental 
information in the notes instead of a cohesive report. Because they can become a 
dominant risk factor for a company, lASB issued IFRS 7 disclosure of financial 
instruments in 2006 to be applied from 2007 onwards and the industry specific IFRS 4 
Insurance contracts in 2004 to be applied from 2005 onwards. Later standard requires 
the disclosure of insurance specific risks. Together they build the regulative framework 
for listed insurance companies on risk disclosure.
Both standards and the resulting risk disclosure must be applied by listed German 
insurance companies and are enforced by their auditors. European listed companies 
have been required by EU regulation No. 1606/2002 to account according to IFRS 
since 2002.
It can be summarized that the form of risk disclosure required by German national and 
international regulations varies. In order to compare the risk disclosure performance of 
European companies a level playing field has to be established. German insurance 
group had to comply with more demanding risk disclosure requirements especially in 
the past. Other listed European insurance groups can close this disclosure gap by
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voluntarily publishing relevant information in their group financial statements according 
to IFRS accounting rules.
Forecasts allow investors insights on opinion of the management about the effects the 
crisis has on the listed European insurance group and tells them what plans the 
managements came up with to pursue their plans. Contrasting the German national 
and international regulations the first mentioned ones require the disclosure of 
expected developments, negative trends, significant assumptions made by the 
management. A very demanding requirement of national German requirement GRS 
15.84 is that the management must forecast significant risk for the following two years. 
The risk shall be quantified in the management report according to GRS 15.89.
Penman (2007) regards this information as a single risk indicator with superior decision 
usefulness for investors. However by a recommendation of the German regulatory 
body this requirement has been lowered in response of the financial crisis when the 
uncertainties are too high. Additionally auditors (PwC, 2009) and regulators (GRS,
2009) diluted this requirement for the then ongoing financial crisis. This 
recommendation did not let the companies off their duty to forecast in a qualitatively 
way. This requirement has been critizised after the crisis of being unrealistic in times of 
crisis by Schwab (2010). However this requirement has been upheld by a German 
district court for public companies that are listed in the German share index (Schwab,
2010). In contrast to the German national requirements to quantify a forecast for a 
specified period of time in the future no such one exists according to international 
accounting standards.
German national and international requirements require similar levels of disclosure 
about current risk, both requirements allow a qualitative description of risk. When GRS 
5.26 recommends to describe interdependencies between individual risk, IFRS 7.34c 
requires the management to describe the concentration and extent of risk that arises 
from financial instruments with similar structures. In regard to current risk international 
requirements are more specific by focussing on financial instruments whereas German 
national requirements stress the disclosure of interdependencies without a clear focus 
on specific assets. In regard to the crisis situation IFRS 7 seems to be a requirement
46
that provides Investors with more specific risk disclosure although it is only qualitative 
and thus not preferred by them according to AI CPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009).
Another similarity between the requirements can be found regarding risk that threatens 
the existence of the company. Such risk shall be disclosed according to German 
requirements as of GRS 5.24. IAS 1.23 requires the disclosure of liquidity risk that may 
threaten the existence of the company, as far as they effect the going concern 
assumption that is vital to the measurement of assets and liabilities in the balance 
sheet. The German national requirement is specified in the time frame when it states 
that the forecast period of existence threatening risk is generally one year. The severe 
risk that may threaten the existence of companies is regulated in a similar way in 
German national and international accounting standards.
The form of disclosure is only regulated by German national accounting requirements. 
GRS 5.30 together with GRS 15.91 advise that information about risk shall be reported 
in a different section of the financial statements than the forecast statements of the 
management. This regulation tries to separate risk and forecast information in order to 
prohibit a mix of information that would reduce the usefulness for investors. No such 
requirements exist in international regulations as all qualitative information is disclosed 
in the notes.
The risk reporting profile varies according to German national and international 
regulations in regard to the place of disclosure within the financial statements, detail 
and forecast period. According to German national requirements risk information is 
centered in the notes and in the management report as a special risk section of the 
financial statements. In contrast international regulations demand an unstructured 
disclosure of risk related information in the notes due to the lack of a special 
management commentary that includes all risk information. This makes collecting data 
from financial statements of listed European insurance groups more difficult.
Regulations differ in detail and commitment in so far as risk disclosure is 
recommended or mandatory. The advantage that international regulations are adapted 
to the crisis situation is an advantage of the case based approach over the principal
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based approach of German national regulations. International regulations can respond 
to crisis situation faster.
Amendments to the IFRS 7 within 2009 (lASB, 2009a) prove the flexibility of the case 
based approach of international regulations. The principal based approach of German 
national regulations is more rigid when risk information must be quantified and has the 
unique requirement to make a forecast statement over a period of maximum two 
financial years. According to Kaiser (2005) this attests the ability of the management to 
identify changes and risk that are considered significant by investors, because this 
ability guarantees the survival and future prosperity of the company.
This requirement goes far beyond the common requirement under international 
regulations to disclose risk that threatens the immediate future of the insurance 
companies. Quantitative information about future risk is not required in this financial 
crisis according to PricewaterhouseCoopers, an auditing company (PWC, 2009). It is a 
situational and crisis related risk disclosure that provides investors with the 
management's assessment of the future impact of the situation. The decision 
usefulness of this key risk disclosure to investors is not provided by international 
regulations.
Analysis of German national and international risk disclosure requirements showed 
that both types of regulations cover the three investment risk categories, the measuring 
risk and the forecast requirements that are assumed to be relevant for investors in a 
financial crisis situation.
The required detail and perspective of risk disclosure varies among German and 
international requirements. Most significant is the forecast requirement of financial 
results and risk situation according to German regulations that is missing in 
international regulations. This prediction must have a perspective of one year ahead. It 
adapts risk disclosure to the individual situation of the company and must consider the 
current risk environment created by the financial crisis as well as strategies of the 
management to cope with the crisis. The lack of such a forecast according to 
international requirements makes is hard to compare the group financial statements of
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Non-German insurance companies that do not have to comply with these national 
regulations.
It might be an advantage of all listed German insurance companies that have to 
comply in their group financial statements with German national and international 
accounting rules. Differences exist regarding the detail of required disclosure. Some 
international requirements are more detailed and require a quantified risk information 
instead of a qualitative one.
Can different risk disclosure requirements result in a common level upon which the risk 
disclosure of European insurance companies can be compared? Because German 
national and international requirements differ in detail it is impossible to define one set 
of rules as the required level of risk disclosure. Therefore it is beneficial to assume that 
these insurance groups compete for a certain level of disclosure by providing more 
information than necessary to meet the accounting rules.
Core (2001) introduced this assumption to disclosure research by stating that voluntary 
disclosure can be defined as disclosure that exceeds regulatory requirements. 
Therefore the highest level of both German national and international regulations can 
be set as the required level and all risk information that exceed that level can be 
defined as voluntary disclosure. This stricter definition recognises exceeding 
disclosures practices. This theoretical approach might face some difficulties in 
measuring the level of voluntary risk disclosure, because the disclosure level among 
the analyzed insurance groups might be higher than relevant accounting requirements.
As a result information that does not meet the peer group level must be negatively 
recognized when risk disclosure is compared among European companies. German 
national and international regulations offer alternative accounting treatment if an 
information cannot be disclosed. The alternatives can be less specific qualitative 
disclosure (GRS 5-20 par. 32) or the statements of reasons why the required 
disclosure cannot be made. Because of these alternative treatments it is possible to 
recognize information that researched companies must not or cannot disclose. Thus, a 
statement that a company must not or cannot disclose that information can be 
distinguished from the behaviour a company that just omits this information.
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As a result of this literature review it can be stated that German and international risk 
disclosure requirements have levelled in and present a common basis of requirements 
since 2007. They differ slightly in regard to the analyzed categories of risk that are 
crisis relevant and differ significantly in their forecast requirements. However the 
statement of Dobler (2005) can be supported that risk disclosure remains subjective, 
although comparable regulation exist. But risk disclosure must be made comparable in 
order to be analyzed with a self administered disclosure index. To perform this the 
preferences of investors must be recognized. To make risk disclosure measurable and 
comparable according to Cheng and Courtney (2006, p. 267) a “checklist-approach” 
shall be applied. This is achieved by defining the highest level of German national or 
international disclosure level as the reference point. Additionally the preferences of 
investors shall be recognized to weighten the criteria in order to measure risk 
disclosure.
In previous studies researchers construed disclosure indices assuming that the 
amount of risk disclosure is a proxy for disclosure quality (Botosan, 1997, Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000, Hussainey et al, 2003, Evelt et al., 2009). Improved methods are 
used by Schleicher et al. (2007) who measure disclosure quality as the number of 
forward looking profit statements in annual report narratives. This method, as well, is 
based on the assumption that quantity equals quality approach and should be 
extended.
Investors preferences based on the Jenkins report (AlCPA, 1984) and a more recent 
report (EFRAG, 2009) regard quantified forward looking risk disclosure as of the 
highest informative quality, specifications of the risk factor is of medium informative 
quality and mentioning risky financial instruments as least informative. Both studies 
prove these preferences to be stable over time.
Another method to measure the quality of disclosed information is analyzed by Beattie 
et al. (2004) who suggest the time orientation, financial orientation and quantitative 
orientation of information disclosed must be recognized in measuring a disclosure 
profile. This approach extends methods that assume disclosure quality is solemnly 
connected with the quantity of key words disclosed. However this superior method to
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measure disclosure quality cannot be applied to crisis situations, because risk 
disclosure within annual group financial statements is highly regulated and cannot be 
fully varied. As an example, the time orientation of the researched risk disclosure 
cannot be chosen freely because financial statements are legally required to be 
published at certain points of times after the end of the financial year. This restricts the 
possibility to measure the timing of information over a short crisis related period.
It can be summarized that the highest level of German national and international risk 
disclosure requirements can be used as categories within the check-list that creates 
the self administered index. The degree of fulfilment of these categories is measured 
according to information preferences of investors.
3.1.4. Implications for the research methodology
The literature review on the interaction between companies and the capital market has 
implications on the researched period of time, the unit of analysis and the measuring of 
risk disclosure performance.
Theories do not provide a simple cause and effect model that would explain what 
extent and quality of risk disclosure investors’ demand. As a result an optimum of risk 
disclosure cannot be defined for the recent credit crisis. Theory indicates that during 
crisis situations other factors that influence investors beside risk disclosure become 
less significant. So crisis situations are appropriate to analyse the effect risk disclosure 
can have on investors in the capital market. But the restriction has to be recognized 
that accounting standards should be stable and uniformly applied by insurance 
companies in order to result in a comparable risk disclosure performance. This limits 
the research period of time to a period between 2007 when IFRS 7 was uniformly 
applied in Europe (Ernst & Young, 2009) and 2008 when the moratorium that 
postponed significant changes in international accounting regulations by the lASB 
phased out (Hayn and Prasse, 2009).
Empirical studies by Armeloh (1998) Bungart (2003), Vielmeyer (2004) Kraft and Nolte
(2005) as well as Kirchhoff (2007) apply self administered disclosure indices that are 
based on classes specified in accounting regulations. This procedure requires constant 
accounting standards that are uniformly applied by the companies that are analyzed.
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The insurance companies must apply IFRS 4 and IFRS 7 in order to approximately 
meet the risk disclosure requirements of German insurance companies in their 
management reports by additional risk disclosure in their notes. Differences between 
risk disclosure requirements can be levelled out by non-German insurance companies 
by providing voluntary risk disclosure. Therefore insurance companies from Germany 
and other European countries that are required to apply IFRS can be compared as 
long as they have a similar risk portfolio that derives of their business structure and 
geographical business activities.
Studies by Chen (2006) and Coval et al. (2009) have significant implications on how 
risk disclosure performance is being measured by focussing on key words to find 
relevant information in the narratives of consolidated financial statements. Such key 
words add additional power to a self administered risk disclosure index when it is 
adjusted to the individual crisis situation.
This index should be operationalized by an audit-like check list. In order to achieve this 
the five classes of risk disclosure detailed by German national or international 
accounting standards that cover risk disclosure are taken as a founding structure and 
the extent and quality of risk disclosure by each listed European insurance group 
should be measured based on the risk information disclosed in the group financial 
statements. The restriction on group financial statements recognises that IFRS 4 and 
IFRS 7 are only mandatory in these financial reports and not in quarterly statements.
In tune with constant investor preferences quantitative risk disclosure including 
forecast information is being regarded as highly informative, specified qualitative 
disclosure including negative statements about the lack of a certain risk is regarded as 
medium informative and unspecified qualitative disclosure is regarded as least 
informative. The classes must be weighted and then summarized to be an index. The 
annually published and insurance related index used in the German periodical 
“manager-magazin” that derived from research by Armeloh (1998) shall be applied on 
the relevant disclosure risk classes because investors information preference are fairly 
constant over time (AlCPA, 1994 and EFRAG, 2009).
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3.2. Motivation of companies to disclose risk
The motivation of listed companies to disclose risk in their financial statements is 
analyzed on three different levels. The structure of the analysis is the same on every 
level and starts with theories or empirical studies and ends with the research results 
being applied to the recent crisis situation. The motivation is analyzed in order to 
identity factors or derive methods that should be recognized in the methodology of this 
research project.
First, economic theories and studies are assessed to explain using the principal agent 
theory why companies are motivated to disclose risk in chapter 3.2.1. In this chapter it 
is assumed that on this high conceptional level no organizational rules or restrictions 
preexist. On the second level in chapter 3.2.2. it is analyzed what factors motivate 
managers to disclose or withhold information. This is done on a corporate level 
assuming a set of rules and internal corporate limitations defined as corporate 
governance being applied. On the third level in chapter 3.2.3. it is analyzed whether 
other non organisational factors influence the disclosure behaviour of managers and 
companies. Implications for this research methodology are summarized in chapter 
3.2.4.
3.2.1. The principal agent theory
The relationship between the company's management and its shareholders is 
explained in economic research by the principal agent theorem. The relationship 
between management and investors can be interpreted as a relationship between the 
agent who is entrusted by the investor to manage his company. An information 
asymmetry between agent and principal exists, because the agent knows more about 
the market and corporate circumstances than the principal. By disclosing information 
the information asymmetry between the management as the agent and shareholders 
as the principals narrows (Core, 2001) (Lambert, 2001).
It has been recognized in the economic theory that contracts between principal and 
agents can enforce the disclosure of information and thus reduce this asymmetry by 
obliging managers to report to their principals. Jensen and Meckling (1976) introduced 
principal agent and contracting theory to economic research as main concepts of 
misalignment of interests between owners and managers of companies. They
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recognized that this potential conflict, coupled with the inability of owners to write 
costless perfect contracts and monitor the managers inherently reduces the value of 
firms as economic entities (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006, p. 262).
The selfishness of managers by using private information gathered in their function as 
managers and withholding them from the public has been researched in regard to 
management compensation. According to Healy and Palepu (2001) as well as 
Bushman et al. (2004) managers influence the timing of reported profits because their 
compensation terms - that are fixed in contracts - depend on the point of time when 
profitability figures are disclosed in financial statements. Such misuse falsifies the true 
and fair view investors should get on companies through financial statements (lASB, 
2 0 0 1 b) and negatively affects their financial decisions resulting in economic 
inefficiencies. Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) support this conclusion with their research 
under the assumption of a laboratory financial market that is assumed in economic 
theory. They found out that greater disclosure quality leads to higher share prices 
resulting in an increased market value and higher liquidity of the company.
This empirical research results coincide with the unravelling theorem by Wagenhofer 
and Drücker (2007) that managers increase the fair value of their company by 
disclosing sensitive information, because investors otherwise assume the worst. These 
positive effects being coordinated with the costs of disclosure determine an optimal 
level of disclosure on this high level of economic theory (Baiman and Verrecchia, 
1996).
The general finding of Bloomfield and Wilks (2000) states that positive economic 
effects of disclosure are stronger when investors face a risk event. How can this 
theoretical background be applied to the researched crisis situation?
A characteristic of this financial crisis was the insecurity of investors about the fair 
value of certain financial instruments of the company they owned. Being complex in 
their structure these instruments have no listed price or original market value. Their 
value derives from calculations based on assumptions set by managers of the 
companies caused by the lack of verified information from markets or other external 
scources.
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This information asymmetry between manager and investor is defined as measuring 
risk in chapter 2.3. and is specific to this recent financial crisis. Kotzle and GrCining 
(2009) in their research study support the conclusion that the information asymmetry 
enlarged during this crisis. According to Cheng and Courtenay (2006) asymmetry 
cannot be eliminated neither by costless perfect contracts nor by constant monitoring 
of managers by the owners of companies. Therefore corporate rules or regulations on 
the disclosure of the measurement assumptions on certain financial instruments must 
address this crisis specific measuring risk. This can be achieved on the company level 
by applying rules or a set of rules such as corporate governance. These rules shall 
increase disclosure In order to reduce the information assymmetry.
3.2.2. Corporate governance affects risk disclosure on corporate level 
How can the selfishness of managers be tamed? Companies try to limit the negative 
effects of their managers' selfishness with corporate restrictions and try to utilise it with 
contractual arrangements that motivate managers to disclose information. The limiting 
aspect is stressed in the corporate governance definition by Menz and Nelles (2009) 
stating that it is the sum of all rules and facts that influence the corporate decision 
making process of the management. These restrictions can be internal or external 
ones such as banks, auditors and courts (Cheng and Courtenay, 2006). The aspect of 
utilizating managers' selfishness extends the scope of this definition. It is included in 
the corporate governance definition by Denis and McConnell (2003) which includes 
both internal and market based mechanism that induce the self interest of corporate 
agents to make decisions that maximize the value of the company to its owners. 
Empirical studies focus on the factors that limit selfishness of managers by the 
disclosure of relevant information. In the following studies that researched the 
relationship between disclosure and other variables are presented such as institutional 
ownership of the companies, existence of audit committees, quality of company's 
auditors and the independence of the board of directors.
The assumption that institutional ownership controls agency problems could not be 
empirically supported by Eng and Mak (2003) who found out that the structure of 
ownership and not the single factor of institutional ownership determines the level of 
monitoring and thereby the level of disclosure desired. These research results are
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specified by Chen and Cheng (2007) who found out that beside auditors’ quality the 
degree of institutional shareholders is significant to the quality of disclosure.
Institutional shareholders need a certain degree of significance in the form of a share in 
voting capital to prevent managers from increasing or decreasing reported profits 
towards a level desired by them (Chung et al., 2002). Non voting or an insignificant 
share of institutional investors thus does not improve disclosure.
Few empirical studies focus on the market based aspects of corporate governance. 
They do not focus on single rules or contracts that utilize the selfish motivation of 
managers. Instead they analyse correlations between corporate governance indices 
and variables of the financial market. Lehn et al. (2007) find statistical support that 
good grades on corporate governance indices increase the share value in the long run. 
The reliance on a corporate governance index of this study shows that individual 
corporate solutions to utilize managers’ motivation are hard to identity, to measure and 
to compare. Market based mechanisms that induce the self interest of managers are 
specific to each company and difficult to compare.
How does corporate governance affect disclosure in the crisis situation? The terms of 
managers’ compensation packages are named as one reason of the recent crisis that 
lead to overhauling risk due to short-sighted behaviour of managers (Anonymous, 
2009b). Rewarding short term success these contracts encourage managers to make 
deals that improved the short term profit situation of the company and accordingly their 
annual bonus without recognizing the long term risk burden these deals placed on the 
companies. Only some financial companies changed their compensation contracts as 
a result of the crisis to risk adjusted measures that determine the size of bonus 
payments (Anonymous, 2009b).
Aside from being inflexible to changing requirements and individual to the company 
can corporate governance improve the economic situations in times of crisis? 
Research on the cause and effect relationship between corporate governance and the 
estimate of market participants on the insolvency probability of companies in the crisis 
situation showed puzzling results.
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Menz and Nelles (2009) found no correlation between credit default ratings and 
corporate governance index ratings of German companies before and during the 
financial crisis. So this empirical research does not support that high corporate 
governance performance reduces insolvency risk. This study however excluded 
insurance companies and sets no results for this research project. It indicates that no 
single cause and effect relationship in regard with corporate governance exists and 
that other factors that influence risk disclosure should be recognized in research 
methodology as well. The next chapter analyses factors that are not part of economic 
theories or corporate governance.
3.2.3. Non organizational factors
This chapter analyzes factors that influence corporate disclosure and underlying 
behaviour of managers in the absence of corporate restrictions. Fields et al. (2001) 
recommend to structure research findings according to the sources of pressure that 
affects disclosure. Following this approach the sources can be subdivided into external 
and internal factors that upheld pressure on managers and on corporations to disclose 
risk information. External factors can be supervisory power, group pressure, corporate 
size or linkage to foreign markets. Internal factors that motivate to disclose are 
predominantly cost related.
External pressure can be put on managers and companies by supervisory agencies 
and by factors that influence the performance of the company which they are 
responsible for. The pressure to perform increases with the benchmark group of 
companies that the manager with his or her individual performance is compared to. 
Such an increase in comparable companies can be caused by internal growth that 
brings the company above a certain size so that it is recognized and compared to 
others. Another way to increase the number of comparable companies is by expanding 
to other markets especially foreign markets and open the company with such a step to 
the scrutiny of additional customers and investors. Supervision, group pressure and 
pressure by other markets are analyzed as external sub-factors causing pressure on 
managers to disclose risk information.
In regulated industries like the insurance industry pressure is put onto companies by 
regulatory bodies (Scheytt et al., 2006). Facing external pressure insurance companies
57
improve their governance transparency defined by Bushman et al. (2004) and 
Bushman and Piotroski (2006) as disclosure to German national or international 
supervising agencies. Despite the possibility to use their external pressure supervisors 
generally do not apply direct pressure but instead use the intrinsic motivation of 
insurance companies to reach an adequate level of transparency. Smith and Tombs 
(1995) researched that higher transparency lowers the burden of inspections for 
individual insurance companies. This however can vary over time and depends on 
local situations, because according to Ericson and Doyle (2004) insurance companies 
have a constantly changing partnership with the state. Because misdemeanors against 
regulators can have legal consequences managers have an incentive to meet 
disclosure requirements set by regulators in their statutory accounting for regulating 
national agencies. Their incentive to exceed them voluntarily however is limited.
Group pressure to disclose information is thoroughly researched. Based on the 
economic theory of information asymmetry competition between companies tend to 
reduce private information of managers. This information is available in several 
competing companies so that single managers cannot selfishly use them in the market. 
Verrecchia (2001) summarizes that competition is an incentive for companies to 
disclose.
Based on the influential study by Welker (1995) Botosan and Harris (2000) find out that 
the size of companies is a significant factor associated with disclosure. According to 
theoretical research by Bushman et al. (2004) and Vielmeyer (2004) transparency is 
significantly higher when firms are larger. This theoretical finding is empirically 
supported by research from Khanna et al. (2004). Smaller companies try to meet the 
legal requirements while bigger companies try to excel them using discretionary 
disclosure defined as voluntary disclosure in excess of existing regulations, according 
to empirical research by Kotzle and Grüning (2009).
Based on this common understanding Kirschenheiter and Jorgensen (2003) found out 
that aside group pressure as one factor another factor that influences disclosure is 
whether the information disclosed are negatively or positively received by investors.
58
This influences the timing of disclosure and depends on the market structure the 
company is embedded in. Dye and Sridhar (1995) researched that disclosure 
improvements are similarly timed in oligopoly markets by participating companies. 
These results are disputed by an empirical research study with contradicting results 
performed by Pincus and Wasley (1994). Insurance companies using international 
financial reporting standards and having a similar business portfolio can be seen as a 
group similar to the group analyzed by Dye and Sridhar (1995) characteristics. Similar 
disclosure behaviour of these companies has been identified with the application of 
IFRS 7 that was fully applied in the industry by 2007 although required by 2006 already 
(see chapter 3.1.3.).
These research results lead to the conclusion formerly discussed by Pae (2002) that 
group pressure as a factor to improve disclosure limits the selfishness of managers to 
alter the extend or timing of disclosed information. This leads to the requirement of a 
homogeneous group of insurance companies being studied in this research.
The interaction with other markets is another extrinsic pressure factor on companies' 
disclosure. Cross listings are a relevant form of interaction that influences corporate 
accounting and has been thoroughly researched. Khanna et al. (2004) found that 
companies that are subject to US-accounting standards especially increase their 
disclosure quality. This supports previous research by Lang and Lundholm (1993) and 
Lang et al. (2003) and can be explained by the exceptional enforcement power of the 
SEC as the regulatory watchdog of US-accounting standards which is not achieved 
under non-country related accounting standards like IFRS according to Pellens (1997).
Apart from this institutionalized external pressure to extend disclosure Baily et al.
(2006) argue that internationality itself is a factor that increases disclosure (see 
Khanna et al. 2004) even without pressing Institutions. This aspect is discussed as the 
'legal bonding hypothesis'. Supporting this theory insurance companies analyzed in 
this research study should comply to the same accounting standards in order to be 
comparable in their risk disclosure.
Internal pressure to disclose information is put on companies by the economic 
incentives associated with it. According to Weick (1995) organizations have an intrinsic
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motivation to inform the market about the way they handle risk by accounting and 
information systems. Extended disclosure reduces the cost of the company to acquire 
additional equity and debt on the capital market This economical explanation is called 
transaction cost economics by Williamson (1975) and has been extensively analyzed 
by Verrecchia (2001). His theoretical explanation has been thoroughly tested in 
empirical research studies by Welker (1995), Botosan (1997), Botosan and Plumlee
(2002), Sengupta (1998) and Healy et al. (1999). While these studies that researched 
US companies and the US financial markets support Verrecchia's theory Kotzle and 
Grüning (2009) researching German companies state that there is no empirical proof 
of an incentive to increase disclosure in order to reduce cost of capital. This statement 
however is restricted to conditions in Germany with its less developed capital market 
culture. Disregarding research of Kôtzie and Grüning (2009) all insurance companies 
analyzed in this research should be listed companies that avail themselves of 
additional disclosure by lower cost to a comparable level.
Beside all the incentives to disclose that are described above there are internal and 
external costs of disclosure that reduce companies' incentive to disclose risk 
information according to Verrecchia (2001) and Vielmeyer (2004). The costs of 
disclosure are not published in the financial statements of companies but internal costs 
could be measured. They include cost of information collection (Beierle, 2004) and cost 
of processing information and report relevant information in financial statements 
(Depoers, 2000). Both types of costs are paid for by the disclosing company. The cost 
level depends on how sophisticated the management reporting systems of the 
disclosing listed European insurance group are and how diversified its organizational 
structure is that makes it more difficult to gather the relevant information (Depoers,
2000). External costs on the other hand cannot be measured. They include the cost of 
unintended use of sensitive information by competitors (Beierle, 2004). Such use can 
become financially harmful to the disclosing entity according to Depoers (2000). This 
effect however cannot be measured. Other external costs are proprietary costs 
according to Verrecchia (1986). He defines them as costs for withholding the 
disclosure of bad news by companies. Verrecchia (1986) argues that traders expect a 
general disclosure of bad news among groups of the same market. When one group 
does not disclose traders assume the worst for this group that withholds such 
information. As a result the share value of this listed group decreases. Cost and benefit
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of disclosure must be recognized in order to find an optimal level of disclosure 
(Bushman and Verrecchia, 1996). However Vielmeyer (2004) along with Wagenhofer 
and Ewert (2003) disagree that this level can be determined. Thus the costs of 
disclosure are neither fully measurable nor published in the financial statements and 
cannot be considered as a variable in this research study.
Another limitation is the behaviour of managers. Theoretical research by Lambert 
(2 0 0 1 ) states that risk disclosure tends to decrease because it is seen by managers as 
a negative information that unveils their past mistakes. As a result they try to disguise 
their actions by providing biased information to the investors (Surrey, 2006). Lenz and 
Diehm (2010) challenge this when they state that risk information are hard to verify and 
cannot be traced back to the managers.
A similar aspect of disclosure timing is empirically researched. According to Shaw
(2003) managers delay recognition of bad news in the balance sheet until they 
prepared the market by enhanced disclosure in the notes. Managers therefore try to 
delay the recognition of bad news but they cannot prevent it altogether.
3.2.4. Implication for the research methodology
The analysis of the motivation of companies to disclose risk has lead to implications on 
the type of risk disclosure, the variables and the unit of analysis.
The principal agent theory supports the research topic. Managers know the 
assumptions and procedures to measure complex financial instruments. This sensitive 
risk information should be disclosed in a crisis situation in order to reduce the 
information asymmetry between management and investors. Such risk disclosure 
would create transparency that restricts the power of managers in setting the 
assumptions and calculation method to value these financial instruments. Without 
information about the measurement investors would assume the worst in a crisis 
situation according to Wagenhofer et al. (2007). In the setting of a financial crisis the 
worst for investors would be that these financial instruments have no positive fair 
market value, cannot be sold or only by a fire sale that creates losses. These losses 
would reduce the equity position of the company and therefore increase its risk of 
insolvency of the company.
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In order to increase the pressure on managers to disclose this information institutional 
investors with a significant share holding in the company's equity are necessary. They 
can be included as a control variable in the research methodology. The proportion 
institutional investors should have in the equity can be set in analogy of research by 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
A further non-organizational factor that restricts individual interests of managers is 
group pressure. As an implication the group of analysis -  the insurance companies 
that are analyzed in this research study -  should be share exchange listed companies 
that are coherent in their business structure.
The idea of an optimal level of disclosure is a theoretical concept that cannot be 
applied to this study. Lack of published disclosure cost would disrupt any calculation of 
cost and benefit that can result in the determination of an optimal disclosure level. It is 
therefore not considered in the research methodology.
Research by Bagnoli and Watts (2007) analyzes the setting of complex situations in 
which disclosure is used to pursue a certain corporate strategy. Although not related to 
the research study by topic conclusions about the research methodology can be drawn 
from it. The authors suggest the use of event study methods during situations of 
market extremity. So this method is used in the research methodology of this thesis to 
quantify the reaction of the capital market towards disclosure.
3.3. Reaction of the capital market towards disclosure
The Focus of this chapter is the behaviour of capital market participants. Different 
types of capital market participants and their decision making process are analyzed. 
Based on the categorization of the participants their behaviour towards disclosure 
information is explained by economic theories and empirical studies in subchapter 
3.3.1. These theories assume rational investors as market participants. To supplement 
the literature review in regard to a crisis situation additional psychological factors like 
trust and fear that affect the behaviour of capital market participants at that time are 
explained in subchapter 3.3.2. All explanations of market participants behaviour are 
summarized and applied to the research methodology in subchapter 3.3.3.
62
3.3.1. Participants in the capital market
Literature identifies different types of capital market participants. Investors are 
regarded as the key element of the capital market in disclosure research (Verrecchia,
2001). This is supported by the perspective of international accounting standards 
which focus the disclosure of information on investors' needs aiming to provide them 
with information that should be useful for their investment and divestment decisions 
(lASB, 2001a). Investors can either be private or institutional. How these different types 
of investors regard disclosed information by companies is not adequately resolved in 
the literature.
Researchers often assume similar preferences and decision making of private and 
institutional investors. They do not distinguish between the two investor types (Nagar 
et al., 2003). However following theoretical problem can enumerate the distinction that 
would be helpful in this research.
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) state that in a company owned by many small owners it 
does not pay for any individual owner to monitor the performance of the management 
because each single owner lacks the power to change wrongdoings by the 
management. By contrast institutional investors like family trusts, pension plans, 
banks, insurance companies or investment funds (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) are 
empowered to intervene in management decision if they possess a significant part of 
the shares.
Institutional investors can therefore be defined as belonging to a certain organisational 
structure and holding significant power to influence management decisions. This 
makes institutional investors more sensitive to corporate disclosure and there is an 
incentive for them to consider disclosed information in their financial decision making 
process. Private investors lack this incentive. It is more plausible for them to make their 
investment decisions based on recommendations provided by analysts. Along with 
different motivations institutional and private investors differ in their decision making 
process model as well.
All capital market participants have a common aim. They try to evaluate the fair value 
of companies they want to invest in or divest from. If the share market values of a
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company is lower than the value estimated by the participants they buy shares of the 
company. If the share market value of a company is higher than its estimated value 
they sell their shares in it (Vater et al., 2008). Investors are supposed to take their 
decisions based on this economic explanations. This decision making model is based 
on assumptions of fully available information, no transaction costs and fully rational 
decision makers. However certain market phenomenons do not make sense on the 
basis of traditional economic models according to Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). They 
can only be explained by psychological theories of which the private investor are 
exposed to by a higher degree than institutional investors. How psychological factors 
affect private investors is the subject of subchapter 3.3.2.
In contrast to private investors institutional investors tend to standardize their decision 
making process in order to evaluate the value of companies. They use uniform 
measurement-models for this task. These models include quantitative data from 
financial statements in addition to current ones historical data are processed to predict 
the future value of companies. Thus, both types of data are included in the calculation 
of the current value of the company which summarizes the value of a company based 
on the future development of its business activities. These models - like discounted 
cash flow analysis - are used for accounting purposes as well (lASB, 2005).
How good the results of this process are depending as well on the quality of qualitative 
information that the market participants get about the company. Vater et al. (2008) 
argue that qualitative information disclosed in financial statements are leading 
indicators for the market value of the company. This argument is empirically supported 
by research from PechtI (2000). He analyzed the forecast disclosure of German 
companies and could prove that these are an integrated part of the decision making 
process of institutional investors. The growing importance of forecast disclosure is 
supported by research of Sinah and Watts (2001) who state the growing relevance of 
future oriented information to investors.
Yet an advance decision making model is necessary to integrate qualitative 
information about the future when calculating the value of companies based on a 
probability weighted cash-flow basis on scenario basis. It is assumed for further
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research that private investors have a reduced capability to process such type of 
information that comes along with advanced standardized methods.
Financial analysts are intermediators in the capital market. They are important players 
in that market and are frequently assumed to represent and influence investors belief 
and their activities. However the effects of extensive disclosure on analysts are 
ambiguous according to Healy and Palepu (2001). They argue that extended 
disclosure enables analysts to make superior forecasts and recommendations. On the 
other hand better public disclosure preempts analyst ability to distribute private 
information of managers to the investors. Healy and Palepu (2001) state that 
enhanced disclosure leads to lower demand of analysts' services. This is plausible for 
institutional investors. But considering a crisis situation private investors might rely 
more on expert opinion during that time for psychological reasons such as fear.
In the following the behaviour of each category of capital market participants towards 
extended risk disclosure is predicted. This is done based on empirical research 
studies. Whether participants sell or buy shares of companies that disclose risk 
information is influenced by their decision making process and their role in the capital 
market.
Research on private investors found out that personality related and situational factors 
influence their decision making. Research showed that personal experience investors 
have made during their early childhood affect their investment behaviour as adults 
(Anonymous, 2009a). This influence can hardly be overcome by additional disclosure 
of companies. Research analyses a variety of other personality related factors that 
influence their financial decision making. An empirical study on situative factors by 
Porcelli and Delgardo (2009) found out that under stress private investors tend to 
chose riskier investment alternatives. When facing the possibility of a minor loss or a 
major one the research participants chose the major loss alternative when being 
exposed to stress factors. Applied to crisis situations when investors are exposed to 
such stress they hold on to shares and do not realize the loss that can be determined 
right now. Instead they hope that the situation might improve in the near future.
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Apart from personal or situative aspects research found out that investors are more 
likely to hold on to shares of companies that raise their confidence by a long track 
record of extended disclosure (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991) (Kim and Verrecchia, 
1994). This research supports the assumption that it takes a long period of time to 
build up confidence in investors in regard to a certain company. Arpan and Roskos- 
Ewoldson (2005) modify the assumption to crisis situations. They state that by 
disclosing bad news early and fully in a crisis situation a company can build up trust. 
Summarizing research results on the behaviour of private investors it can be stated 
that their financial decision making is hard to predict due to personal traits that 
question the existence of uniform investors. Even if uniform investors are assumed to 
exist situative factors that change the level of stress must be recognized in order to 
predict financial decision making of private investors. This aspect is analyzed in 
subchapter 3.3.2. with psychological factors like fear and trust which might dominate 
the decision making process of private investors in stress situations.
Research on institutional investors does not find situative factors to influence their 
decision making behaviour. Like private investors they tend to hold to shares of 
companies with enduring good disclosure performance according to Diamond and 
Verrecchia (1991) as well as Kim and Verrecchia (1994). It can be assumed that this 
factor influences institutional investors more than private ones due to the lack of 
disturbing situative factors and their increased decision making process capability to 
store and process historic disclosure information and forecasts.
Research by Bushee and Noe (2000) states that institutional investors have an 
excessive focus on short term performance of companies they invest in. This trait may 
lead institutional investors to disregard risk disclosure by companies and cut their 
losses instead of holding on to their shares in times of crisis situation. No empirical 
research supports this theory.
Literature does not provide indications on how the decision making process of analysts 
is affected by extended corporate disclosure but only the other way around. Research 
by Healy, Hutton, Palepu (1999) as well as Lang and Lundholm (1996) show that more 
information disclosure leads to a larger analysts following of that company. According 
to Barth and Hutton (2004) this has a positive effect on corporate disclosure as those
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companies integrate more rapidly corporate information on accruals than less followed 
firms. It is safe to assume that the quality of recommendations improves the more 
analysts deliver their view on the corporation. However no research has been 
performed on how analysts react to enhanced disclosure of companies during times of 
financial distress. Although common sense suggests that they reward disclosure 
because it enables them to make better and information based recommendations on 
these corporations.
Summarizing the analyzed research studies no coherent response of private, 
institutional investors as well as analysts to enhanced corporate disclosure can be 
assumed drawn from existing research. Predominantly, research is based on the 
assumptions of uniform investors and rationality of their decision making process. 
Additional psychological factors that influence foremost the decision making process of 
private investors in times of distress are presented in the next chapter.
3.3.2. Psychological factors that influence the capital market 
Private investors do not predominantly use standardized measurement-models. Their 
decision making process is more opaque and seems to be influenced to a higher 
degree by the interaction with other individuals (Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003, p. 27). This 
might lead to a substantial dependence on analysts recommendation.
The assessment by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003) discussed in literature under the name 
of “herd behaviour” is based on Keynes (1935) who stated that the markets are moved 
by “animal spirits” and not by reason. Hirshleifer and Teoh define herding as any 
behaviour similarity or dissimilarity brought about by the interaction of individuals. It 
includes sub-rational mechanisms that induce an individual to be influenced by the 
behaviour of another individual to behave in the same way (Hishleifer and Teoh 2003).
Several empirical studies try to measure herd behaviour in investment decisions 
focussing on private investors (Jain and Gupta, 1987), (D'Arcy and Oh, 1997) (Foresi 
et al., 1998). All studies found only weak evidence of herding in different investment 
decisions. The disappointing results of empirical research are partly to blame on the 
impossibility of researchers to eliminate other causal factors that might affect the
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financial decision making process of private investors aside from interaction that 
causes herding behaviour as explained in theory by Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003).
A theoretical explanation by Vater et al. (2008) of how companies communicate with 
capital markets can be used to describe the relationship that leads to herding. It states 
that collective psychological and emotional decisions are affected by the reputation of 
the company. They define reputation as the sum of all images that stakeholders have 
about a company (Vater et al., 2008). The effect of a good reputation is trust that 
investors have in the abilities of the management. Vater et al. (2008) assume that trust 
in the company leads to a loyal behaviour of the market participants towards the 
company. In times of crisis instinct based behaviour prevails and investors become 
more sceptial (Keynes, 1935). So trust can balance this scepticism and make market 
participants stay invested in the company (Vater et al., 2008) because they assume 
that those effects forecasted by companies in their disclosure are to remain or become 
true.
This idea is supported by the “stealing thunder-theory" (Aspan and Roskos-Ewoldson, 
2005) that increases trust by early and extended disclosure of bad news at the 
beginning of a crisis. This idea has been empirically supported by Lundholm and 
Myers (2002) and Zarowin and Gelb (2002). Other theories why companies disclose 
bad news are discussed by Skinner (1994) who does not pursue an approach that 
focuses on crisis situations.
Nevertheless, scepticism can also prevail and overturn trust into fear. Acting according 
to that feeling market participants sell shares of all companies regardless of their 
previous disclosure performance. What is easily explained in theoretical models cannot 
be supported by empirical research. One point objecting empirical research is that 
herding is very hard to measure because of contradicting effects (Hirshleifner and 
Teoh 2003). So research studies performed on a company-level by Jain and Gupta 
(1987) leads to mixed results seeing no herding among the bigger market participants 
and herding in the behaviour of the smaller market participants following the bigger 
ones.
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It can be summarized that the images of companies in the mind of capital market 
participants can influence their investment decisions. Trust in a company has a 
stabilizing effect and herd behaviour a destabilizing effect on the investment decision 
of market participants. Whereas trust is a feeling that influences private investors to 
proceed in their own financial decision making process herding leads private investors 
to follow recommendations of analysts or act without individual consideration in 
accordance with the behaviour of other private investors.
According to empirical research by Choe et al. (1997) herding takes place before a 
crisis period but not within the crisis. This is recognized in the timing of the event study 
within the research methodology. Whereas the decision making process of private 
investors cannot be predicted in regard to psychological factors research by Sias and 
Starks (1997) found out that institutional investors reduce price effects of herding. 
When private investors tend to emotionalize, institutional investors build a rational 
counterpart that can -  after gaining a critical mass in number or reputation -  lead to 
tipping private investors in favour of rational decision making back again. This is 
considered by Hirschleifer and Teoh (2003) as a possibility of future research.
Literature revealed that the relationship between disclosing companies and investors 
are influenced by multiple factors among them psychological ones which make it hard 
to determine a causal relationship. Emotions as part of the decision making process of 
capital market participants harrass attempts to predict investors behaviour.
3.3.3. Implication for the research methodology
In respect with the results of analysing the reaction of the capital market following 
aspects on the variables and the timing of the event study are recognized in the 
research methodology.
Research shows that investors are not homogenous and must be studied according to 
categories of private and institutional investors. This implies that the ownership 
structure of all companies analyzed in this research methodology must be known and 
categorized. The categories of private and institutional investors can be defined using 
definitions of the research by Shleifer and Vishny (1986).
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Another implication that derives from the literature review is that investor decision 
making can depend on long term experience with the disclosure performance of the 
company. However it is understood that psychological factors influence the financial 
decision making process of private investors too but that they can hardly be singled out 
as a factor in this research study. They can be used to explain unusual effects that do 
not comply with shared economic sense. Herding cannot be eliminated as a factor 
influencing private investors behaviour because it is considered high before a financial 
crisis peaks.
The reaction of the capital market towards disclosure has been empirically tested 
during the South East Asian financial crisis in 1997. Research by Baek et al. (2002) 
analyzed the effect of disclosure quality on the share value of Korean companies 
during this regional financial crisis. They found out that Korean firms that ‘had higher 
disclosure quality (...) suffered less’ in their share value (Baek et al., 2002 p. 269). This 
study is supported by earlier research with a similar structure by Mitton (2002). Baek et 
al. (2005) used the “event study method” which measures the development of the 
share prices at days around a significant event. Share prices are called by the 
researchers “return” and consequently the deviation of share prices form an 
individualized industry share index around a significant event is called “abnormal 
return”. The accumulation of all abnormal returns of each international insurance group 
in the days around the event is called “cumulative abnormal return”. The significance 
and direction of the abnormal return shows that investors held on to the share of a 
company or sold it around that event, resulting in a lower share price. The application 
of the event study method is regarded by Bagnoli and Watts (2007) as the standard in 
the research field of market extremity. Considering psychological aspects like trust and 
fear such tool should be applied when the crisis situation peaked in order to test the full 
extension of these psychological factors.
The influencing effect of reduced herding according to research by Sias and Starks 
(1997) by institutional investors on private investors is monitored in the research 
methodology of this study. It might be helpful to assume that a high level of institutional 
investors in an European insurance company has a calming effect on private investors 
that reduce their herding behaviour and increase the benefit of disclosed risk 
information by lower cumulated abnormal returns. However it cannot be ruled out that
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situative circumstances can superimpose trust of investors that has been build up by 
fear with significantly different consequences in regard to investment or divestment 
decisions. Stress imposed on investors can lead to these psychological effects that 
cannot be sufficiently forecasted and affects predominantly private investors. Because 
trust of investors is hard to measure it is necessary to analyse the risk disclosure 
performance of companies over a period of time. In this research study it is done over 
two reporting periods because of accounting restrictions not longer (see subchapter
3.1.3.).
Literature indicates that institutional investors as one owner group influence the extend 
of risk disclosure by companies (Chung et al., 2002). Similar behaviour has been 
empirically testified for Chinese listed companies by Chen and Cheng (2007). A 
calming effect of institutional owners on private investors during crisis situations has 
been indicated by Kim and Verrecchia (1994). This influencing factor modifies the 
intensity of the relationship between independent and dependent variables and can be 
defined as a moderator variable (Mbengue and Vandangeon-Dorumez, 1999). 
Additionally literature indicated that existence and timing of manager compensation 
schemes are influencing the extent of risk disclosure. Therefore the type of manager 
compensation is recognized as a control-variable in this research study. After catching 
the phenomenon of risk disclosure and the reaction of capital market participants in a 
model which is enriched with additional variables the validity of this concept is verified. 
In a first step using a quantitative deductive method several hypotheses that arise from 
the concept are stated (see chapter 5.1.) and afterwards tested.
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C h a p t e r  4
4. Hypotheses
This chapter develops the hypotheses of the relationship between risk disclosing 
listed European insurance groups and the capital market is gathered. In order to 
answer the research question whether those listed European insurance groups with 
higher risk disclosure performance suffered less in their share value during the recent 
crisis or not the relationship is categorized in hypotheses in chapter 4.1., the relevant 
variables identified in chapter 4.2. and measured in chapter 4.3. Chapter 4.4. 
describes the research methods necessary for data processing and chapter 4.5. the 
data and sample selection.
4.1. Development of Hypotheses
The aim of this research study is to detect how risk disclosure by listed European 
insurance groups influences the investment/divestment decisions of capital market 
participants during the financial crisis. Based on theories and empirical studies 
analyzed in chapter 3 a concept has been built that creates a model that consists of 
variables and assumes premises among them. This process is called 
conceptualization by Charreire and Furieux (2001) and it requires hypothesis that 
illustrate relationships within this concept. The theoretical concept is assessed in a real 
life crisis situation and the researcher has to determine whether a hypothesis is 
acceptable or not aside from limits that enables the researcher to make a decision 
about the acceptability. Further prerequisites for testing hypothesis are identified 
variables quantified by using a risk disclosure index, an event study and a modified 
equity ratio as well as quantitative and qualitative methods are needed.
The six hypotheses that derive from the literature review in chapter 3 cover the 
following areas of the above mentioned relationship. Hypothesis Hi questions a 
relationship between the capital market and risk disclosing insurance groups. The next 
hypotheses cover the activities of the insurance groups and the capital market. 
Hypotheses H2 an H3 ask how listed European insurance groups adapt their risk 
disclosure performance in times of crisis or to their ownership structure. Hypotheses H4  
and H5 question how the capital market evaluates the fair value of insurance groups in
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a crisis situation based on trust that has been built up by disclosed risk information. 
The hypothesis He is for technical reasons in this research analysis and questions the 
risk disclosure performance difference from 2007 to 2008. The last hypothesis H? 
summarizes the relationship between all analyzed variables.
As stated in chapter 3.1.4. theory does not provide a simple cause and effect model 
that would explain to what extend the quality of risk disclosure of insurance group 
effects the financial decisions of investors. Although no single effect concept between 
accounting and capital market can be created in a functioning market situation Lutz 
and Diehm (2010) conclude that during crisis situations disclosed information can be of 
higher relevance for the decision making process of investors. With the intention of 
eliminating other confounding factors the hypothesis of a relationship between 
disclosure and capital market is tested. The hypothesis is based on an empirical study 
of Baek et al. (2002) that higher disclosure quality of companies in a crisis situation 
stabilizes their share prices.
There is no relationship between risk disclosure quality of listed European insurance 
groups and their fair value In a crisis situation. This Hi hypothesis is analyzed by the 
testing for a correlation between the risk disclosure performance of listed European 
insurance groups in their 2007 and 2008 consolidated financial statements and the 
cumulated abnormal return that represents the capital market reaction via the loss or 
built up of trust towards disclosure. The correlation must be statistically significant with 
a correlation coefficient within the confidence interval.
The motivation of listed European insurance groups to disclose their risk is supported 
by the principal-agent theory. However organizational factors like the selfishness of 
their managers can restrict the disclosure of risk information. Specified to crisis 
situation Wagenhofer et al. (2007) state that listed European insurance groups are 
advised to disclose as much risk information as possible because investors otherwise 
assume the worst. This would bring those insurance groups with the highest exposure 
to mortgage portfolio based financial instruments that are in the center of the financial 
crisis according to Scharpf and Schaber (2009) to disclose most risk information in 
their consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008. Extended and timely risk 
disclosure about these instruments would be awarded with high marks in the self 
administered risk disclosure performance measurement of this thesis. The reduction in
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modified equity ratio from 2007 to 2008 is a proxy that is used to measure the extent of 
risk each listed European insurance group is exposed to via mortgage portfolio based 
financial instruments.
It is assumed for this research that no situations occurred between 2007 and 2008 that 
would have increased the provisions of listed European insurance groups. The variable 
change of modified equity ratio is based on the assumption that no significant insured 
event took place in the period 2007 to 2008 that would have hit a single listed 
European insurance groups more than others and would have caused it to record for a 
provision that would have reduced equity.
There is no relationship between risk disclosure quality of listed European insurance 
groups and the degree they are affected by the financial crisis situation measured 
using the change in their modified equity ratio. This H2 hypothesis is analyzed by 
testing for a correlation between the risk disclosure performance of listed European 
insurance groups in their 2007 and 2008 consolidated financial statements and the 
negative effect that the recent financial crisis produced on their equity ratio. The 
correlation must be statistically significant with a correlation coefficient within the 
confidence interval.
Based on chapter 3.2.1. corporate governance of listed European insurance groups 
can influence the disclosure quality. The empirical study by Chen and Cheng (2007) 
found out that a certain degree of institutional shareholders is beneficial for the risk 
disclosure performance of insurance groups.
There is no relationship between risk disclosure quality of listed European insurance 
groups and their degree of institutional ownership. This H3 hypothesis is analyse 
testing for a correlation between the risk disclosure performance of listed European 
insurance groups in their 2007 and 2008 consolidated financial statements and the 
minimum 10% level of institutional investors as defined by Chung et al. (2008) on the 
voting shares of listed European insurance groups. The correlation must be statistically 
significant with a correlation coefficient within the confidence interval.
The relationship between corporate risk disclosure and the capital market response 
cannot be analyzed within the same period of time. The format to disclose risk 
information is standardized and required in the consolidated financial statements of
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listed European insurance groups. The financial crisis situation peaked during 
September 2008 at a point of time when the last published financial statements has 
been half a year old and the next one expected in half a year. This time gap has been 
closed with the assumption of trust that can be build up by extended risk disclosure 
and helps investors to hold on to their shares during financial crisis situations. 
According to research in psychological factors that influence behaviour of market 
participants, extended disclosure leads to a good reputation of a company (DIRK 
2007). Trust by market participants that derives from a good reputation of a company 
makes them hold on to the company's shares or to buy more. Bad reputation in 
combination with a crisis situation might lead to short sighted behaviour by market 
participants. This behaviour is recognized as “herding” in the literature (Hirshleifer, 
Teoh, 2003) and makes market participants divest from shares of companies with bad 
risk disclosure performance.
The share prices of listed European insurance groups do not decline during the 
analyzed event of the financial crisis. This H4  hypothesis is tested by analysing 
whether or not the share market valuation of the insurance industry dropped after AI G 
announced its near insolvency. This is done by measuring the average standardized 
cumulative abnormal return of all thirteen listed European insurance groups that sould 
be zero when no effect takes place and be negative when the share market valuation 
dropped.
The next hypothesis is based aside from theoretical knowledge analyzed in chapter 3. 
Based on the assumption that risk information are communicated between listed 
European insurance groups and the capital market using structured ways like financial 
statements the capital market could not detect differences between the insurance 
group. The information about drops in the fair value of crisis relevant financial 
instruments and impairments that would reduce the equity of insurance groups have 
been disclosed later than the point of time when the event study that measured the 
reaction of the capital market has taken place.
There is no relationship between the capital market reaction and how the modified 
equity ratio of listed European insurance groups has been affected by the financial 
crisis. This H5 hypothesis is analyzed by testing for a correlation between the 
cumulative abnormal return that represents the capital market reaction and the proxy
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for the negative effect that the recent financial crisis produced on the equity ratio 
change from the consolidated financial statements as of 2007 to 2008. The correlation 
must be statistically significant with a correlation coefficient within the confidence 
interval. This hypothesis test whether or not the capital market is efficient in detecting 
those listed European insurance groups with the highest risk and the resulting drop in 
their equity disregarding their risk disclosure performance.
The risk disclosure performance is not measured in an index that includes the 
checklists of 2007 and 2008. Instead the analysis of each financial year is measured 
separately. The reason for this is that the accounting requirements changed during the 
crisis and that a search of key words has been performed in the checklist 2008 that 
could not be performed in the checklist 2007. This separation allows additional 
research on how listed European insurance groups changed their discretionary risk 
disclosure. A prerequisite for these conclusions is that there is a relationship between 
the results of the risk disclosure analysis for 2007 and 2008.
There is no relationship between the risk disclosure performance 2007 and 2008 of the 
listed European insurance groups. This He hypothesis is analyzed by testing for a 
correlation between the risk disclosure performance of listed European insurance 
groups based on their 2007 consolidated financial statements and their risk disclosure 
performance based on their 2008 consolidated financial statements. The correlation 
must be statistically significant with a correlation coefficient within the confidence 
interval.
The next hypothesis summarizes the relationship between capital market and listed 
European insurance group that disclose risk information during the crisis situation. The 
dependent variable that measures the response of the capital market towards the risk 
disclosure and the two independent variables that measure the affect the crisis had on 
the groups by their reduced equity ratio and their risk disclosure performance 
measured in an index are combined. The goal of this hypothesis is to specify the 
relationship between the capital market reaction towards risk disclosure tested in the 
Hi hypothesis by adding the proxy for negatively effected by the financial crisis as 
another independent variable.
There is no relationship between the capital market reaction and the risk disclosure 
performance and how the modified equity of listed European insurance groups has
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been affected by the financial crisis. This H? hypothesis is analyzed by testing for a 
correlation between the dependent variable of capital market reaction measured by 
cumulative abnormal returns and the two independent variables risk disclosure quality 
2007 and 2008 and the change in equity ratio as a proxy for the effect of the financial 
crisis on listed European insurance groups. The multivariable regression analysis 
necessary for hypothesis H? should improve the predictability of the capital market 
reaction by including two variables that influence it. The correlation must be statistically 
significant with a correlation coefficient within the confidence interval and a higher 
value than in the Hi hypothesis.
4.2. Selection of Variables
The relationship between disclosure of listed European insurance groups and the 
capital market is well researched (Verrecchia, 2001). However studies that measure 
the capital market reaction on the risk disclosure performance of companies are rare, 
due to lacking data. To be able to predict capital market reaction as well as the effort 
listed European insurance groups make with their risk disclosure the researcher needs 
a model that is based on measurable variables. In this chapter the implications for the 
research methodology that has been analyzed in the literature review are applied to 
the variables and documented how these variables are quantified in order to analyse 
their relationship during a crisis situation with quantitative research instruments.
The behaviour of the capital market is the dependent variable. It is influenced by the 
risk disclosure performance and the negative effect of the financial crisis on the equity 
ratio of listed European insurance groups as independent variables. The structure of 
institutional ownership is assumed in the literature by Chung et al. (2008) as an 
independent variable but is classified as a control variable in this thesis due to a similar 
ownership structure among all analyzed insurance groups.
The four variables risk disclosure performance, the capital market reaction measured 
with cumulative abnormal returns, the change in equity ratio as a proxy for the negative 
effect of the financial crisis and institutional Investors are described below.
Risk disclosure performance can be considered an independent variable in the 
relationship between listed European insurance groups and the capital market during
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crisis situations. Insurance groups can influence the dependent variable with the extent 
of risk disclosure they pursue. The preference of investors for risk information remains 
stable over time according to AI CPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009) covering blocks such 
as measuring risk and forecast information. As response to this crisis situation with its 
dramatic drop in the fair values of investments the investment risk with its three sub­
blocks market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk is added to these blocks and defined as 
the risk disclosure performance. The disclosure about the three sub-blocks of 
investment risk empowers insurance companies to explain how the unusual drop in fair 
value of assets they have invested in affects their recent financial situation and can 
predict future implications for the financial situation of their group. For the purpose of 
this research study disclosure about these risk factors in the consolidated financial 
statements 2007 and 2008 of listed European insurance groups is measured using a 
check list. The measurement process is described in subchapter 4.3.1. and 
documented in appendices A, B and C.
The dependent variable analyzed in this research study is the cumulative abnormal 
return. It can be considered the reaction of the capital market in response to risk 
disclosure of listed European insurance groups aggregated in a short period of time. 
The reaction of the capital market towards risk disclosure has been researched during 
the Korean crisis situation by Baek et al. (2002). According to them Korean companies 
with higher risk disclosure quality had a more stable share value over the crisis period 
then companies that disclosed less risk information (Baek et al., 2002). Although the 
Korean financial crisis differed from the global financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 a 
similar response of the capital market towards risk disclosure can be assumed for this 
research study. But it should be considered that unusual phenomenon in the share 
price as a response of the capital market towards certain events can exist according to 
Frino et al. (2009). Two aspects that have come up in the literature review should be 
applied to the accumulative abnormal return as a dependent variable of this research 
study. First, the response towards disclosure of the capital market can differ in crisis 
situation because of psychological aspects that influence the decision making process 
of investors as analyzed in chapter 3.3.2. Another aspect that can influence the capital 
market response is the access of private and institutional investors to risk information. 
As analyzed in chapter 3.3.1. institutional investors do not solemnly depend on 
financial statements but have access to non structured ways of communication with
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companies. Both psychological and information aspects can deter the response of the 
capital market from the assumed response that is based on research by Baek et al. 
(2005). Whether an unusual phenomenon in the response of the capital market to a 
crisis situation exists or not can be tested using the "event study method” which 
measures the development of the share prices at days around a significant event. 
Share prices are called by the researchers “return” and consequently the deviation of 
share prices form an individualized industry share index around a significant event is 
called “abnormal return”. The accumulation of all abnormal returns over the period 
around the event of each listed European insurance group is called “cumulative 
abnormal return” (CAR). Summarizing the cumulative abnormal returns of all 
researched insurance groups is measured in the research result AGAR or Z. The 
significance and direction of the abnormal return may indicate a phenomenon that 
requires deeper analysis or it may confirm the assumed response that the capital 
market holds on to shares of risk disclosing companies so that their share value 
remains stable during a crisis situation. The measurement process of this dependent 
variable is described in subchapter 4.3.2. and documented in appendix D.
Another independent variable is the change in equity ratio. This variable is necessary 
as an indicator to classify listed European insurance groups in two categories. On the 
one hand there are those listed European insurance groups that have not invested in 
financial instruments that have dropped in fair value as a result of the financial crisis. 
On the other hand there are those insurance groups that invested heavily in those 
mortgage portfolio based financial instruments to achieve higher returns. That 
expected higher return as it turned out in the crisis has been connected to a higher risk 
that materialized in a drop of the fair values in these financial instruments. Those listed 
European insurance groups with a heavy exposure to these toxic financial instruments 
and with significant losses due to their drop in fair value should have reported more 
about the associated risk to investors via their annual consolidated financial 
statements. Those insurance groups without this exposure did not need to disclose risk 
information to a similar degree. Therefore the change in equity ratio is used as a proxy 
to indicate the degree of investment by listed European insurance groups in toxic 
assets that have dropped in value during the crisis.
Why is the change in equity ratio a useful proxy for the degree of exposure to these 
toxic assets? In the recent financial crisis financial instruments quickly lost their market
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value in three ways. First directly by a drop in the value of their underlying mortgage 
portfolios, second by an indirect decrease of their values due to higher market interest 
rates when they have been fixed interest rate bonds that led to lower fair values or 
fourth by default of bond issuers. Lower fair values lead to depreciation of these 
financial instruments which in time leads to reduced equity and consequently to a 
reduced equity ratio. The equity ratio reflects the loss of companies' fair value more 
closely than the figure of depreciation which otherwise seems to be the most relevant 
figure to analyse the loss in fair value of international insurance groups. However, IAS 
39 “Financial instruments: Recognition and Measurement” allows companies to 
influence depreciation as a figure with effect on the profit and loss account depending 
on the IAS 39 categories they place their financial instruments into and to interpret the 
criterion of “lasting” lower fair values. But equity is affected by drops in these financial 
instruments fair values regardless of the chosen categories either by impairments or by 
unrealized losses. An additional reason why the figure of equity ratio is useful for 
measuring the impact of the financial crisis is that equity is fundamental for companies 
during a crisis because it increases the possibility of severely hit companies to survive 
the economic struggle. The measurement of this independent variable is described in 
subchapter 4.3.3. and documented in appendix E.
The last independent variable in the relationship between capital market and listed 
European insurance groups are the institutional investors that own a significant part of 
the equity of those groups. It is analyzed because according to empirical research by 
Eng and Mak (2003), Hotchkiss and Strickland (2003) as well as Chen and Cheng
(2007) institutional investors as shareholders improve the disclosure quality of listed 
companies. This theorem is based on the principal agent theory and assumes that long 
term investors control the management by demanding additional information to be 
disclosed. Due to a similar ownership structure the variable has the same number for 
all analyzed listed European insurance group and can therefore be recognized as a 
control variable. The measurement of this control variable is described in subchapter
4.3.4.
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4.3. Measurement of Variables
In the following subchapters methods are documented that have been used to 
measure the one independent and two dependent variables and one control variable in 
this thesis. Starting in subchapter 4.3.1. with the risk disclosure performance the steps 
lead to its measurement with a self administered risk disclosure index are presented. 
Then in subchapter 4.3.2. the behaviour of the share market in a crisis moment named 
cumulative abnormal return as the dependent variable is measured using the event 
study. After that in chapter 4.3.3. the change in equity ratio as a proxy variable for the 
impact the financial crisis had on the each listed European insurance company as an 
independent variable is measured by the change in modified equity ratio in the 
consolidated financial statements as of 2007 and 2008 of each insurance group. Last 
the control variable of institutional investors is measured by defining the type of 
investors and the minimum level of significant influence. This measurement is 
presented in subchapter 4.3.4. The measurement methods are stated to increase the 
reliability of the research. All calculations and results are presented in appendices to 
this research study.
4.3.1. Self-administered risk disclosure performance measurment 
To measure the risk disclosure performance of listed European insurance groups in a 
self administered risk disclosure index four steps have been taken. As a first step the 
analyzed content of risk disclosure has been defined. In a second step two checklists 
for each analyzed financial year have been constructed that are based on weighted 
categories and a scoring model that is based on investor information preference. The 
third step has been reading and putting the relevant risk disclosure passages of the 
consolidated financial statements in the two checklists. The forth and last step has 
been the calculation of the scores in each checklist and the calculation of an index. 
Each step is explained in the following. To increase the understanding of assumptions 
made and decisions taken by the researcher a current research study by Ewelt et al.
(2009) is cited and analyzed to provide a contrasting example.
In step one the content of risk analysis has been defined based on the results of the 
literature review and the comparison of accounting requirements in chapter 3. Risk 
disclosure is analyzed over the time period of January 2007 to March 2009 when the 
accounting requirements remained fairly stable and two group financial statements
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have been published by each listed European insurance group. In addition to 
international accounting standards IAS 1, IFRS 4 and IFRS 7 national German 
requirements such as GRS 5, GRS 5-20 and GRS 15 are used to provide the 
categories that listed European insurance groups can fill with their discretionary risk 
disclosure published in their consolidated financial statements. This category based 
measurement concept is based on empirical research by Core (2001). Based on the 
result of chapter 3.1.3. the highest level of risk disclosure required in one of the above 
mentioned accounting standards is taken as the necessary risk disclosure level in the 
checklists. This content of risk analysis has been implemented as categories in the 
checklist for the analysis of the consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008.
Risk disclosure in the group financial statements 2007 (referred to as pre-crisis) has 
been recognized according to the investment risk, the measuring risk and forecast 
information. The content of risk analysis for the financial year 2008 has been modified 
because during that period of time the crisis worsen and reached its peak. This lead to 
a change in accounting requirements and offered listed European insurance groups 
the possibility to disclose additional information to crisis related topics that had become 
of public interest The lASB as the standard setter for international accounting 
standards released amendments to IFRS 7 at the beginning of 2009 (lASB, 2009a). 
These amendments eased the pressure on companies to write down investments that 
negatively affecting their profit and loss account by reclassifying assets into other IAS 
39 categories. These easing requirements could be considered by listed European 
insurance groups in their group financial statements 2008 (referred to as post-crisis). 
Risk disclosure in the group financial statements 2008 included in addition to the above 
mentioned risk blocks the documentation whether or not listed European insurance 
groups used the IFRS 7 amendments or not. Additionally the disclosure of the 
companies about certain urgent topics that came up during the crisis is considered 
relevant risk disclosure for the analysis of the 2008 consolidated group financial 
statements. This corporate risk communication on urgent topics has been included as 
a criteria in the past crisis checklist 2008. In order to find this qualitative information in 
the consolidated financial statements 2008 on this new category key words have been 
used. These key words have been selected from an report by Business Insights (2008) 
"Impact of US subprime crisis on the insurance industry” that provided key words
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relevant to the insurance industry in the crisis. These key words have been reconciled 
with crisis relevant key words stated by Scharpf and Schaber (2009).
Due to this modification of the risk content that has been analyzed in the 2008 post 
crisis consolidated financial statements two checklists have been set up in a second 
step. The approach to use checklists for the risk disclosure performance measurement 
is recommended by Chen (2006) and has been used in other studies by Rahman 
(1998) as well as Cheng and Courtney (2006). These checklists build the data and 
scoring basis for the self administered risk disclosure index. Such indices have been 
recommended by Hussainey et al, (2003) for future research on disclosure 
performance in the absence of the discontinued US-based disclosure index by AIMR 
as mentioned in chapter 3.1.2. Critical parts of such self administered disclosure 
indices are to weighten categories and to score the content of risk disclosure. Both 
parts are subjectively performed by the researcher and reduce the reliability of the 
research results. To minimize this subjective influence the information preference of 
investors published in previous research has been used to weighten categories and to 
score content in the self administered risk disclosure index used in this research study. 
Based on research by AI CPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009) the three block of investment 
risk, measuring risk and forecast information have a similar importance for investors 
that remained constant over the years. However in this crisis situation investors 
requested more risk information about the prognostic value of companies and about 
the effects of drops in the fair value of investments on the companies. This crisis based 
modification of preference is recognized by adjusting the weight of the forecast block 
categories in the checklist to 40%, the weight of the investment block categories to 
35% and the weight of the measuring block categories to 25%. This modification has 
been applied uniformly in the pre crisis checklist on consolidated financial statements 
2007 and on the post crisis checklist on these group reports 2008.
Each risk block consists of sub-criteria that are specified in international and national 
German accounting requirements. The weight of the block had to be distributed among 
these sub-criteria. This distribution could barely be based on previous research on 
investor preference because the accounting standards changed too often during that 
period of time so that empirical studies that collected the preference of investors could 
not keep up with the speed of change. Only the insurance industry specific adaption of
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the German disclosure index (see chapter 3.1.2.) that is published annually by Balzer 
(2008) provides an orientation for the distribution of weights to the sub-criteria. The 
weight of sub-criteria such as the amendments of IFRS (lASB, 2009a) or the key word 
related sub-criteria could not be based on research and have been applied subjectively 
by the researcher. The weight to each sub-criteria is documented in the checklist 2007 
and 208 in appendices A and B.
Measuring the risk disclosure performance of listed European insurance groups 
require a judgement on the quality of information that have been published in their 
consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008. All the accounting requirements 
used to create sub-criteria are vague as to whether only qualitative or quantitative 
information are required. International standards such as IAS 1, IFRS 4 and IFRS 7 as 
well as national German standards such as GRS 5, GRS 5-20 and GRS 15 allow 
alternatives or different level of detailed information depending on the situation of each 
specific company as analyzed in chapter 3.1.3. In order to compare the risk disclosure 
performance of listed European insurance groups each published risk information had 
to be scored according to its usefulness to investors. Former research by Armeloh 
(1998) discovered in a survey of users of financial statements that they regard 
quantitative data as more informative than qualitative ones. Another discovering by the 
same researcher has been that company specific information are preferred by 
investors to general information. Both preferences have been implemented into this 
research study by setting up following scoring model.
Quantitative information on sub-criteria is rewarded with five points. Entity-specific 
qualitative information is rewarded with three points. General qualitative information 
that is not related to specific situation of the listed European insurance group is 
rewarded one point. When no information on the sub-criteria has been disclosed then 
one point has been subtracted. This has been done because it is possible to 
distinguish between information that a company must not or cannot disclose and 
information that companies just omit. This different approach of companies towards 
information demands of investors is recognized in the scoring model based on 
research by Armeloh (1998). This principal of punishing companies that are unwilling to 
disclose by subtracting points had to be applied to the easying of accounting 
requirements by lASB (2009). Each listed European insurance group had to state 
whether or not it has facilitated the choice to restructure their investments into different
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IAS 39 categories. No information on this sub-criteria would result in the deduction of 
one point. A negative statement that this accounting choice has not been utilized by 
the insurance group would result in three points. A listed European insurance group 
that has used this choice is required to disclose the quantitative effect of the 
recatogrization on the profit and loss account and equity. The disclosure of this 
quantitative risk information would result in five points granted.
An additional step has been included into the scoring process in order to increase the 
transparency and to document the scoring decision. The additional documentation of 
the scoring process of each sub-criteria should increase the reliability of this research 
study and enable other researchers to redo the scoring process with the same results. 
Each sub-criteria included in the pre-crisis checklist and the post-crisis checklist has 
been thoroughly analyzed concerning its detailed requirements. For this purpose the 
text of each relevant national or international accounting requirement has been stated. 
After that the scoring classes have been specified to each sub-criteria. As a result of 
this additional documentation every scoring process can be traced from the index 
score back to the score on the subchapter and the company's disclosed risk 
information out of its consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008 that in stated in 
the checklists. The scoring documentation is added as appendix C to this research 
study.
As a third step the consolidated financial statements as of 2007 and 2008 of all thirteen 
listed European insurance groups have been analyzed. All these financial statements 
have been accessed via the internet page of the insurance groups. The notes as part 
of the consolidated financial statements of the researched insurance groups have been 
read completely by the researcher. Relevant text passages and numbers from the 
notes have been copied and placed into the checklist. Risk information in the 
consolidated financial statements 2007 have been included into the pre-crisis check list 
2007 and those risk information from financial group reports 2008 have been 
transferred into the post-crisis checklist 2008. This checklist has been filled additionally 
with risk information concerning crisis relevant topics that have been disclosed by 
listed European insurance groups. The crisis relevant risk information has been 
searched by key-words using the search function of the word-processing programme 
within the consolidated financial statements 2008 on the companies' internet pages.
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All results of this third step are documented in appendix A and appendix B. The filled 
out and rated checklists of all thirteen listed European insurance groups are attached 
as these appendices.
The process of reading the financial statements, detecting relevant information and 
copying it into the pre-crisis and the post-crisis checklist has been tested with a dummy 
financial statements. The consolidated financial statements of ERGO Versicherungs- 
gruppe AG, a company not included in the unit of analysis, has been used to test this. 
No adjustments or corrections have been done as a result of this dummy testing.
As a fourth step the scores of the checklists have been calculated. A prerequisite for 
summing up all points is that the risk disclosure of each listed European insurance 
group has been graded. These grades have been multiplied with the weight associated 
to each sub-criteria. The weighted grades have been added up to the level of the 
blocks investment risk, measuring risk and forecast information. In recognition of the 
critic in chapter 3.1.3. that listed German insurance groups have an advantage 
because they are required to disclose forecast information whereas other listed 
European insurance groups do not oblige to similar national requirements two different 
results of each checklist have been calculated. One result that includes all three block 
investment risk, measuring risk and forecast information and another result without the 
scoring of the forecast block have been calculated for each checklist. This 
differentiation proved useful in the quantitative analysis in chapter 5.1. because the 
forecast information have been deleted from the further research study in order to have 
a level playing field of listed national German and European insurance groups. Instead 
of an index that would level detailed information a variable for each checklist has been 
created. Therefore a risk disclosure reporting performance 2007 and a risk disclosure 
reporting performance 2008 have been measured. The degree of fulfilment of the risk 
criteria have been measured in percentage. A result of each year form 0 to 1 is 
possible for the risk disclosure performance variable for each analyzed financial year.
Following comparison between a recent empirical study on risk disclosure by Ewelt et 
al. (2009) and this research study should demonstrate the difficulties in measuring risk 
disclosure performance. Ewelt, Knauer and Sieweke (2009, p. 706) analyse the risk 
disclosure performance of thirty German industry groups that are listed in the German
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share index DAX. The researchers focus on risk disclosure because of the “clearly 
defined accounting requirements that limit choices of companies” in preparing their 
group financial statements. This would increase the objectivity of the research study 
according to Ewelt et al. (2009). The researchers ignore the concept of discretionary 
disclosure by Core (2001) and the unravelling principal by Leuz and Diehm (2010) to 
get comparable risk information. By analysing the risk disclosure performance of listed 
insurance groups form different European countries the concept of Core (2001) and 
Leuz/Diehm (2010) should be applied in this research study. To illustrate the necessity 
the formal accounting requirements of IFRS 7 are equal but the risk information 
disclosed is also based on additional or supplementary national accounting 
requirements. This makes it difficult to compare the quality and quantity of risk 
disclosure. Only by assuming that each listed European insurance group can exceed 
these differences because an industry wide risk disclosure level is recognized makes a 
comparison of them possible. The companies analyzed in the research study by Ewelt 
et al. (2009) exclude listed banks and insurance groups because of their different 
business model and varying accounting requirements. This limitation creates a 
homogenous group of companies that can be compared in their risk disclosure, 
however significant the industries that have been directly affected by the financial crisis 
like banks or indirectly affected like insurance groups are not considered in the 
research study by Ewelt et al. (2009).
Differing from research by Ewelt et al. (2009) this research study specifies risk 
disclosure demand of investors according to their long term preference to a specific 
crisis situation. Rooted in empirical background (PwC, 2007 and Coval et al. 2009) 
investment risk, measuring risk and forecast information are seen to be relevant to 
investors in the analyzed financial crisis. These three information parts are the basis of 
the risk-disclosure checklist that has been used in this research study to measure the 
risk disclosure performance. These information parts have been operationalized in 
similarity with the research study by Ewelt et al. (2009) by applying accounting 
requirements and using their detailed requests codified in the accounting standards as 
categories and sub-criteria.
The risk information provided by companies in their group financial statements about 
these sub-criteria is scored. Ewelt et al. (2009) use a 0 to 1 scale instead of a 0 to 5
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scale as in this research study. In difference to this research study Ewelt et al. (2009) 
measures in addition to the quality also the quantity of risk disclosure by companies. 
This approach is criticized by Schleicher et al. (2007) who states that quantity does not 
equal quality in the risk disclosure. Other studies used the amount of disclosure 
measured in pages or words as a proxy for disclosure performance of companies 
(Botosan 1997, Lang and Lundholm 2000). The approach in this research study is to 
analyse the quality of risk disclosure performance solemnly disregarding its quantity.
Another difference in the two research studies is the information preference of 
investors that is recognized in one and is not recognized in the others research 
methodologies. Ewelt et al. (2009) assume that investors value every risk information 
provided in the consolidated financial statements the same way. This general 
approach is contrasted in this research study as it adapted weighten sub-criteria to 
crisis situations. Doing so this study approach assumes that investors appreciate 
certain risk information more than others, depending on what they regard as important 
during the crisis. The weighten of criteria is based on investor preferences that has 
been empirically researched, however certain adaptation within the risk blocks have 
been set subjectively in this research study. Both studies measure the index value as a 
percentage of the maximum points that could possibly be granted to each disclosure 
performance.
4.3.2. Measurement of the capital market reaction variable (CAR) 
Measuring the cumulative abnormal return of European insurance group shares by 
applying the event study method at the peak of the financial crisis should indicate any 
share value phenomenon. The result of this measurement is a prerequisite to verify an 
analogy in the observation of Baek et al. (2005) gained during the Korean financial 
crisis that in a crisis situation companies with high risk disclosure performance remain 
their share value. The test of a relationship between risk disclosure and the capital 
market reaction measured in the individual cumulative abnormal return of each listed 
European insurance group will be performed in chapter 4.3.4. using quantitative 
research methods.
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The measurement of the accumulative abnormal return of listed European insurance 
groups that are part of the unit of analysis takes place in five steps. After an 
introduction to the method as a first step the theoretical background of the event study 
is presented in a second step. The timing of the event study is critical to the useability 
of its result. Unlike in other event studies in which a cause and reaction take place at 
the same point of time this event study is based on a longer lasting cause effect that 
influences the reaction at a crisis point of time. Not the immediate response of the 
capital market toward announced trades (Frino et al, 2009) or towards changes in the 
accounting policies of companies (Cornett et al, 1996) is measured in this research 
study but how trust based on risk disclosure performance of companies affects the 
financial decision making of investors during a crisis situation. Assuming a long lasting 
cause that arises from the publication of annual financial statements the share price 
effect at a point of time is tested. The reasons why a certain point of time has been 
chosen to perform the event study are presented as a third step. In a forth step 
measures to improve the information usefulness of the event study results are 
described. This is being done by eliminating confounding events that are stated in this 
section. In the last and fifth step the formulas applied in the event study are listed that 
build up to the cumulated abnormal return. The event study is based on data that 
Bloomberg as an independent financial information system provides on a daily basis. 
The data have been gathered for one hundred share market trading days before and 
five trading days after the event. For this research study GoldmanSachs provided the 
share market data.
As a first step the event study is introduced. Event study methodology has been 
started by Ball and Brown (1968) as well as Fama et al. (1969) and further developed 
by Brown and Warner (1985). Event studies are designed to examine market reactions 
and excess returns around specific information events. They measure the impact of a 
specific event on the value of a firm according to MacKinlay (1997). These studies 
focus on the relative changes in share price following the effect of an event. Over the 
years this research method has been applied to a large number of events. 
Announcements of dividends, earnings, mergers, capital expenditures and new issues 
of share are a few examples of vast literature in this area (Ross et al., 1996).
What the event study does, it measures the abnormal return of shares during a time 
period around the event (the “event window”). The definition of abnormal return is one
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that exceeds the return justified by the riskiness of the investment according to Besley 
and Brigham (2000). Applied to a crisis situation this definition must be enlarged to 
lower return that justified by risk due to an overreaction of the capital market caused by 
psychological factors as stated in chapter 3.3.2. For the period of the event window the 
abnormal return is contrasted to the so-called “normal return”. The normal return is 
determined by applying the same deviation of the company's share price from a 
reference index which had been calculated for a time period before the event window 
(the “estimation window”). The cumulative abnormal return is the sum of the 
differences between normal and abnormal return for over the event window. The 
reference index used in this research study is Bloomberg BINSUR, an industry specific 
index that includes in addition to the thirteen IFRS insurance groups that are part of the 
unit of analysis other companies of the same industry that apply national accounting 
requirements such as US-GAAP. These later mentioned companies are not included in 
this study.
The useability of the abnormal returns for this analysis has been verified by testing the 
trade volume of each day in the event window. Trade days with low trading volume 
tend to result in unrepresentative share returns which impair the informative relevance 
of the event study results according to Andersen (1996). The analyzed trade days all 
had trade volumes of at least 30% of the mean trading volume of each listed European 
insurance group during the longer estimation window. Based on this the results of the 
event study can be considered fit for further research according to Brailsford (1996).
In a second step the theoretical underpinning of the event study method is presented. 
Event study methodology makes the assumptions of rationality in the marketplace so 
that the effects of an event will be reflected immediately in security prices and that 
asset returns are jointly multivariate normal and independently as well as identically 
distributed through time according to MacKinlay (1997). In case these statistical 
preconditions are not met nonparametric event study tests exist and can be applied 
according to Corrado (1989) and Cowan (1992). However concerns about the 
useablility of results from the event study have been eliminated by McWilliams and 
McWilliams (2000). According to them normal distribution can be assumed despite 
the limited sample size of thirteen listed European insurance groups in this research
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study. McWilliams and McWilliams recommend the event study method for even 
smaller sample sizes.
Another central assumption is that the event has been unanticipated by the market 
participants. In order to verify these assumptions researchers are urged to check for 
confounding events, that are additional events that took place during the research 
period and influenced market participants without formerly being addressed in the 
research analysis. The effects of these confounding events should be eliminated in 
event studies according to McWilliams and Siegel (1997).
The theory which is central to the practice of event studies is the operation of efficient 
capital markets, and the efficient market hypothesis. As stated by Ross et al. (1996) 
an efficient capital market is one in which share prices fully reflect available 
information. Besley and Brigham (2000, p. 315) define the efficient market hypothesis 
as 'the hypothesis that securities are typically in equilibrium - that they are fairly 
priced in the sense that the price reflects all available information on each security'. 
When a share continues to react to an unfavourable development, it often signifies 
adjustment to the new pieces of information about the situation that has become 
available, rather than over a long adjustment period. This makes event studies an 
important tool to analyse market reactions during crisis situations. This ability of the 
market to adjust to new information comprises the foundation of the efficient market 
hypothesis (Besley and Brigham, 2000).
Event studies are an ideal tool for examining capital market reactions. The results of 
the event study have a higher information usefulness in those cases where the sample 
companies have a common characteristic such as being members of the same 
industry (MacKinlay, 1997). This method can therefore best be used to evaluate the 
capital market opinion about companies that are similar in size, business model and 
belong to the industry such as the listed European insurance groups that are being 
studied in this research project. Although the assumptions regarding rationality and 
efficiency of the capital market remain doubtful during crisis situations the event study 
method is applied to this research study because by isolating a single effect within a 
narrow time frame they control for important differences within firms that cannot be 
observed by other means according to King and Lennox (2001).
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The timing of the event study as the third step is critical for analysing the relationship 
between risk disclosure and capital market reaction that is performed in chapter 4.3.3. 
Not the direct cause and reaction could be tested in this research study but whether or 
not trust that has been build up with extended risk disclosure holds in a crisis situation. 
Therefore the timing is essential for the reaction of the capital market and should take 
place at the peak of the crisis in order to minimize the influence of other factors on the 
capital market that are not considered in this research study. The event study method 
as used in this research methodology needs a specified date to be applied to. Previous 
research by Gonedes and Dopuch (1974), Leftwich (1981), Barth (1994), Barth et al. 
(1992) and Beatty et al. (1996) used the release of new fair value accounting 
requirements to test the relationship between companies' disclosure and capital 
market. Because the release of new accounting requirements or better the relaxation 
of these requirements (lASB, 2009a and 2009b) has been the reaction of the standard 
setter towards the financial crisis dates connected to their release could not be used.
The event study with a research date is preferred over research methods that analyse 
data over a longer period of time using arithmetic averages that do not recognize the 
character of a crisis and reduce the explanatory power of crisis data. The climax of the 
financial crisis has been set as a research date for the event study. This point of time 
can be specific to each industry and it enables researchers to test the relationship 
between accounting disclosure and the reaction of the capital market shortly before 
and after the event.
The near insolvency of AIG -  then the biggest insurance group of the world -  on 
September 14^  ^2008 has been chosen as the event date because it can be singled out 
as an unanticipated event of equal significance to all analyzed listed European 
insurance groups (Goldfarb, 2008). The effect has been unanticipated because on 
September 16*^  2008 AIG's share price fell more than 90 percent according to 
Brunnermeier (2009). Such massive share price reaction epitomizes the loss of trust 
that is important for the long term business of insurance.
The event study method has been applied and the cumulative abnormal return of each 
insurance group calculated in an event window of 10 days before and 5 days after the 
event date of September 14^ *^  2008. The estimation window is the period starting 99 
days before the event date until September 14**^  2008. According to Ryngaert and
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Netter (1990) the length of 99 days chosen In this research study as an event window 
is short enough to capture the significant effect of the event.
Because the near bankruptcy event of AIG took place on a Sunday the information 
following the publication, particularly of newswire articles, information was made 
available to investors by news-services and newspapers almost immediately and could 
therefore influence their trading behaviour from Monday which can be considered the 
day after the announcement even on the same day of the announcement. In this 
specific case due to the event on a Sunday the information could not leak prior to its 
announcement and be used for share trading before the information but has been 
widely available on Monday when trading started. However, often information has been 
found to leak prior to the official announcement date so it is possible that the event 
studied could have influenced the share prices of the days preceding the 
announcement (Ross et al. 1996). Therefore, taking the information leakage factor into 
consideration and knowing that difficulties of AIG were already known the event 
window includes 10 days prior to the announcement of AIG near bankruptcy at 
September 14^ "^  2008 and 5 days after (-10,+5).
As a forth step two corrections in the event study structure have been made to 
increase the informative value of its results.
The share market data and the event study results included in the event window ten 
days prior and five days after the event date have been tested for confounding events 
applying the recommendations of McWilliams and Siegel (1997). It has been checked 
whether or not active mergers or acquisition processes took place during that period of 
time that might have influenced the share prices of the researched listed European 
insurance groups. Doing so the ZEW-ZEPHYR M&A index has been checked for that 
period. It can be assumed that no such activity took place because the index has been 
on its lowest level for four years in September 2008 when the event date has been set. 
The web-sites of the analyzed listed European insurance groups have been tested on 
dividend announcements during that time and no indication has been found. However 
September 19^  ^ has been a triple witch day on share exchanges with unusual trading 
activities. Based on recommendation by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) the data and 
the results of this day have been eliminated from the research study. The same has 
happened to the data and results from September 8^*^ . At that day floods in China and 
hurricane season in the US have been topics of the day. Around that date an industry 
specific gathering of international reinsurers took place in Monte Carlo. Within this
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gathering reinsurance contracts for future time are closed or previous ones modified. 
This might explain the unusual share price reaction of this day, because the insurance 
industry being in the spotlight in Monte Carlo has been sensitive to information about 
possible claims that arise from the hurricane and floods catastrophes. The elimination 
of the data of both trade days reduced the data to thirteen from the original fifteen 
trading days in the event window. By doing so the researcher tried to eliminate trade 
day results with inducements that undue influence the results of cumulative abnormal 
return. The theoretical aspects of the four steps are considered in the application of the 
event study method. This is documented in appendix D.
As a fifth step the formulas needed for an event study and the prerequisite of 
regression for each listed European insurance group in the market model are 
presented as follows.
The abnormal return of insurance group shares during the event window can be 
calculated as the ex post return of the securities over the event window minus the 
normal return of the firm over the event window according to MacKinley (1997). To 
price data of securities the Bloomberg 500 Insurance Index called BEINSUR is used. 
For this event study the constant mean return model is used (MacKinlay, 1997 and 
McWilliams, Siegel 1997). Although the constant mean return model is the simplest 
model, its results are often similar to those of more sophisticated models according to 
Brown and Warner (1980).
Normal returns were assumed to be modelled for the share prices by the Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) market model. The calculation of the regression parameters has 
been performed using a scientific internet site
www.arndt-bruenner.de/mathe/scripts/rear.htm which is freely accessible and verified 
by applying SPSS as a statistical software.
The rate of return on the share price of insurance group i on day t is expressed as;
+PR,„,+e^, (1)
where
, = the rate of return on the share price of insurance company i on day t
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K,,t ~ the rate of return on a market portfolio, the Bloomberg Insurance Index 
BEINSUR on day t
a , (3 are the regression parameters for firm i, is the return on the share of each 
insurance group in the sample group for day t 
e,,t is the residual term or prediction error.
The definition of an abnormal or excess return is one that exceeds the return justified 
by the riskiness of the Investment (Besley and Brigham 2000). Thus, the reduction of 
excess or less abnormal returns associated with investors trust due to high disclosure 
performance on crisis related information were estimated by using the OLS market 
model, solving for the residual term as follows:
+ (2)
PJl^  , = the abnormal return for company i on day t, which is the residual term in the
regression equation. The abnormal return, based on the market model 
discussed by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for company i on day t using 
slightly different denuminations: ARit = Rit -  (at + btRmt) where at and bt are 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators, calculated over the estimation 
period, for the market model for insurance group i
Rf , = observed arithmetic return for insurance group i on day t 
R„, ^  = the return on the specific insurance index m for day t
â  or a and b according to McWilliams and Siegel (1997) = the Ordinary Least
Squares estimates from the regression of return data on firm i, with index m, 
for both their respective values during the estimation period days (-100,-11).
Sit = the standard error of the OLS market model regression for firm i 
T = the number of days in the estimation period
K = the number of days in the event window
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Process to calculate b und a:
Based on the website http://www.arndt-bruenner.de/mathe/scripts/reqr.htm the 
parameters and the standard error for each of the listed thirteen European insurance 
groups have been calculated and verified by applying SPSS a statistical software.
Results OLS analysis for a, b and St:
• Allianz
ARit = Rit-(-0 .09  +0,64 *Rmt)
St = 1,0086665698508985
• AXA
ARit=Rit-(-0,13 + 0,52*Rmt)
St = 0,94959529954217
• Generali
ARit = R it - (-0,16 +0,13 *Rmt)
St= 1,64994748443866
• Aviva
ARit = Rit- (-0 ,1 8  +0,03 *Rmt)
St = 1,653157058765464
• INC
ARit = Rit-( -0 ,1  + 0,56 * Rmt)
St = 1,1117734391394798
• Aegon
ARit = Rit-(-0 ,0 5 +  0,51 *Rmt)
St = 1,127421364502298
• CNP Assurance
ARit = Rit-(-0 .2 4 +  0,65 *Rmt)
St = 1,2868315026554742
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• Legal & General
ARit = Rit- ( -  0,18 + 0,04 *Rmt)
St = 1,6517209442920797
• Zurich
ARit = Rit- ( -  0,17 +0 ,17  *Rmt)
St = 1,6294925332317694
• MunichRe
ARit = Rit- ( -  0,06 + 0,73 *Rmt)
St = 1,2355239115045748
• Old Mutual
ARit = Rit- ( -  0,19 +0,0 *Rmt)
St = 1,655074658371793
• Standard Life
ARit = R it - (-0,19+ 0,03 *Rmt)
St = 1,6531482953882306
• Hannover Re
ARit = Rit-( -0 ,1 2 +  0,38 *Rmt)
St= 1,401592243298169
According to the efficient market hypothesis, firm i’s share abnormal return at time t, 
, should reflect the release of information at the same time. The expected value of
AR,, is zero if investors view the near bankruptcy of AI G as not conveying significant 
information to consider it for their market activities. Therefore, in order to derive at the 
excess or abnormal returns for every company, first the â and ^  respectively a and b 
parameters were estimated for each firm using a OLS calculation method. These 
regression parameters resulted from the regression of return data on firm i with index
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m for their respective values during the estimation period days, which is the interval of 
90 days before the event window (-10,+5).
Many researchers calculate a standardized abnormal return SAR following Dodd and 
Warner (1983) where the abnormal return calculated is standardized by its standard 
deviation:
SARit = ARit / SDit
With SDit is the standard deviation or ARn.
SDit = St j 1  ^ ( R m t ~ R m )+ - +
Y.jeEp{Rmt~Rm)
Where R„, represents the mean return over the insurance group's estimation period of 
the insurance index.
1CAR , = SAR u
Where k is the number of days in the event window. This number has changed with the 
confounding events that have been taken into account during the research. Thus the 
number of days considered in the event windows has been reduced from 15 to 13. 
This formula leads to the individual cumulated abnormal return of each insurance 
group, which provides a result that can be analyzed individually for each listed 
European insurance group and used in correlation analysis in chapter 4. It is assumed 
that the individual values of CAR; are independent and independently distributed and 
therefore t distribution is used as in the guiding literature by McWilliams and Siegel 
(1997).
The following equation does provide information about the abnormal return of the 
whole research group. Parameter n is the number of insurance groups included in the 
research sample.
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The average standardized cumulative abnormal return has been -10.1 when the two 
trading days as confounding events have been eliminated.
Alternatively the test statistic Z can be used to express the effect the AIG near 
insolvency has had on all listed European insurance groups together.
Z = ACAR X 4n
The cumulative abnormal return of 36,5 is significant. It can be stated that the near 
insolvency of AIG had a significant impact on the share values of the thirteen
researched listed European insurance groups. Further analysis will be based on the
CAR results of each insurance group. The data, the formulas and the application are 
documented in appendix D for all analyzed listed European insurance groups. The 
relationship between the CAR results as the independent variable and risk disclosure 
performance as well as change in modified equity ratio as dependent variables will be 
analyzed in chapter 5.2.2.
4.3.3. Change in modified equity ratio 2007 to 2008
The drop in the fair value of derivative financial instruments had a “devastating impact 
on companies during the Korean financial crisis” according to Rahman (1998, p. 17). 
These drops all affect the equity of companies that prepare their books according to 
IAS 39 “Financial instruments” (lASB, 1989). However some listed European insurance 
group can cope with such a negative financial impact better than other ones. To make 
the impact comparable ratios can be used that relate the affected equity to assets 
under management or total assets. Based on research by Nissim and Penman (1999) 
equity ratios are research tools that can be used to eliminate effects that derive from 
other economical or accounting related factors and to compare the economic 
performance of different companies. As listed European insurance groups all had the 
same ability to add equity from the capital market without a restricting ownership 
structure. Thus the starting equity ratio as of December 31^ 2007 has been similar to 
all researched insurance groups.
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However change in equity from one financial year to the next does not solemnly 
consists of the financial results of core business of a company. That is why changes in 
equity are explained to investors in the change in equity statement that is according to 
IAS 1 (lASB, 2003) a mandatory part of consolidated financial statements. This 
statement lists all effects on the equity within one financial year and classifies them. 
Because no industry-wide description of the classes exist the researcher tried to 
distinguish and compare all equity effects in the analyzed change in equity statements 
as of 2007 and 2008 in the consolidated financial statements of the listed European 
insurance groups. Depending on their business structure and their international 
business locations and activities these insurance groups disclosed in their change in 
equity statements effects such as reserves for currency transactions, transactions 
among subsiduaries and tax effects. These effects have been subtracted from the 
starting equity ratio of all insurance groups. Also accounting effects and factors specific 
to each listed European insurance group such as changes through shadow 
accounting, unspecified reserves and changes in pension plans schemes have been 
eliminated from the starting equity. Another subtraction from starting equity stated in 
the 2007 consolidated financial statements has been all changes in equity that are not 
based on core business activities and did not affect the insurance specific 
performance. These changes relate to own shares transactions and buy back 
programs, dividends paid and other distributions made to shareholders, the issue of 
new share capital and changes in subordinated debt that can be considered as a 
substitute for equity.
Based on the information disclosed by the listed European insurance groups in their 
change in equity statements the above mentioned substractions have been made. To 
arrive at ratios the stated equity as of consolidated financial statements 2007 has been 
cleaned from all the above mentioned non core business factors. The resulting figure 
for each insurance group has been divided by its total assets stated in their 
consolidated group financial statements 2007. To arrive at the modified equity 2008 
the cleaned 2007 equity is used as a starting point and the above mentioned non core 
business changes in equity stated in the 2008 consolidated financial statements 
substracted. The resulting equity figure has been divided by the total assets stated in 
the group financial statements 2008.
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The change from these two ratios has been used as an independent variable in this 
research study. The change in percent from the modified equity ratio 2007 to the 
modified equity ratio 2008 is the analyzed variable. The economic sense of this 
variable is the impact by the drop of fair value in investments that had to be accounted 
for by reducing equity. All disturbing factors that are specific to each company's size, 
location, organization etc. have been eliminated in order to purify the unrealized losses 
and impairments on financial instruments. Especially governmental support that have 
been provided to struggling listed European insurance groups have been eliminated. 
They appeared especially in the consolidated financial statements 2008 as share 
issues or subordinated debt issues and have been eliminated in order to provide a 
same level playing field approach for all listed European insurance groups that are 
analyzed in this research study. To improve the reliability of this research the 
measuring method to calculate modified equity ratios are presented in appendix E.
4.3.4. Percentage of institutional investors of stated equity 
Institutional investors are considered an independent variable in this research study, 
however due to their measurement they have become a control variable. Institutional 
investors control the management with their demand on additional disclosure as 
analyzed in chapter 3.3.1. In order to arrive at a figure on institutional investors in listed 
European insurance groups two steps have been taken. First the groups of investors 
that can be considered institutional must be defined. Second the level of this 
institutional investors sufficient to assume their significant influence must be set.
For this research study institutional investors are defined as families, trusts, significant 
individual investors, banks or insurance companies. This definition is based on similar 
empirical research by Chung et al. (2002).
More disputed in the literature is the level of institutional investors on the shares that is 
necessary for them to have a significant influence on the business activities and the 
connected accounting disclosure decisions of the management. The lowest level used 
in empirical studies is 5% of institutional investors owning of shares by Eng and Mak 
(2003) as well as Chen and Cheng (2007). Both research studies analyzed single 
substantial shareholders that can influence the business and accounting decisions of
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the management. This approach is not followed in this research study because all 
listed European insurance groups analyzed have such a size and global expansion 
that a single investor owning shares on this level is unlikely. A higher level of 10% that 
are directly or indirectly held by institutional investors is used in research by Attig et al. 
(2006). This level is the same as the one used in a research study by Chung et al. 
(2002) and will be followed in this study. To gather the information about institutional 
investors this research relied on the internet websites of the listed European insurance 
groups that are part of the unit of analysis. Twelve out of thirteen insurance groups 
provided the necessary information on their websides. The researcher tried to gather 
the missing data on one insurance group 'Standard Life’ by sending emails to the 
investor relation department that have not been answered. The missing data have 
been assumed on the basis of the majority of the ownership structure of the other 
twelve listed European insurance groups. The date the share ownership structures 
have been analyzed and published on their websites differed among the insurance 
groups. Ownership analysis dates strayed from year end 2005 to mid 2010 on the 
websites of the insurance groups.
When institutional investors exceed the 10% level they are considered as a 1 and 
when they fail to reach this level a 0 is measured in the statistical research in chapter
5.3. All analyzed listed European insurance groups have surpassed the 10% 
institutional ownership level by far. All insurance groups are considered in the 
statistical analysis with their value 1. This makes institutional investor a controlling 
instead of an independent variable for this research study.
4.4. Research Methods for Data Processing
Data processing includes the collection of data, the processing of data and the 
analysis of data. These steps are undertaken as a preparation before applying the 
research tools and partially performed by using computer programmes.
The collection of data has been performed by the researcher to gather data on the 
variables risk disclosure performance, change in modified equity ratio and 
institutional ownership of listed European insurance groups. The data on the capital 
market reaction has been provided by GoldmanSachs and verified in sample by the 
researcher using Bloomberg information that is accessable via internet.
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The processing of data has been done using Excel sheets that include formulas and 
other calculations. The processing of the data about risk disclosure performance has 
been detailed for each criteria and documented in appendix C. The processing of 
data about the capital market reaction has been done in excel sheets. The different 
formulas that are applied to calculate the ACAR and Z results are included and step 
by step documented in the excel sheets which are attached to this document as 
appendix D for each listed European insurance group. The formulas and connections 
of data on the capital market reactions have been checked by an independent 
researcher to avoid mistakes. The data for the modified equity ratio has been 
collected from the consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008 of each 
insurance group. The method to deduct positions from the equity is documented in 
appendix E. The data about the ownership structure has been gathered from the 
internet websites of twelve listed European insurance group. Standard Life as the 
only insurance group did not provide sufficient data about their ownership. It has 
been assumed that this insurance group surpasses the level of a 10% institutional 
ownership share that all other listed European insurance group as well.
The processing of the data has been done using ‘Statistical Package for Social 
Science’ (SPSS) in Version 17.0 that has been provided by the university. For the 
correlation analysis a code book with all variables, their SPSS names and coding 
instructions has been prepared.
The analysis of the data has been performed based on graphics. This has been done 
in order to check the distribution using SPSS and it has been used to cluster the 
listed European insurance groups based on the change in equity and their risk 
disclosure performance as of 2007 and 2008. This has been done to detect those 
insurance groups that have been extremely exposed to risk from mortgage based 
portfolio financial instruments and did not sufficiently disclose this risk position in their 
consolidated financial statements 2007 and 2008. These insurance groups can be 
considered high risk shares for investors. The same has been performed for 
companies with low equity ratio reduction and better risk disclosure performance. 
These insurance groups can be considered low risk shares for investors. The 
clustering is documented in appendix F and G. It has been used as a preparation for 
the expert interviews that have been applied as qualitative research tools in this 
thesis.
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4.5. Data and Sample Selection
The selection process of companies that are analyzed in research studies should be 
based on logical restriction according to Kraft and Nolte (2005). The number of 
companies that are included in the group of analysis is limited due to two logical 
restrictions that derive from the literature review in subchapter 3.2.4. The first logical 
restriction is that similar accounting requirements are necessary to compare risk 
disclosure performance on a detailed level. The second logical restriction is that all 
analyzed companies should belong to the same industry to have a coherent capital 
market response that is not diffused by effects that influence industries in different 
ways.
The first logical restriction that leads the analysis of risk disclosure only over a period 
of two financial years is that the crisis communication of listed European insurance 
companies is comparable from January 2007 to March 2009 when all companies 
applied nearly equal accounting requirements related to risk disclosure. In order to 
compare risk disclosure and recognizing the absence of external disclosure indices a 
situational risk disclosure index has been developed. This index is based on 
categories that derive from international accounting requirements. Because 
accounting requirements differ International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 
have been chosen for this research study as the ones that are most detailed on the 
aspect of risk information with the acting IFRS 7 as analyzed in subchapter 3.1.3. To 
base the research on this accounting standard reduced the unit of analysis to 
insurance groups that applied this standard during the researched period 2007 and 
2008. This lead to the exclusion of significant listed international insurance groups 
that applied US-GAAP a different set of US national accounting requirements from 
this research study. Beside the application of the same set of accounting standards 
the structure of companies with similar business risks, similar ownership structure, 
similar listing status and application of similar accounting requirements are a 
prerequisit for a homogenous group of companies to be analyzed. These limitations 
lead to a small sample of thirteen listed European insurance groups as predicted in 
the literature by Core (2001) for disclosure research studies.
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Referring to the second logical restriction is that including other less homogeneous 
companies in the unit of analysis would diffuse the causal relationship between the risk 
disclosure performance and the change in equity ratio as independent variables and 
the capital market response during a crisis situation as the dependent variable. This 
diffusion is indicated in Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) as well as Kim and Verrecchia 
(1994). They recommend that a homogenous group of companies from the same 
industry should be chosen in order to limit inter-industry effects and other hard to 
analyse relationships. Instead of banks that were affected differently from the crisis 
depending on being either an investment bank that sold crisis related financial 
instruments or a saving banks that bought them, being in the US or in Europe, having 
made acquisitions before or grown by themselves, insurance companies were chosen 
as the single industry analyzed in this research study because they were not directly 
related to the sub-prime crisis. Beside impairments on their financial instruments with 
mortgage portfolio underlying -  which also happened to other financial companies - 
their relationship with investors was affected by a single event. This allows the use of 
the event study method to analyse the effect of this single event on a limited number of 
listed European insurance groups. Due to this indication financial groups other than 
insurance business related are not included in this research study and insurance 
companies with a similar business structure and product portfolio have been chosen.
The researched financial crisis can be characterized by the drop of fair value in 
mortgage portfolio based financial instruments first. That drop has been followed by a 
decline in the fair value of other investments that lasted longer than one financial 
period. This market development has affected the insurance industry as a pool of 
investments by its business model most severely and uniformly whereas th^ affect on 
banks depended on their degree of activities in the securitization of mortgage based 
financial instrument, their exposure in certain regions of the world and their mix of 
business activities.
Following this argumentation only a unit of analysis consisting of thirteen listed 
European insurance groups has been selected as a sample for this thesis. This size 
might restrict the information usefulness of quantitative methods. A generalization 
from the behaviour of thirteen insurance groups can be misleading when applied to 
companies from a different industry, size or groups that disclose accounting
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information based on country specific accounting standards. This problem is 
recognized and solved by using a mixed method approach in this research study. By 
using qualitative methods statistical research results based on the existing unit of 
analysis are triangulazed and improved. In the structured interviews with experts in 
the field of listed European insurance groups statistical results from quantitative 
methods of this thesis are verified by experts that do not take part in the preparation 
of financial statements and can be considered as independent in their opinion.
By focussing on the insurance industry in this research on risk disclosure a lack is 
closed that other studies on disclosure like Ewelt (2009) leave when they exclude 
insurance groups from their unit of analysis because of their unique business model 
and the specified accounting regulations. So this research study that is based on a 
small unit of analysis follows the recommendation by Fields et al. (2001) to 
complement existing large sample studies with research study that analyse 
accounting effects with small sample studies. This is done on insurance industry 
specific risk disclosure during a crisis situation.
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C h a p t e r  5
5. Research Methodology
The hypotheses will be tested using quantitative and qualitative research tools. 
However, by choosing these tools and by setting the research methodology the 
researcher brings his personal touch to this study. This influencing factor that is 
recognized as the epistemological presuppositions of the researcher by Girod-Sèville 
and Perret (2001) is analyzed and stated in chapter 5.1. Other factors that influence 
the methodology as well as limit the usefulness of the researched results are the 
assumptions made for this research study that are stated in chapter 5.2. The research 
methodology is detailed in chapter 5.3 and 5.4. The statistical relationship between the 
variables is topic of chapter 5.3. In this chapter the search for correlations between the 
variables is documented as well as the attempt to find causal relationships between 
more than two variables applying regression analysis although the statistical 
prerequisites for this statistical method are not met by the small unit of analysis in this 
research study. Chapter 5.4. introduces structure interviews with experts as qualitative 
methods to triangulize the statistical results as part of the mixed method approach. In 
this chapter the experts commented on the theoretical assumptions, the research 
structure, the statistical results and the relevance of the research results on future 
accounting standards. Chapter 5.5. states confidentiality aspects and ethical 
considerations of the research.
The goal of chapter 5 is to provide transparency on the methods to analyse 
relationships among variables. The results of the methods described in this chapter 
and whether or not the hypothesis as the implementation of the research question can 
be falsified or not are content of chapter 6 ‘Results and Discussion’,
107
5.1. Epistemology
According to Girod-Séviil and Perret (2001) two epistemological questions should be 
answered by the researcher to disclose his personified influence on the study. One is 
his understanding of knowledge and the second are the ways the researcher takes to 
produce this knowledge. The understanding of knowledge has been influenced by 
the literature review in chapter 3. Based on this literature review the researcher found 
out that the behaviour of listed companies and capital market participants is based on 
economic theories that are constant. Regardless of the statistical insufficiency this 
allows the researcher to use statistical tools in order to predict investor's behaviour 
on extended risk disclosure according to theories and test it. This approach can be 
considered a model that the researcher affiliates himself with according to Kuhn 
(1962). By measuring variables and analysing their relationship using statistical tools, 
the researcher belief is that objective knowledge will be gathered in this approach. 
The benefit of this positivist approach is a high degree of confirmation and logical 
consistency according to Girod-Séville and Ferret (2001).
However subchapter 3.3.2. about psychological factors that influence capital market 
participants and is impossible to include as a variable in this research approach 
proofed that emotional factors influence the decision making of investors. This 
questions the positivist approach which is based on a model that recognizes all 
influencing variables. Considering this capital market participants are integrated in a 
social systems and tend to act within one. This consideration is supported by the 
“herding theorem” in subchapter 3.3.2. which describes that individual investors tend 
to rely on the decision of other capital market participants and do not decide on a 
pure rational basis. Considering this in the research study social factors of investors 
need to be recognized considering a critical realism paradigm of the researcher.
The dual paradigm approach in researchers the understanding of knowledge 
influences the way this research is pursued. The methodology of this research 
recognizes economic theories and develops a model in order to predict the behaviour 
of the capital market in a crisis situation. Considering the social context in which 
financial decisions are taken by individual investors both paradigm should be used to 
answer the research question of this study. The positivist and critical realism 
paradigm should be combined to a multi paradigm perspective that is applied to this
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research in a mixed method approach. Based on the literature review the researcher 
developed the theoretical cause and effect model and created hypotheses. After this 
abductive process the hypotheses are tested using an event study and correlation 
statistics as a hypothetico-deductive process (Chalmers, 1976). To triangulate these 
results interviews with expert users of financial reports are held in order to explain the 
results implemented in the mixed method approach. The results of the quantitative 
event study are analyzed with a qualitative approach. This mixed method approach in 
the research of disclosure was suggested by Beattie et al. (2004). Interviews are held 
with experts specialized in the field of European insurance companies from banks or 
rating agencies. The combination of these two approaches is defined as 
methodological triangulation (Yin, 2003) and allows the researcher to benefit from the 
advantages of the quantitative and the qualitative approach (Baumard and Ibert, 
2001). The quality of the quantitative event study is impaired by the small sample 
size. However the sample size cannot be extended to other Insurance groups, 
because they differ in size and structure or follow other accounting requirements than 
IFRS. Interviews with preparers of group annual financial statements are dismissed 
because of their personnel involvement with the company and their inability to freely 
disclose the motives of their accounting decisions. The information provided by 
experts and analysts can be biased by their need for justification of the financial 
judgements they have made about the companies. The combination of both 
approaches using statistics and interviews enhances the quality of the research 
study.
Another aspect of epistemology is the degree to which the research results can be 
generalized and transferred. To achieve this, the validity and reliability of the 
research should be considered in the research methodology. Validity represents the 
relevance and the precision of research results that correspond with the extent to 
which the research results can be generalized according to Drucker-Godard et al. 
(2001). Although the concept and the measurement of the tools used in this research 
study are scientific standard and explained in detail in chapter 4.3. due to the 
research subject the results can hardly be generalized to other research situations. 
This research focuses on a financial crisis situation that has been considered unique 
in regard to its intransparent risk situation by Baetge et al. (2008). To catch the risk 
information published by insurance companies in their groups financial statements as 
of 2007 and 2008 accounting standard based criteria have been selected and
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extended by key words special to this financial crisis in analogy of research by Chen 
(2006). Although the criteria have been weighten based on preferences used before 
the crisis (Armeloh, 1998) the measuring of the disclosure performance based on an 
index cannot be generalized to other non-risk related parts of group financial 
statements. As a result the specification to the financial crisis 2007/2008 reduces the 
ability to generalize the results of this research study.
Another aspect of epistemology is the ability to transfer the results. This is possible 
when the study could be repeated by another researcher or at another point in time 
with the same results according to Drucker-Godard (2001). To increase this reliability 
all procedures to measure and analyse the variables are described in detail in the 
subchapter 4.3.1. and 4.3.2. Additionally the checklists filled for all listed European 
insurance groups are documented and attached as appendices A and B to this 
research. As a further step to increase reliability all assumptions made in the research 
methodology are documented in chapter 5.2. All these means and documentation are 
provided to the reader for transparency purposes.
Contrasting these reliability improving procedures certain limits exist. A recent study on 
risk disclosure by Lenz and Diehm (2010) however illustrates that in this research field 
limits must be accepted until technical improvements occur. Lenz and Diehm in their 
empirical study state that “selecting the types of risk to be analyzed and choosing the 
category the risk is refered to is based on a high degree of subjectivity” (Lenz and 
Diehm, 2010, p. 391). However they stress the fact that the setting of a research 
method in risk disclosure research is based on subjective decision they point out that 
this critical point applies to the majority of empirical risk disclosure studies namely 
Kajüter (2001), Bungartz (2003), Vielmeyer (2004) and Filipiuk (2008).
The researcher faced the problem that corporate governance policies prohibit most 
rating agencies to discuss their policies and judgment with non-clients. As a result only 
one rating agency has been willing to discuss questions with the author of this 
dissertation under anonymity. Due to this lack of qualified experts the researcher 
extended his search for experts by looking for other knowledgeable users of financial 
statements of listed European insurance groups. Those users have been selected 
based on whether or not they represented a certain group of users of financial 
statements of listed European insurance groups. Contacting the experts has been
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based on personal recommendations by friends and collègues of the author of the 
dissertation.
Another weakness in the risk disclosure research is that due to the high manual effort 
to read, extract, compare and rate risk information in group financial statements this 
analysing process is not performed parallel by another researcher. Lenz and Diehm
(2 0 1 0 ) state that the analysis of group financial statements has been performed by 
Diehm only. His research results have not been double checked by performing another 
analysis of the same group financial statements by another researcher. They admit 
that this research procedure restrains the objectivity of the research and sets limits to 
its reliability. Lenz and Diehm (2010) suggest that computer based methods to analyse 
qualitative risk disclosure in group financial statements should be developed and 
applied in further research.
Certain steps to increase the reliability of this research study have been done by 
adding the results of nearly every research step as appendices to this work. This 
enables the reader to trace any risk relevant statement of an insurance group 
disclosed in their group financial reports to the checklist, to the scoring process and to 
the risk disclosure performance. This transparency in the research should increase the 
transparency of this research methodology. However restrictions concerning the 
subjectivity of the analysis remain. Because they are common in the leading empirical 
studies on risk disclosure they are accepted as a given in this research study. The 
validity of the research remains low because due to the emphasis of this research 
study on a specific financial crisis situation its results can hardly be generalized. 
However they can indicate how listed European insurance groups act on other 
sensitive accounting information that may be required by future fair value measuring 
and disclosing international accounting standards.
5.2. Assumptions
To research the relationship between risk disclosing listed European insurance groups 
and the capital market assumptions have been set. Several assumptions are set in 
regard to variables researched and other assumptions are implied in the research 
methods applied in this research study.
I l l
Following assumptions are made concerning the risk disclosure performance of listed 
European insurance groups that is included in this study as a variable.
Although the preference of investors about the type of risk disclosure has been 
analyzed by AI CPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009) the preference of investors to have or 
not to have risk information has to be assumed. Lenz and Diehm (201 Op. 387) call it 
the “unravelling principal” that investors assume the worst risk situation when they are 
not provided with entity-specific risk information. Based on this assumption there is an 
incentive for the management to extent their risk disclosure in times of crisis. This 
leads to implications in the measuring of the risk disclosure performance when it is 
assumed that listed European insurance groups are willing to exceed the requirements 
set by international accounting standards to meet the expectation of investors taking 
an active approach towards risk disclosure. Additionally it implies in the measuring 
process that little disclosure of risk information or the statement that such a risk is not 
present is regarded higher than no risk information at all.
According to empirical research by Kajüter and Winkler (2003) companies prefer to 
disclose unspecific general risk information instead of individualized risk information 
specific to the company. On the contrary investors need company specific information 
to ensure rational financial decisions. Because quantitative risk disclosure must be 
company specific whereas general risk can be described qualitative investors prefer 
quantitative risk disclosure. In a crisis situation the assumption of constant information 
requirements by investors set in empirical studies like Sengupta (1998) should be 
modified. Companies that hold greater risk shall provide more information than 
companies with smaller risk. These assumptions are implemented in the measurement 
of risk disclosure performance in subchapter 4.3.1.
Following assumptions are made concerning the capital market participants, whose 
reaction is analyzed in this study as a variable.
It is theorized that timely, extended and specified disclosure of insurance companies 
about financial investments such as those that originated the crisis enhances the 
company's credibility and causes their investors to respond favourable towards the 
company during a crisis (Vater et al., 2008, p. 2606). This company -  shareholder
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relationship has been researched simulating crisis situations and empirically testing an 
increase in the purchase intent of stakeholders to buy a product of the disclosing 
company (Arpan and Roskos-Ewoldsen, 2005, p. 430). Along the same lines previous 
research by Diamond and Verrecchia (1991) and Kim and Verrecchia (1994) indicates 
that in a crisis situation investors are more likely to hold on to shares of companies that 
raise their confidence by a long track record of discretionary disclosure is applied to a 
crisis situation. Consequently each company's disclosure performance is measured by 
analysing the group financial statements of companies in 2007 and 2008 are analyzed 
and to find statistical evidence that those listed European insurance groups with high 
performance are held and not sold by their shareholders during the peak of the 
financial crisis. Pre crisis experience of investors with the insurance company is a key 
predictor of the investor's evaluation of the company during the crisis according to 
Arpan and Roskos-Ewoldsen (2005). The assumption that investors that are informed 
about risk do not sell the shares they own of that company during a crisis situation is 
implied in the quantitative methods that analyse the relationship between risk 
disclosing and share prices of listed European insurance groups in subchapter 5.3.1.
Following assumptions are made concerning the measuring of the capital market 
reaction, the quantitative and qualitative methods used in this research study
Measuring the capital market reaction certain assumptions are made when using the 
event study method. The assumption of market efficiency as the basis of the event 
study method is provided with short event windows according to McWilliams and 
Siegel (1997). However market efficiency is impaired during crisis situations. Therefore 
the trade volume of each share per day is considered in order to determine that the 
financial market is not inactive or tight so that it still can provide accurate share prices. 
With a minimum trade volume defined by Brailsford (1996) each insurance group has 
been tested on a sufficient trade volume during the event window. The normal 
distribution of the researched data in the event study can be assumed, because 
McWilliams and McWilliams (2000) assume it for smaller sample sizes than in this 
research. Another assumption for the use of the event study is that the event has been 
unanticipated. Although a crisis develops the near insolvency of the then world largest 
insurance company AIG can be assumed as unanticipated due to the magnitude of this 
event. Outliers have been identified using the indirect and direct approach by
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McWilliams and Siegel (1997). As a result the data of three days within the event 
window have been excluded from the research as detailed in subchapter 4.3.2.
The amount of statistical data gathered based on the unit of accounts restricts 
quantitative research methods. This restriction is accepted for this research study 
because the risk disclosure quality can only be compared between groups that apply 
the same accounting standards, that have a similar business structure and that 
account based on a constant set of rules over a period of time. It is assumed that the 
resulting population of thirteen listed European insurance group is sufficient to be 
statistically analyzed, although certain preconditions on normal distribution or sufficient 
sample size might not be met. Due to the application of a mixed method approach the 
verification of these insufficient statistical results by expert interviews is assumed to be 
enough.
Applying quantitative methods certain assumptions about the type of experts that have 
been asked to participate in this research study have been made. Experts in the field of 
European insurance industry have been asked on the research methodology and 
results. Those experts cover the full range of users of groups financial statements 
representing the buyer-side, the seller-side, transaction bankers and rating agencies. 
Preparers of financial statements have not been included in this group, because it is 
assumed that they are not sufficiently objective. Being responsible for preparing 
consolidated financial statements of listed insurance groups it is assumed that these 
managers are not in the position to switch sides and commend from an investor side 
on the information that they provided themselves.
5.3. Quantitative Methods
The hypotheses are detected and tested by finding the relationship between the 
dependent and the independent variables using two different quantitative methods. 
According to Pallant (2007) these methods explore in a first step the association 
between pairs of variables by testing their correlation and in a second step predict 
capital market reaction as a dependent variable towards the two independent variables 
risk disclosure performance and equity ratio by testing multiple regressions. 
Institutional investors are considered a controlling variable, because all listed European
114
insurance groups have the same high level of institutional ownership in common that 
they all share the same data (see subchapter 4.3.4.) that is considered in quantitative 
methods.
In the following subchapters statistical test for normality are performed before methods 
to detect and test the relationship are applied. This is as a preparation for the results 
that are documented in chapter 6  ‘Results and Discussions’.
5.3.1. Testing for Normality
Testing for normality of the distribution determines the statistical research techniques 
that either parametric or non-parametric tests can be applied. The testing for normality 
has been performed for the dependent variable capital market reaction and the two 
independent variables risk disclosure performance and change in modified equity ratio. 
Three tests are applied to test the distributions of the variables. The 5% Trimmed 
Mean removes the top and bottom five per cent of the cases and recalculates a new 
mean value. Comparing the original mean with the trimmed mean shows the effect 
extreme scores have on the mean. The second test is the analysis of the distribution 
concerning skweness and kurtosis. Negative results on skewness present a 
distribution that leans to the right. Positive skewness results present a distribution that 
leans to the left. If a kurtosis result is negative, the distribution will be flat. If the kurtosis 
is positive, the distribution will be peaked. This test provides information about the form 
of the distribution that might falsify the assumption of normal distribution. The third test 
is the Shapiro-Wilk test that is applied to small samples and that is more rigid than the 
Koimogorov-Smirnov test that is considered as additional information (Field, 2009). A 
result of more than 0.05 indicates a normal distribution. A result of 0.00 indicates a 
violation of the assumption of normality.
5.3.2. Setting of the confidence interval
The confidence interval is necessary to decide whether or not hypotheses are true or 
not. The Pearson correlation coefficients of all relationships analyzed in this research 
study are different from zero. Therefore a correlation between the variable other than 
the controlling variable exists, it should be determined if the results of the correlation 
analysis are significant enough to falsify or verify the hypotheses.
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In order to do this all data on correlation results can be converted into data that has a 
mean of zero and a standard deviation of one that are called z-scores according to 
Field (2009). The z-scores set individual confidence intervals for each Pearson 
correlation coefficient. They have been calculated based on an SPSS syntax that is 
freely accessable via a companion website published in the statistic book of Andy 
Field at www.saaepub.co.uk/field3e.
The z-scores are used to construct a 95% confidence interval for each of the six 
analyzed correlations among the four variables. The variables are risk disclosure 
performance 2007, risk disclosure performance 2008, change in modified equity ratio 
and cumulative abnormal return that are tested for the following six correlations.
The two variables risk disclosure performance 2007 and change in equity have a lower 
boundary of confidence interval of -0.751 and an upper boundary of 0.259.
The two variables risk disclosure performance 2007 and 2008 have a lower boundary 
of confidence interval of 0,082 and an upper boundary of 0.867. The two variables 
change in modified equity ratio and risk disclosure performance 2008 have a lower 
boundary of confidence interval of -0.757 and an upper boundary of 0.245. The two 
variables cumulative abnormal return and risk disclosure performance 2007 have a 
lower boundary of confidence interval of -0.267 and an upper boundary of 0.747. The 
two variables change in modified equity ratio and cumulative abnormal return have a 
lower boundary of confidence interval of -0.141 and an upper boundary of 0.799. The 
two variables risk disclosure performance 2008 and cumulative abnormal return have a 
lower boundary of confidence interval of -0.398 and an upper boundary of 0.674.
When the Pearson correlation coefficients for these variables that are normally 
distributed are within the boundaries of the confidence interval, then the correlations 
can be assumed significant and the hypotheses can be falsified. A confidence interval 
for multiple regressions cannot be set, because according to Pallant (2007) the sample 
size is too small so that the researcher cannot rely on the results. The result of the 
analysis on multiple regression is therefore taken as an indication that is not pursued 
further statistically but is included in the structured interviews with insurance experts 
that are utilized to triangulize this result.
Table 1; Confidence intervals
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Correlation between Hypothesis Lower bound 
of a 95% 
confidence 
interval for r
Upper bound 
of a 95% 
confidence 
interval for r
Significance of 
r
Risk disclosure
performance
2007
Cumulative
abnormal
return
HI -0.267 0.747 0.274
Risk disclosure 
performance in 
2008
Cumulative
abnormal
return
H1 -0.398 0.674 0.530
Risk disclosure 
performance in 
2007
Change in 
modified equity 
ratio
H2 -0.751 0.259 0.262
Risk disclosure 
performance 
2008
Change in 
modified equity 
ratio
H2 -0.757 0.245 0.242
Change in 
modified equity 
ratio
Cumulative
abnormal
return
H5 -0.141 0.799 0.131
Risk disclosure 
performance in 
2008
Risk disclosure 
performance in 
2007
H6 0.082 0.867 0.026
A confidence interval for hypothesis H3 has not been calculated because all listed European insurance 
groups have institutional investors.
A confidence interval for hypothesis H4 has not been calculated because no correlation is measured.
A confidence interval for hypothesis H7 has not been calculated because it is a multivariate analysis that 
is not used for statistical purposes but only as an indication for the qualitative analysis.
5.3.3. Correlation analysis between two variables
Correlation coefficients as the product of correlation analysis provide a numerical 
indication of the direction and strength of the linear relationship between two variables 
according to Pallant (2007). A negative or a positive correlation coefficient indicates the 
development of one variable when the other variable increases. The size of the 
correlation coefficient indicates the statistical strength of the relationship. In a first step 
it is tested in this research study whether or not the relationship between two variables 
is linear or not. The kind of relationship being linear or not-linear determines the type of 
correlation coefficients used in this part of the research study. That is Pearson 
correlation coefficient (r ) for linear relationships as a parametric test and Spearman's 
Rank Order Correlation (rho ) for curvilinear relationship as a non-parametric test 
according to Pallant (2007). The results of the correlation coefficient used need an 
interpretation in order to be facilitated in this research study. The strength of the 
relationship between two analyzed variables can be interpreted based on Cohen 
(1988, p. 79) that a correlation coefficient of r=0.30 to 0.49 is considered medium 
strong and of r=0.50 to 1.0 is considered very strong. However individual confidence 
intervals that recognize the distribution of each variable are recommended by Field
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(2009). Because the statistical sample that is based on the unit of analysis with only 
thirteen listed European insurance groups is quite small z-scores are calculated in 
order to set improved correlation specific confidence interval that are necessary to 
verify or falsify the hypotheses from chapter 4.1. Additionally the coefficient of 
determination is used to explain the amount of variability in one variable that is 
shared by the other variable according to Field (2009).
5.3.4. Regression between multiple variables
Multiple regression techniques are used to explore the relationship between one 
dependent and a number of independent variables according to Pallant (2007). Applied 
to this research study the relationship between the capital market response as a 
dependent variable towards the risk disclosure performance and the proxy of change 
in modified equity ratio is tested using a standard multiple regression. According to 
Pallant (2007, p. 147) this approach explains ‘how much unique variance in the 
dependent variable each of the independent variables explains’.
The variable of institutional investors is indirectly recognized as a control variable 
because its value is 1 with twelve out of thirteen listed European insurance groups that 
are part of the unit of analysis. Lacking data on the thirteenth insurance group is 
assumed to be similar to the other groups with a value of 1, too. Multiple Regressions 
are performed because they allow ‘a more sophisticated exploration of the 
interrelationship among (...) variables’ than the correlation analysis according to 
Pallant (2007, p. 146). The knowledge gain of this method is that it is able to predict a 
particular outcome of a certain combination of variables. This would support the idea of 
Baiman and Verrecchia (1996) that an optimal level of risk disclosure exist, even when 
the referring dependent variable is not cost that has been critizised by Vielmeyer 
(2004) but share price stability measured using the cumulative abnormal return as 
described in subchapter 4.3.2. The variable that is a proxy for the effect the crisis had 
on the equity of each listed European insurance group can be controlled for to set this 
optimal level. Using a standard multiple regression to achieve this requires certain 
conditions that are not completely met in this research study. The small sample size 
that has been used in this research study in order to maintain a high quality information 
level of the risk disclosure variable hinders the application of multiple regression tools. 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) the required sample size for a regression
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analysis with two independent variables in analogy to this research design would be 6 6  
listed European insurance groups. This number cannot be achieved without comparing 
financial companies with different business models, different global reach and different 
accounting standards they apply. To base this risk disclosing research on sufficiently 
large group of analysis would lead to unspecific risk disclosure data. The response of 
the capital market towards non industry specific risk information diffuse the cause and 
effect relationship because the financial industry has been affected by the crisis 
situation differently depending on their individual business model and exposure to US- 
mortgage based financial instruments.
Although the statistical assumptions for multiple regressions are not met it is continued. 
The results may be invalid from a statistical point of view. They can be used however 
as indications that can be verified or refused in the structured interviews that are 
performed with experts in the insurance industry as described in the following chapter.
5.4. Qualitative Methods
By applying mixed method research using an explanatory design the shortcomings of 
the research methodology especially in the small unit of analysis that restrains the 
explanatory use of its statistical results are overcome. Mixed methods according to 
Baumard and Ibert (2001) are used to expand the results of the statistical analysis. To 
gain an in-depth understanding of the relationship between risk disclosure quality and 
the capital market reaction experts interviews are applied. Statistical analysis from the 
positivist perspective and expert interviews from the constructivist perspective are 
applied in this mixed method research approach. Both methods are sequenced and 
combined to maximize the understanding of the relationship in a crisis situation. The 
statistical results can be explained by experts (Morse, 1991) and those international 
insurance groups that are most relevant in the crisis can be selected for a follow up 
analysis (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).
Selecting those international insurance groups that have been analyzed in the 
interviews is done by clustering them as documented in appendix F and appendix G. 
The thirteen insurance groups are clustered according to how they were affected by 
the crisis (change in equity ratio) and their risk disclosure performance. Those three 
international insurance groups that were negatively affected most and disclosed least
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can be regarded as the most dangerous cluster for the capital market. Those three 
insurance groups that were affected least and disclosed most can be regarded as the 
most beneficial ones for the capital market. These six international insurance groups 
are contrasted and analyzed in structured interview with experts. As experts Managers 
of rating agencies as well as bankers and institutional investors, who are not involved 
in the preparation of financial statements and with expertise in the insurance sector are 
asked for structured interviews. The interviews shall focus on specific quantitative 
finding that need additional explanation (Creswell and Clark, 2007).
The following research method of structured interviews has been used in this research 
study. Five one-on-one telephone interviews have been undertaken during the 
research process in the period of time from December 2010 to January 2011. The 
participants in these interviews were qualified in the field of listed European insurance 
groups by their daily work.
The participants have been chosen according to their business position and their 
expertise in the field of listed European insurance groups. They are working at 
international banks that recommend shares of insurance companies their clients to 
buy, at investment banks that provide transaction services such as acquisitions of 
insurance companies and therefore follow them, at funds that buy shares of insurance 
companies to put them into their portfolio that they hold for their customers and at 
rating agencies that provide clients with their opinion about the financial strength of 
listed European insurance groups. The work-places of these participants represent 
experts that are using the group financial statements of European insurance groups for 
their business activities. They are not included in the preparation of these statements 
themselves. The participants selected for interviews represent the buyer-side by funds 
managers, the seller-side by bank managers and the rating-side by managers of a 
rating agency. Managers working in listed European insurance groups that take part in 
the preparation have not been included in the research study. It is assumed that they 
are biased in answering questions about financial statements that they could be held 
legally responsible for. The participants have not been selected randomly. Due to a low 
response rate from emails asking banks and rating agencies for a interview 
opportunities a different approach has been chosen. Based on the recommendation by 
friends and collègues personalized emails have been sent asking for an interview. This
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increased the response rate and allowed the researchers to cover buyer-side, seller- 
side and rating-side as users of consolidated financial statements of European 
insurance groups with expertise on the researched group of analysis.
The interviews were undertaken in a semi-structured way. This allowed the researcher 
to broach a series of subject areas defined in advance (Ibert et al., 2 0 0 1 ). Recognizing 
the limited time participants were able to allocate to these interviews topic and sub- 
topics as well as questions were sent to them via email at least two days in advance. 
This interview guide has been used to ensure that the same basic line of inquiry is 
pursued with each expert who is interviewed (Patton, 2002). These ‘guidelines for a 
structured interview’ as documented in appendix H have been pre-tested by a banking 
expert experienced in the field of European insurance groups who has not been taking 
part in the later interview process in order to increase the reliability of the qualitative 
data (Ibert et al., 2001). The interviews lasted between thirty minutes and one hour. As 
the interviews have been scheduled before or between meetings of participants the 
structured questions allowed an efficient use of the limited period of time available 
(Patton, 2002). All participants asked for not being recorded so their answered were 
written down by the researcher and later completed. The documentation of these 
interviews has been sent to each participant and has been confirmed by each expert. 
Ethical issues have been recognized in the guidelines that were sent to all participants 
ahead of the interview and mentioned verbally at the beginning of each interview 
session. As a response the majority of participants opted for anonymity. The 
participants told the researcher that corporate governance and internal requirements 
prohibit them to provide information or an opinion about the researched listed 
European insurance groups.
The topics and questions discussed in the semi-structured interview reflect the theory, 
structure and results of the quantitative research part. Using interviews experts were 
asked to comment on each part. The questions asked related to four sub-topics. The 
three research variables were three sub-topics and the other sub-topic the wider 
implications of the researched risk disclosure on the accounting process and the future 
of accounting standard setting. The sub-topics are the effect on equity ratio, the risk 
disclosure behaviour, the capital market functionality as the three research variables
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and the sub-topic of overall questions. Four questions on each sub-topic added up to 
sixteen questions overall.
Aside from the sequence of the questions the purpose of the interviews has been to 
verify the implied theory, the research methodology, results of the quantitative analysis 
and to ask experts about future implications.
The implied theory has been discussed with the experts in three questions that 
focused on the theoretical background of the research. The purpose of this approach 
was to gather the opinion of experts on theoretical assumptions between the 
relationship of corporate risk disclosure and the capital market that have been used in 
research studies but that have been questioned and specified in the face of financial 
crisis situations. The first question has been about the ability of the capital market to 
integrate all available information in its decision making process as assumed by 
Blackwell and Girshik (1954). The second question asked the experts on the predictive 
value of disclosed risk information. This question specifies the assumption of Blackwell 
and Girshik (1954) to financial crisis situations. As researched by Lenz and Diehm 
(2 0 1 0 ) it would enable experts to predict the effect a crisis would have on the listed 
insurance groups based on its disclosed information ahead of the crisis. The other 
theoretical question asked the experts about the relationship between risk disclosure 
performance and how the capital market recognized this activity. Although this 
relationship has been thoroughly researched by Welker (1995), Sengupta (1998), 
Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) as well as Lambert et al. (2007) it has 
been questioned recently whether or not it can be applied to crisis situations by Menz 
and Nelles (2009) who could not empirically support this relationship during a crisis 
period.
The research methodology has been discussed with experts in six questions. This 
research has focused on the insurance industry, on specific insurance groups, 
assumed preferences of investors regarding information disclosure, the proxy of equity 
ratio as a way to measure the negative effect of the crisis on listed insurance 
companies and has used the event study method at a certain point of time assuming it 
to be the peak of the financial crisis. The purpose of these questions was to discuss 
the research methodology with experts in the business field and not in the academic
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field where they are either uniformely accepted like the event study method 
(McWilliams and McWilliams, 2000) or rarely discussed like proxies or investor 
preferences. This approach did not work in regard with the event study method that 
was unknown to the experts, however it has worked out with the preferences that 
supported studies by AI CPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009).
The results of the quantitative research that analyzed the statistical correlation of the 
three research variables have been discussed with experts in six questions. The focus 
of these questions has been to explain the weak statistical relationship between better 
disclosure quality and a better opinion of the capital market of the disclosing company. 
This has been specified by clustering the researched listed European insurance 
groups. The cluster in which companies have been negatively affected by the financial 
crisis and did not disclose much information about their equity destroying structured 
financial instruments like Asset Backed Securities, Commercial Mortgage Backed 
Securities, Residential Mortgage Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt 
Obligations (Scharpf and Schaber, 2009) have been subject of questioning to experts. 
In addition to that questions have been asked about the opposite cluster of listed 
insurance companies that were less affected by the crisis and provided a lot of 
information. These questions however could not be answered by two of the three 
experts due to corporate governance regulations of their companies. The last question 
has been about a paradox in the relationship between disclosing companies and the 
financial market with that is statistically relevant. The capital market detected those 
companies that have been affected worst by the crisis way before they disclosed 
information about their risk. This paradox has been explained by the experts.
The future implication of the research has been the last question to the experts. All 
experts related this question to efforts of the accounting standard bodies to introduce 
market related fair value measurement to both sides of the balance sheets. The 
disclosure of fair values can been considered as sensitive as the disclosure of risk 
information about structured financial instruments during the financial crisis. With this 
analogy the researcher tried to determine a constant preference of listed European 
insurance groups not to disclose information they consider sensitive. The purpose of 
this question is to broaden the research results to future accounting matters and to 
other aspects of the communication between listed companies and the capital market.
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Although the answers of the experts are not specific they provide an idea about the 
topics that can used in future research studies.
5.5. Confidentiality and Ethical Considerations
To analyse confidentiality and ethical aspects or this research study the data gathering 
and the results must be distinguished. As far as the gathering of data infringes 
individual and organizational rights, the results do not place a threat towards these 
rights.
The research study is based on publicly accessable and private date. Listed European 
insurance groups are required by national law or listing requirements of share 
exchanges to disclose annual consolidated financial statements. When these 
statements are prepared according to International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) they must include risk information according to IFRS 7 in the researched period. 
These risk information is publicly accessable to everybody. The analyzed listed 
European insurance groups all present this information voluntarily on their corporate 
websites. The structuring of this data in categories and scoring them has no effect on 
the organization or any individual. The same can be said about the quantitative 
analysis using statistical methods to research the relationship between risk disclosure, 
change in modified equity ratio and capital market reaction.
However the qualitative methods used to verify, test and question the statistical results 
depend on interviews with experts. They are entitled to personnel rights and rights of 
the organization they represent. According to Patton (2002) questioning experts 
requires an interactive style of communication. This restricts the possibility of experts 
to maintain their anonymity by answering prepared questions. The interview of experts 
requires a personnel contact between them and the researcher either vis-à-vis or by 
phone. Such an exposure endangers their confidentiality rights and those of the 
organization they represent. Ibert et al. (2001) specify that the attitude or behaviour of 
experts or their organization may be revealed and that can have consequences for the 
organization. The confidentiality rights are endangered of investment banks, funds and 
rating agencies that all experts that have been taken part in the interviews belonged. 
Investment banks are providing transaction advice to different parties. With statements 
in the interviews they might lose their neutrality that is required by their customers. The
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same applies to rating agencies that sell their advice about the financial situation and 
outlook of organizations. The loss of neutrality would threaten their business model. 
Internal regulations of funds limit each fund manager in his or her external 
communication. Third parties should not be enabled to conclude about investment or 
divestment decisions taken by the funds by analysing external communication.
To consider confidentiality aspects in this research study, the researcher has taken 
following steps in preparation of structured interviews with experts. Based on the 
recommendation by Patton (2001) the researcher explained the purpose of the 
research study to each expert in a letter that has been sent to them at least two days 
ahead of the interview date. Another part of this letter which is attached as appendix H 
to this research study includes a confidentiality clause. This clause enabled each 
expert to opt for anonymity. As part of the introduction at the beginning of each 
structured interview it has been mentioned by the researcher that questions can be 
skipped by the experts. This right to refuse answers on certain questions has been 
used by several experts in the process of the interviews.
Based on the results of the literature review in chapter 3 a model of the relationship 
between risk disclosing insurance groups and the capital market has been developed. 
Within this chapter aspects of this model such as the analyzed variables, the methods 
used to measure these variables, the qualitative and quantitative research instruments 
as well as the unit of analysis have been set and explained. In performing this research 
no ethical problems have risen and the confidentiality of experts that have voluntarily 
taken part in this research study has been preserved.
In the next chapter the model-relationship is tested. According to Royer and Zarlowski 
(2001, p. 113) the testing requires that ‘hypotheses have to be formulated in such a 
way as to be (...) falsifiable'. In a second step the hypotheses are tested with 
quantitative statistical methods. Those results have been questioned or verified by 
experts in the field of the European insurance industry. The result of these structured 
interviews is the last part of the following chapter.
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C h a p t e r  6
6. Results and Discussion
The relationship between the variables capital market reaction as the dependent 
variable, risk disclosure performance and change in equity ratio as the independent 
variables and ownership structure as the control variable have been statistically 
analyzed. The results of applying the quantitative research tools are presented and 
discussed in chapter 6.1. In order to verify statistical results, the theory implied and the 
research methodology of this thesis, professional users of financial statements have 
been interviewed and the implications of the research results discussed with them. The 
results of the interviews are presented in chapter 6.1. The main findings are 
summarized in chapter 7.1.
6.1. Statistical Results and Discussion
6.1.1. Results of the test of normality
The results on the tests of normality for the cumulative abnormal return of the 
dependent variable, the risk disclosure performance of the two independent variables 
and the change in modified equity ratio are presented in the following. The distribution 
of the control variable’s institutional ownership is not measured because it has the 
same value for nearly all listed European insurance groups. The variable risk 
disclosure performance has been measured based on two checklists that refer to risk 
information that have been published in 2007 and 2008. Thus the results of two 
disclosure performances are presented.
The distribution of the cumulative abnormal return of the dependent variable that 
represents the capital market reaction can be considered normal. The trimmed mean 
of -10.08 is close to the mean -1 0 . 0 2  and the scores are clustered to the right with a 
negative Skewness of -0.061 an flat with a Kurtosis of -1.349. The Kolmogorov- 
Smirnov test with 0.134 and the Shapiro-Wilk test of 0.924 are higher than the 
significance level of 0.05 according to Field (2009). These results lead to the 
assumption of a normal distribution. This also supports the assumption of McWilliams 
and McWilliams (2000) that the data of event studies even on small samples can be 
assumed to be normally distributed.
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The distribution of the risk disclosure performance in 2007 of the independent variable 
can be considered normal. The trimmed mean of 53.518 is close to the mean 53.671 
and the scores are clustered to the left with a positive Skewness of 0.202 an slightly 
peaked with a Kurtosis of 0.075. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 0.147 and the 
Shapiro-Wilk test of 0.953 are higher than the significance level of 0.05 according to 
Field (2009). These results lead to the assumption of a normal distribution.
The distribution of the risk disclosure performance in 2008 of the independent variable 
can be considered normal. The trimmed mean of 53.956 is close to the mean 53.677 
and the scores are clustered to the right with a negative Skewness of -0.530 and 
relatively flat with a Kurtosis of -0.765. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 0.177 and 
the Shapiro-Wilk test of 0.945 are higher than the significance level of 0.05 according 
to Field (2009). These results lead to the assumption of a normal distribution.
The distribution of the independent variables’ change in modified equity ratio can be 
considered normal. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 0.166 and the Shapiro-Wilk test 
of 0.967 are higher than the significance level of 0.05 according to Field (2009). These 
results lead to the assumption of a normal distribution.
For all dependent and independent variables it can be assumed that their distribution is 
normal. Therefore parametric tests have been applied to analyse the relationship 
between the variables with statistical methods.
Table 2: Test of Normality
Mean Trimmed
mean
Skewness Kurtosis Kolmogorov-
Smirnov
Shapiro
Wilk
Dependent
variable;
Cumulative
abnormal
return
-1002 -10.08 -0.061 -0.075 0.147 0.953
Independent
variables:
Risk disclosure
performance
2007
53.671 53.518 0.202 0.075 0.147 0.953
Risk disclosure 
performance 
2008
53.677 53.956 -0.530 -0.765 0.177 0.954
Change in 
modified equity 
ratio
0.324 0.388 -0.244 0.200 0.166 0.967
There is no test of normality for the control variable ‘institutional ownership’ because all listed European 
insurance groups have significant institutional ownership
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6.1.2. Correlations between the variables
The form chosen to present the correlations between variables is summarized in 
accordance with Paliant (2007, p. 133).
The relationship between risk disclosure performance in 2007 and the capital market 
reaction measured by the cumulative abnormal returns in a crisis situation has been 
investigated using a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Preliminary 
analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the assumption of the normality and 
linearity. There was a medium positive correlation of r=0.333 between the risk 
disclosure in 2007 and the cumulative abnormal return and a weaker positive 
correlation of r=0.196 between risk disclosure in 2008 and the cumulative abnormal 
return with n=13. Both correlation coefficients are between the lower and upper 
boundary of a confidence interval that have been calculated using z-scores for each 
statistical distribution. The hypothesis Hi that there is no relationship between risk 
disclosure quality of listed European insurance groups and their fair value in a crisis 
situation can be rejected. High risk disclosure quality of insurance groups in their 2007 
and 2008 financial statements leads to lower negative cumulated abnormal returns. 
The capital market appreciates the disclosure of risk information and does not sell their 
shares in such companies as fast in a crisis situation. The statistical relationship is 
stronger with the information disclosed in the 2007 financial statements before the 
crisis peaked than with the 2008 data because this was the information considered by 
the capital market during the event period. The result supports the empirical study by 
Baek et al. (2002) so that their results can be transferred to the financial crisis situation 
of 2007 and 2008. With a coefficient of determination of 0.111 for 2007 and R  ^of 
0.038 for 2008 the shared variances between the variables are limited.
The relationship between risk disclosure performance in 2007 and 2008 of listed 
European insurance groups and the degree they are affected by the financial crisis 
situation using the change in their modified equity ratio as a proxy has been 
investigated using a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Preliminary 
analyses were performed to ensure no violation of the assumption of the normality and 
linearity. There was a medium negative correlation of r=-0.340 between the risk 
disclosure 2007 and the change in modified equity ratio and a stronger negative 
correlation of r=0.354 between risk disclosure 2008 and the cumulative abnormal
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return with n=13. Both correlation coefficients are between the lower and upper 
boundary of the confidence interval that have been calculated using z-scores for each 
statistical distribution. The hypothesis H2  that there is no relationship between risk 
disclosure quality of listed European insurance groups and the change in modified 
equity ratio can be falsified. High risk of derivative financial instruments that are based 
on mortgage portfolios are associated with lower equity ratio, because the instruments 
lost a significant portion of their value during the crisis. This loss is recognized by 
reducing the equity of insurance groups. The smaller the equity and thus the higher the 
materialised risk from these derivative financial instruments the better the risk 
disclosure performance. Therefore insurance groups under financial stress try to 
improve their disclosure about their financial risks more strongly in their 2008 financial 
statements after they experienced the shock and awe of the event as a peak of the 
effect from the financial crisis on the insurance business. With a coefficient of 
determination of a of 0.116 for 2007 and a R^  of 0.125 for 2008 the shared 
variances between the variables are limited.
The relationship between risk disclosure performance of listed European insurance 
groups and their degree of institutional ownership is not correlated because the 
ownership structure of all analyzed insurance groups is measured with the number one 
as all groups are owned by more than 10% institutional owners. It was not possible to 
find out the ownership structure of Standard Life as one of the listed European 
insurance group. Assumed that this insurance group is not owned by institutional 
investors and provided with the value of zero in this statistical analysis a correlation 
coefficient r =-0.062 is close to zero. Therefore the H3 hypothesis cannot be falsified. 
Institutional investors as a significant proportion of shareholders have no statistical 
influence on the risk disclosure quality of companies. The reason for this is that 12 of 
the 13 analyzed international insurance groups have significant institutional investors.
The results on the H4  hypothesis are not based on a correlation analysis. The results 
sums up the cumulative abnormal returns of all thirteen listed European insurance 
groups analyzed. The H4  hypothesis that the share prices of listed European insurance 
groups do not decline during the analyzed event of the financial crisis cannot be 
supported. The average standardized cumulative abnormal return that summarizes the 
share price development of all listed European insurance groups in the unit of analysis
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is -10.1. This means that the share value of each insurance group deviated negatively 
from the industry index during the period of the event window by 10,1%. It can be 
stated that the near insolvency of AI G indeed troubled the shareholders of listed 
European insurance groups, let more owners sell their shares than shares bought and 
therefore leading to lower share prices and a decreased fair value of the insurance 
groups.
The relationship between the capital market reaction and the change in modified equity 
ratio of listed European insurance groups at a crisis situation has been investigated 
using a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient. Preliminary analyses were 
performed to ensure no violation of the assumption of the normality and linearity. There 
was a medium high positive correlation of r=0.444 with n=13 between the capital 
market reaction represented by the cumulative abnormal returns of each listed 
European insurance group and their change in modified equity ratio. The correlation 
coefficient is between the lower and upper boundaries of the confidence interval that 
has been calculated using z-scores for each statistical distribution. The H5 hypothesis 
can be falsified. High risks of derivative financial instruments that are based on 
mortgage portfolios are associated with lower equity ratio, because the instruments lost 
a significant proportion of their value during the crisis. This loss is recognized by 
reducing the equity of insurance groups. The smaller the equity and thus the higher the 
materialised risk from these derivative financial instruments, the higher the negative 
deviation of the share price of the listed European insurance groups from the industry 
benchmark. Therefore the lower the risk and the higher the equity ratio the lower the 
negative deviation of the share price of the insurance company from the industry 
benchmark. The capital market has worked efficiently by reducing the share price of 
international insurance groups in September 2008 that had high financial risk. This risk 
arose from financial instruments based on mortgage portfolios. The risk from these 
financial instruments materialized four months later when the financial statements of 
2008 of the insurance companies disclosed the decrease in equity caused by the drop 
in fair value of these instruments. With a coefficient of determination of 0.197 the 
shared variance between the variables is limited.
The relationship between the risk disclosure performance in 2007 and 2008 of listed 
European insurance groups has been investigated using a Pearson product-moment
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correlation coefficient. Preliminary analyses were performed to ensure no violation of 
the assumption of the normality and linearity. There was a high positive correlation of 
r=0.606 with n=13 between the risk disclosure performance of both years. The 
correlation coefficient is between the lower and upper boundary of the confidence 
interval that have been calculated using z-scores for each statistical distribution. The 
He hypothesis can be falsified. Those listed European insurance groups with a high 
disclosure performance in their consolidated financial statements 2007 also have a 
high risk disclosure performance a year later in 2008. Those insurance groups with a 
low disclosure performance in 2007 showed a low disclosure performance based on 
their 2008 consolidated financial statements. The impression that the risk disclosure 
performance of listed European insurance groups is relatively stable shows that their 
willingness to disclose risk information is not situational and is not significantly 
influenced by the financial crisis situation.
Table 3: Univariate analysis measured by Pearson correlation
Cumulative 
abnormal return
Change in 
modified equity 
ratio
Risk disclosure 
performance 2007
Risk disclosure 
performance 2008
Risk disclosure 
performance 2007
r=0.333 r=-0.340 r=0.606
Risk disclosure 
performance 2008
r=0.196 r=-0.354 r=0.606 -------
Cumulative 
abnormal return
r=0.444 r=0.333 r=0.196
6.1.3. Multivariate regression
The relationship between the capital market reaction as dependent variable and the 
risk disclosure performances 2007 and 2008 as well as the change in modified equity 
of listed European insurance groups as independent variables of this research study 
have been investigated using a Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient 
although the sample of listed European insurance groups is statistically too small to 
apply such regression analysis according to Paliant (2007). Therefore no confidence 
interval has been calculated. The statistical results are used as an indication for the 
qualitative method applied in this research study. The results of the H? hypothesis are 
used to cluster listed European insurance groups according to their relevance for the 
capital market. Those that disclose little and bear significant risk positions are 
frightening to the capital market. Those that disclose a lot and bear little risk are the 
stars of the capital market. These results are documented in appendices F and G. The
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response of the capital market is influenced by a medium correlation of r=0.282 with 
the change in modified equity ratio and to a high correlation of r=0.584 with the risk 
disclosure performance of 2007. The response of the capital market is influenced to a 
slightly lower degree with a medium correlation of r=0.262 with the change in equity 
ratio and to a lower degree with a medium correlation of r=0.292 with the risk 
disclosure performance of 2008. The H? hypothesis can be falsified although this result 
is not based on statistically valid confidence intervals and the necessary sample size. 
The better risk disclosure performance and a lower risk from derivate financial 
instruments that are based on mortgage portfolios resulting in a higher equity ratio, the 
less insurance groups suffer from a negative effect on their share price in a crisis 
situation. The capital market does not sell the shares of those companies with small 
financial risk and a good risk disclosure performance in a crisis situation. The capital 
market relies more on the risk disclosure performance before the crisis event with a 
correlation coefficient of r=0.584. The statistical significance of this multivariable 
correlation is higher than the Ho hypothesis because the is high with 0.461 and even 
the R^corrected Q.354 is higher than the R  ^of the Hq with 0.111 according to Backhaus 
et al. (2008). So it is worth using the multiariante regression analysis with the change 
in modified equity ratio and the risk disclosure performance of 2007 as independent 
variables in this research study.
After the quantitative results are presented, qualitative methods are used in the 
combined research approach to improve the precision of the statistical measurement 
according to Baumard and Ibert (2001).
6.2. Qualitative results and discussion
Interviews with users of consolidated financial statements that are experts in the 
European insurance industry were performed and documented in appendix I. By using 
clusters those insurance groups were selected that should be analyzed by experts 
from rating agencies. The sample of thirteen international insurance groups was 
subdivided into four clusters using their disclosure performance of 2007 and the 
change in equity ratio. Two of the clusters each containing three insurance groups with 
bad disclosure performance and low equity ratios as well as a cluster of three 
insurance groups with high disclosure performance and high equity ratio in 2007 and 
2008 were further analyzed as documented in the appendices F and G.
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The three insurance groups Allianz, ING and Standard Life are the ones with the 
lowest disclosure performance and the highest risk from financial instruments in the 
crisis situation measured by the reduction of equity used as a proxy. Can they be 
considered the most dangerous investments in the industry?
The three insurance groups MunichRe, AXA and Zurich are the ones with the highest 
disclosure performance and the lowest risk from financial instruments in the crisis 
situation measured by their reduced equity ratio used as a proxy. Can they be 
considered the safest investments in the industry?
The interviews have been performed with five experts in the fields of banking, 
investment banking, fund management and rating agencies that cover the full 
spectrum of professional users of risk information in group financial statements. The 
daily work of all experts is focused on the European insurance industry. The purpose of 
the interviews was to receive comments about the implied theory, the research 
methodology, results of the quantitative analysis and to ask experts about future 
implications of the research performed.
6.2.1. Experts on the implied theory
Answers on these questions differed among experts. The first question about the 
ability of the capital market to include all information available at a given point of time in 
the share price was answered by four experts. The question is based on the 
assumption mentioned by Blackwell and Girshik (1954) that can be considered the 
cornerstone of empirical research on the capital market. Although the experts agreed 
on the assumption they voiced criticism that this is an academic assumption. They 
pointed out that the business model of listed European insurance groups is far too 
complex so that not all information is available to the market and can be processed by 
the capital market. Anonymous (2010) asserts that insurance shares suffered unduly 
during the crisis. Seel (2011) provides the information that the special regulations in 
each European market and entity-specific assumptions on disclosed information make 
it almost impossible -  especially in the life insurance business -  to gather the 
necessary information to compare new business ratios among listed European 
insurance companies. The information was based on the attempt to create an internal
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report on European life companies. This questions the capacity of the capital market to 
receive understandable and sufficient information in order to make financial decisions.
The second question about the assumptions of a relationship between corporate 
disclosure and the capital market can be adapted to the financial crisis. As mentioned 
by Lenz and Diehm (2010) it would be possible to predict the effect of the financial 
crisis on the listed insurance groups in September 2008 based on risk information that 
was disclosed in the group financial statements 2007. The question was answered by 
four experts. Anonymous (2011a), Anonymous (2011b) and Anonymous (2010) are 
supportive that the effect of the crisis on European listed insurance groups can be 
predicted. However Anonymous (2011a) specifies that information needed to make 
such predictions exceeds that which is disclosed in the group financial statements or 
disclosed in other ways. Seel (2011) opposes the opinion of the other experts by 
stating that the insurance industry is far too complex in order to be able to make 
precise predictions about the financial results of European insurance groups.
The third question about the relationship between risk disclosure performance and how 
the capital market recognizes this activity has been thoroughly researched by Welker 
(1995), Sengupta (1998), Healy et al. (1999), Botosan and Plumlee (2002) as well as 
Lambert et al. (2007). They empirically supported better financial possibilities on the 
capital market for listed companies that exceed requirements and disclose additional 
information. The psychological aspect of this relationship gains importance during 
crisis situations. Williams and Dolnik (2001) found out that such disclosure behaviour 
of companies increases the credibility of these companies in the eye of the investor. 
These investors are endangered of panicking during crisis situation in a phenomenon 
called “herding” by Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003). Only the trust of investors in the 
credibility of companies can reduce such herding effects (Vater et al., 2008). All 
experts agreed that timely and extensive disclosure of companies build up trust by 
investors. Seel (2011) points out that it is the quality and not the amount of information 
that is significant for investors. He defines this quality as being able to compare 
disclosed information with other benchmarking European insurance groups.
Summarizing the experts verified existing theories about the relationship between 
disclosing European insurance groups and the capital market, they support the
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theoretical ability of the capital market to consider every information available at any 
given point of time in its decision making process. However, some experts constrict 
this opinion when they stress the complexity of the insurance business model, the 
country-specific regulations and the entity-specific assumptions. These constraining 
factors limit the efficiency of the capital market in regard to the share evaluation of 
listed European insurance groups. The experts question the interdependency between 
disclosure performance of companies and their share evaluation by stating that the 
information disclosed must be comparable in order to be useful for investors.
6.2.2. Experts on the research methodology
The research methodology has been determined by the kind of industry and the 
companies that were analyzed, by the event study method and its timing, by the 
proxies to measure the effect of the crisis and the risk disclosure performance by the 
companies.
The focus of this research is on the insurance industry. Only insurance companies 
were analyzed because they did not initiate the financial crisis but predominantly 
experienced side effects of the crisis like illiquid markets for financial instruments and 
lower market interest rates on corporate and governmental bonds. These side effects 
mattered to them because insurance companies are major pools of financial assets. In 
order to research this industry it is essential that listed European insurance groups 
were affected in a similar way in order to compare their risk disclosure behaviour and 
the reaction of the capital market on their disclosure. All five experts answered this 
question. Their shared opinion was that the insurance industry was hit hard by the 
financial crisis. The industry was affected indirectly by the crisis according to Noack 
(2 0 1 0 ) unlike banks which were hit harder and directly by selling credit default swaps 
that originated the crisis (Anonymous, 2010). The experts explain this difference 
between banks and insurance companies by pointing out that insurance companies 
have a longer liquidity position that did not force them to sell as many assets as banks 
during a time when the market was down (Anonymous, 2011b). The experts did not 
address the problem in this question that several of the researched listed European 
insurance groups owned banking subsidiaries. This leads to organizations with a 
mixed structure of banks and insurance segments. It disturbs the idea of a 
homogenous group of analysis that was analyzed in this research study.
135
In addition to the focus on the insurance industry only listed European insurance 
groups that record their books according to International Financial Reporting 
Standards (IFRS) were included in this research study. The purpose of these 
restrictions was to build a comparable and homogeneous group of companies to be 
analyzed. The request about the homogeneity of the insurance companies was part of 
the question: Which European insurance group was affected most negatively by the 
crisis? Four experts answered the question. They agreed upon two main differences in 
the structure of European insurance groups. First, the exposure to the US-life 
insurance market forced these groups to meet financial guaranties of policies which 
they sold that could not be achieved with the actual return of their investments which 
lead to significant losses during the researched period of 2007 to 2008 according to 
Noack (2010) and Anonymous (2011a). Second, by being involved in banking activities 
European insurance groups were affected directly by the financial crisis and not only 
indirectly like those groups with pure insurance business (Anonymous, 2010). 
Anonymous (2010) and Noack (2010) specify that AI G and SwissRe as two 
international insurance groups that were involved in initiating the financial crisis by 
selling credit default swaps. These two groups were excluded from the sample of this 
thesis because they record their books according to US-Generaily Accepted 
Accounting Standards (US-GAAP) that differ in their requirements to disclose risk 
information from the other internationally applied accounting standards IFRS. This 
leads to the conclusion that the thirteen European insurance groups that were 
analyzed in this research are only partially homogenous. Groups with banking activities 
like Allianz and ING could be considered separately or given special attention in the 
analysis of their statistical results. However, the thirteen groups are homogenous in the 
accounting standards they apply and in the way that they are predominantly indirectly 
affected by the financial crisis and did not initiate it by selling credit default swaps.
The event study method was used to analyse the reaction of the capital market 
towards risk disclosure at a certain point of time. The method is uniformly accepted in 
the academic world to analyse the relationship between events of listed companies 
and the capital market reaction (McWilliams and McWilliams, 2000). Only one of the 
five experts answered this question. Anonymous (2010) did not respond to the 
application of the event study method but pointed out and provided examples, that the
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financial crisis produced some extraordinary share price reactions. The event study 
method contrasts according to Kothari (2001) average market reaction in the past with 
extraordinary share price reactions around the chosen event date. Therefore this 
scientific method is applicable to the analysis of this financial crisis. What Anonymous
(2010) might suggest is that the analysis should not stop by stating that there are 
extraordinary share price reactions but why these reactions occurred. At least this is 
the way he explains the share price of MetLife and AEGON in the examples he 
provides. Although none of the experts explicitly recommends the event study method, 
one of them hints in the direction that research tools should be used to analyse 
extraordinary share price reactions. As the event study method is accepted in the 
scientific community to be such a tool (McWilliams and McWilliams, 2000) it is 
assumed that this part of the research methodology is supported by the experts.
The timing of the event study was set in such a way as to minimize other confounding 
factors and to purify the relationship between risk disclosure and capital market 
reaction. Based on the assumption of Vater et al. (2008) that during the peak of a 
financial crisis investors fear most and need trust to hold on to their investments the 
event study was set on September 14^ *^  -, 2008 when AI G faced near insolvency and 
had to be rescued by governmental aid. This event was chosen because it complies 
with the requirement set by Kothari (2001) that it is not clustered in calendar time and 
with the requirement by MacKinlay (1997) of being preponderantly unanticipated. All 
experts answered the question regarding the timing of the event study method and 
alternative timing. Four experts agree that the near insolvency of AIG has been an 
unanticipated one-time disaster. This incident left investors shocked and fearful 
according to Anonymous (2010) and Anonymous (2011a). Noack (2010) and 
Anonymous (2010) suggest other dates like the insolvency of Lehman, an investment 
bank, Hypo-Real-Estate, a German Pfandbrief-bank or the recapitalization of ING. 
However these suggested events lack the same magnitude or are locally restricted to 
certain countries. As a result of the expert interviews the chosen event date has been 
confirmed. Alternative dates can be considered in future research studies.
Two proxies were used in this research project. One proxy is the change in modified 
equity ratio of listed European insurance groups. This quantitative number should 
stand for the effect the financial crisis had on the insurance groups. The underlying
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assumption is that the financial crisis lowered the fair value of interest bearing assets 
and equity based assets that insurance companies as pools of investments are 
holding. The difficulty is that insurance groups can categorize their assets into different 
groups according to IAS 39. Depending on the chosen category lower market values 
are accounted for in different ways either against loss or against equity. As a result the 
effect on the annual results varies but on the equity of companies remains the same. 
Therefore experts were asked about modified equity ratio being a proxy to represent 
the effect each European insurance group suffered from the financial crisis. All five 
experts answered this question. The experts explicitly agreed that the change in the 
modified equity ratios can be used as a proxy for the effects of the financial crisis on 
insurance groups. Anonymous (2010) specified that banking losses from insurance 
groups with banking segments lowered the equity ratio as well. As a result, direct and 
indirect effects of the financial crisis on European insurance groups are enfolded in the 
proxy that is used in this research study. Seel (2011) and Anonymous (2011a) 
suggested more specific proxies to use. Seel (2011) suggested to use several results 
of European insurance groups in one year such as results from regulatory accounting 
required by insurance companies by local regulators, results from rating agencies 
concerning these groups and results from the embedded value that life insurance 
companies voluntarily disclose. The problem with such an expanded proxy is that not 
all results are available and comparable. The accounting requirements of local 
regulators may differ and the business model of the analyzed European insurance 
groups vary so that the embedded value that measures only the market value of life 
insurance segments may not be available for all insurance groups or overrate the 
significance for one group. Another suggestion by Anonymous (2011a) was to extend 
the period of time in which the proxy is measured. He suggests that the write-downs 
because of lower market values of investments and the write ups when the market 
value of these investments rises again should be measured. The advantage of this 
method would be that the impairment policy of each insurance group could be 
analyzed. Does the insurance group write investments down during the crisis because 
of lower market values or does it wait until the prices come back to the original level? 
The disadvantage of this method would be the longer period of time to measure. It is 
not clear at what point of time the market values of all investments get to the same 
level as before the crisis. Another objection of the experts is that depreciation is not by
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choice and that all insurance groups have to comply with the impairment rules of IAS 
32 and IAS 39 so that a level playing field approach exists.
The other proxy used in the research methodology is that the disclosure performance 
is appreciated by investors. The disclosure requirements of IFRS 7 on risk information 
set a standard that all listed European insurance groups are obliged to keep to. 
However certain information can either be provided in a quantitative or a qualitative 
manner. Based on empirical research by AlCPA (1994) and EFRAG (2009) investors 
prefer quantitative to qualitative information and entity-specific rather than general 
information. These preferences were recognized in the scoring method used to 
measure the disclosed risk information of the listed European insurance groups in their 
annual group financial statements of 2007 and 2008. This was not questioned by the 
researcher. However Anonymous (2010) verified the investors’ preference for 
quantitative and entity-specific information in their decision-making process so that the 
proxy concurs with the infrequent research studies performed on this topic.
To summarize the statements of the analysts regarding the research methodology, 
they agreed that the analyzed industry and the selected companies are a 
predominantly homogenous group to be analyzed. Although this group includes 
insurance groups with banking segments it was stated by the experts that all have 
been indirectly affected by the financial crisis. A direct affect could be ruled out 
because none of the international insurance groups that sold credit default swaps is 
included in the group of analysis. The experts supported the application of the event 
study method without explicitly mentioning it and confirmed the set event date as the 
peak of the financial crisis from the view of investors in all listed European insurance 
groups. The two proxies in this research study used to measure the effect of the crisis 
on companies and the effect of disclosed information on investors were confirmed by 
all analysts. The chosen quantitative research methodology that is based on a 
scholarly review of the existing theories and empirical studies were confirmed by users 
of group financial statements and experts in the field of the European insurance 
industry.
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6.2.3. Experts on the results of the statistical results
In the quantitative part of this research study the statistical correlation of the three 
research variables was analyzed. This revealed that better risk disclosure is generally 
appreciated by the capital market. In addition the analysis showed that the disclosure 
quality improved during the crisis. In two questions analysts were asked about 
insurance companies that suffered from the financial crisis and did not reveal their risk 
position or were not affected but revealed their risk. In order to generalize the 
statements about this phenomenon the listed European insurance groups were 
clustered as documented in the clustering in appendices F and G. In the last question 
an unexplainable statistical result was presented to the experts that the capital market 
detected those insurance companies that suffered most from the financial crisis way 
before they disclosed their risk position in their annual financial statements.
In contrast to empirical research by Lehn et al. (2007) that good corporate governance 
increases the share value of companies this could not be statistically supported in this 
research study assuming that risk disclosure is regarded as a means of corporate 
governance. The capitalization of all analyzed listed European insurance groups 
dropped by 10% during the research period. In order to analyse a correlation between 
positive or negative feelings of experts and the risk disclosure performance of 
insurance groups these experts were asked whether or not they were able to get a 
clear picture of insurance groups in the crisis. Three experts answered the question. 
Anonymous (2011a) stated that information in the group financial statements have 
been insufficient and non-specific. But Noack (2010) generalizes that the timeliness 
and extent of risk information is directly connected to his judgement about the value of 
an insurance company. By doing so he supports the correlation between the risk 
disclosure performance of the two researched variables and capital market reaction. 
He specifies that the necessary information about the insurance companies’ risk 
position portfolio-based financial instruments was not available in 2007 and 2008 but 
has improved since. The impression of improvement in the disclosure about these 
crisis affected financial investments was shared by all experts.
The analysts were provided with information about the clustering of researched listed 
European insurance groups as documented in appendices F and G. They knew that 
Allianz, ING and Standard Life lost equity as a result of the crisis and revealed less risk
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information than their peers. Analysts knew as well that MunichRe lost less equity and 
scored higher in its risk disclosure performance than other insurance groups. The 
experts were asked to comment on these statistical findings. Four experts commented 
on this issue. Seel (2010) and Anonymous (2010) confirmed that Allianz and ING 
suffered equity losses and that MunichRe remained stable in its equity basis. 
Anonymous (2011b) explains this by stressing that ING had a strong position in life 
insurance that suffered during the crisis whereas MunichRe had a stronger position in 
the property and casualty insurance that did better. The risk disclosure performance of 
clustered companies was evaluated differently by the experts. This difference 
epitomized on Allianz. Noack (2010) puts MunichRe and Allianz on the same level by 
stating that both pursued an active course in their risk disclosure. However 
Anonymous (2010) specifies that Allianz made an attempt to be transparent about their 
risk exposure but could have done more, whereas MunichRe was fully transparent 
during the financial crisis. He adds that ING disclosed excessive amounts of 
information but does not confirm that this information was impaired in their use for 
investors because they could not be compared with other peers. The experts 
predominantly support the statistical results of the clustered insurance groups about 
the negative effect of the financial crisis on these groups and their disclosure 
performance. Doing this they hinted that the risk disclosure measurement that was 
performed in this research is reasonable and complies with the judgement of the 
experts that were interviewed.
The experts were asked about the unexplainable phenomenon of the capital market 
that detects insurance groups with high risk although this risk was not disclosed in their 
annual financial statements. Four experts answered this question. The experts agreed 
that the risk information in the annual financial statements of 2008 came too late to 
provide investors with the necessary information during this crisis (Anonymous, 
2011b). Noack (2010) explains how the information was available before the disclosure 
of the financial reports. He states that alarmed by ad-hoc announcements analysts 
asked the management of all European insurance groups during conference calls and 
investor days about problems that one group had to announce and asked each 
management about their position on the relevant problem. This created transparency 
in the financial market and share prices reacted correspondingly according to Noack 
(2010). Anonymous (2011b), Seel (2011) and Anonymous (2010) confirm this
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procedure. Anonymous (2011b) adds that investors rely more on these sources during 
crisis situations. The common opinion of the experts is that during this financial crisis 
the annual financial statements were not the prime source of information for the capital 
market. To cover the time lack until new information is released investors asked the 
management about current issues and problems of other peers and demanded a reply. 
Aside from this question Anonymous (2011a) states that when analysts do not get a 
response from the management on specific questions the analysts expect the worst 
and act accordingly. This puts listed European insurance groups into the situation that 
according to Anonymous (2011b) they have to disclose the right information in the right 
way so that professional investors understand it. Therefore the phenomenon could be 
explained by specific risk information that was disclosed in time and ahead of the 
annual financial statements to investors during conference calls and investor days.
Summarizing the response of the experts on the results of the statistical research it can 
be stated that the statistical relationship between risk disclosure quality and the opinion 
of the capital market is supported by the experts. They believe that good disclosure 
improves their view and opinion about listed insurance groups. Although the 
researched European insurance groups did not disclose much information about their 
equity destroying structured financial instruments of this financial crisis like Asset 
Backed Securities, Commercial Mortgage Backed Securities, Residential Mortgage 
Backed Securities and Collateralized Debt Obligations that are relevant according to 
Scharpf and Schaber (2009), their disclosure performance improved since the crisis 
according to the experts. The experts confirmed the disclosure quality of the clustered 
insurance groups measured in this research study and explained that during a crisis 
critical information is provided to institutional investors in informal ways such as on 
investor days or conference calls. This puts private investors at a disadvantage. Not 
necessarily concerning the access to this information, because all information at such 
events is placed on the internet according to Noack (2010) but because of the 
complexity of the insurance business model that needs experience that only 
professional investors can rely on (Seel, 2010).
6.2.4. Experts on the future implication of research results
The future implication of the research was the last question to the experts. They
confirmed that the disclosure of fair values of insurance contracts is considered in the
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industry to be as sensitive as the disclosure of risk information about structured 
financial instruments during the financial crisis. Therefore, the disclosure of risk 
information according to IFRS 7 that was the subject of this research study can be 
seen as a process of enhanced disclosure required by international accounting 
standards. This process continues with the new IFRS 4 standard on the measurement 
of insurance contracts and the exposure draft on IFRS 9 future standards about the 
measurement of financial instruments. Their measurement is either based on real 
market derived values, on market orientated values or on entity-specific calculated 
values. These values will be required not just for the debit but for the credit side of the 
balance sheet as well. This step brings disclosure of chances, risks and their 
quantification in fair values to the next level. The experts were asked about this new 
level of transparency for listed European insurance groups. All experts answered this 
question. Two experts welcome the higher transparency that a market oriented 
measurement of the total balance sheet would bring (Anonymous, 2011a). It would be 
a consistent approach that would be beneficial for investors (Anonymous, 2011b). Four 
experts stressed technical difficulties of such an approach that surfaced during the 
financial crisis. Anonymous (2011a) mentioned that market values did not exist in the 
last crisis situation, although pressure mounted on accountants to mark them to market 
value. Noack (2010) mentioned that the lASB allowed a new categorization of 
investments away from the fair value category at the peak of the crisis for companies 
which wanted to conceal drops in the fair values of such investments. Seel (2010) and 
Anonymous (2010) mentioned the adaption of estimations that must be used in order 
to calculate fair values of investments that are not traded on a market like insurance 
liabilities. But aside from the technical problems during the crisis two experts question 
the willingness of listed European insurance groups to increase the transparency of 
their business to investors. Noack (2010) stresses that insurance groups would only be 
willing to disclose bad news when these are of no relevance to the assessment of their 
overall performance. This opinion is supported by Anonymous (2011a) who believes 
that bad news are only disclosed when the insurance group could afford it. This 
assessment of experts brings back the basic assumption of this research study 
whether or not managers of listed European insurance groups are willing to disclose 
the negative risk positions of their companies in a timely and extensive way under the 
pressure of a financial crisis.
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C h a p t e r  7
7. Conclusions and Implications
This last chapter summarizes the main findings of the thesis (chapter 7.1.) and 
demonstrates their implications (chapter 7.2.). After presenting the limitations of the 
used research methods and the sample size in chapter 7.3. the researcher lists 
suggestions to investors, accounting standard setters and regulators of the insurance 
industry that derive from the findings of this research work (chapter 7.4.).
7.1. Main findings
The research was performed on the European insurance industry that was affected by 
the financial crisis especially by the sharp drop in the fair values of investments it held. 
The sample selected to analyse its risk disclosure performance and the response 
towards it by the capital market is homogenous regarding its common implementation 
of international financial reporting standards by all insurance groups but differs about 
their degree of banking activities and their geographic exposure of the thirteen listed 
European insurance groups analyzed.
The main findings are categorized in how the insurance groups have disclosed their 
risk positions during the crisis situation and how the capital market reacted towards this 
risk disclosure.
Experts confirmed that it is possible to predict the future value of listed European 
insurance groups based on the risk information that they disclosed in their consolidated 
annual financial statements. They supported the theory that insurance groups can 
build up trust that investors have in them during crisis situations by extensive risk 
disclosure. By doing so the insurance groups hope that investors do not sell the shares 
during crisis situations despite the uncertainty that prevails during that period of time. 
That they do sell is proven by the 10% drop in the market capitalization of the 
European insurance industry sample that was analyzed in this recent crisis situation 
using the event study method. The degree to which insurance groups disclose their 
risk positions was analyzed using quantitative methods. By falsifying the Hg hypothesis 
the researcher found out that the risk disclosure performance of the analyzed 
insurance groups remained relatively stable over the researched period of 2007 to
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2008. However, individual insurance groups that were threatened to be exposed 
improved their risk disclosure performance in their 2008 consolidated financial 
statements. This disclosure trait of managements can be statistically supported with 
the falsification of the Hz hypothesis. In contrast to former empirical research no 
correlation between risk disclosure performance and the ownership structure of listed 
European insurance groups could be found. The H3 hypothesis could not be falsified 
because nearly all analyzed insurance groups have the same ownership structure with 
a significant share of institutional investors.
The extraordinary share price reaction during the recent financial crisis was a result of 
the capital market towards the companies’ risk disclosure performance because 
experts stated that in the interviews. Statistical evidence exists with the falsification of 
the He hypothesis that the capital market appreciates better risk disclosure 
performance of insurance groups. Investors did not sell off their shares in listed 
European insurance groups with high risk disclosure performance easily during the 
recent crisis situation. However, according to experts the capital market considers all 
information available in order to take financial decisions. This market behaviour can be 
tracked down statistically by falsifying hypothesis He and by expert opinion. The share 
prices of those insurance groups that were exposed to fair value drops of mortgage- 
based portfolio financial instruments and banking activities suffered most at the peak of 
the financial crisis although those insurance groups had not disclosed their risk 
positions in their consolidated financial statements. The efficiency of the capital market 
in valuating the insurance groups was made possible by direct communication 
between professional investors and managers when relevant, company-specific and 
timely risk information was disclosed during investor days, conference calls and similar 
occasions.
Experts agreed that the disclosure of a risk position of an insurance group is equally 
sensitive to the disclosure of their assets’ and liabilities’ fair values. Therefore the 
research results about the behaviour of the insurance groups as well as the reaction of 
the capital market can be applied to the disclosure of other sensitive information as 
well as to other situations that are not as extreme as the recent financial crisis 
situation.
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7.2. Implications of the findings
It is unclear whether or not the research results analyzed for the insurance Industry can 
be applied to other industries. Although the insurance industry can be regarded as a 
secretive one that hesitates to disclose sensitive information it would be wrong to 
conclude that other industries are more willing to disclose sensitive information. 
Experts point out that the business model of the insurance industry is unique and 
difficult to understand for investors.
Aside from the attitude of managements towards risk disclosure in normal times, the 
behaviour of management under pressure changes for those with risk positions in their 
books and remains constant for those with a better position in their books. Statistical 
methods indicate that the insurance groups exposed to high financial risk and 
decreased equity ratios as a consequence improve their risk disclosure performance in 
their next financial statements. On the other hand the insurance groups without these 
kinds of risk and better equity ratios maintained their high level of risk disclosure. As a 
proof the cluster of the best risk disclosing insurance groups with limited exposure to 
financial risks remained the same in both financial years, whereas the companies 
within the cluster of least risk disclosing insurance groups which did however face risk, 
changed. The risk disclosing behaviour of managers can be distinguished in eager 
managers that hold on to their high level of risk disclosure regardless of a tough 
environment and those managers that limit their risk disclosure and might reveal more 
risk information only when pressed by professional investors or the public. This 
behaviour remains relatively stable over time.
The participants in the capital market demand risk disclosure and want risk information 
that suits their needs during crisis situations as soon as possible and as closely 
tailored to the individual risk situation of the insurance group as possible. Statistical 
methods indicate that they get this information during a crisis situation nevertheless 
because the capital market detected those insurance groups that were affected most 
severely even before they disclosed risk information in their financial statements. 
Experts pointed out that the capital market demands risk information from the 
management in a crisis and receives it by unregulated ways of communication. This 
additional source of information puts private investors in a position of disadvantage.
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especially, as experts stress in an industry that is as complex and hard to understand 
as the insurance industry, industry.
The results of this dissertation can be used in further academic research. According to 
Verrecchia (1986) research in the field of disclosure should try to link corporate 
disclosure to its economic consequences on the disclosing company and the capital 
market. This dissertation has highlighted some behavioural patterns of disclosing 
companies and the capital market in connection with the handling of ‘sensitive 
information’. With fair value accounting and detailed notes requirements companies 
are forced to disclose ‘sensitive information’ that can result In high external cost from 
their unintended use by competitors. How companies comply with or try to circumvent 
these disclosure requirements about ‘sensitive information’ can be subject of futures 
empirical research studies.
7.3. Limitation of the research
The results of this research study can be generalized based on the restrictions that 
only listed groups of the insurance industry have been analyzed. In regard to the 
willingness of companies to disclose ‘sensitive’ information the insurance industry can 
be regarded as a good proxy for companies from other industries because according 
to Meyer et al. (2004) insurance groups fear that the disclosure of risk can be judged 
critically by investors and customers as a sign of weakness in their business model. 
This enables the researcher to identify traits of managements to retain ‘sensitive’ 
information that should be considered by regulators and standard setters in their 
attempt to provide all investors with relevant information.
This thesis considered the capital market reaction in only one short period of time. 
Experts confirmed that this period had a significant impact on the insurance industry, 
however the long-term risk disclosure performance of companies and the reaction of 
the capital market over a longer period of time are not part of this thesis.
Statistical results that are based on an analysis of data from a limited sample size can 
be misleading and should only be generalized when confirmed by another research 
method. This problem was addressed in this research study by verifying the results via 
structured interviews with experts. By using two methods to analyse the research
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question the consistency of findings generated by the one method is validated by the 
other (Patton, 2002). However, future research on risk disclosure with an extended 
sample size is recommended.
7.4. Policy orientated suggestions
The starting assumption that additional risk disclosure of listed European insurance 
groups is appreciated by the capital market during this current financial crisis situation 
has been statistically supported. This result has implications for the management of 
listed European insurance groups, for the capital market as well as for regulators and 
standard setters.
The risk disclosure efforts of listed European insurance groups stay constant over time 
and vary within a crisis situation. Expert interviews indicated that the same insurance 
groups are holding up a high level of risk disclosure quality. This has been confirmed 
by statistical methods that find a significant correlation between the risk disclosure 
performance in 2007 and 2008 of each analyzed insurance group. Therefore 
management that stresses the importance of investor relations and extensive risk 
disclosure in financial statements have been pursuing this policy for a longer period of 
time. Such management behaviour supports theories that only long-term and constant 
disclosure of risk-relevant information builds up investors’ trust in the company. On the 
other hand, managements that limit risk disclosure or at least the quality of disclosed 
risk information as indicated in expert interviews do this as a pattern and over a longer 
period of time as well.
Regulators might want to empower private investors so that they receive explanations 
from the management about their risk position and not merely the data that have been 
communicated to professional or institutional investors and posted on the internet 
which are understood by professional investors without further explanation but not by 
private investors. The need for timely risk information that is specific to the crisis 
situation has proven that risk disclosure in annual group financial statements is 
insufficient The lack of qualitative risk disclosure as a separate part of the notes in 
quarterly financial statements does not close this risk information gap.
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standard setters reacted at the peak of the financial crisis by modifying their 
accounting standards. This reaction has been the first of such interferences and can 
only be explained by the magnitude of this global financial crisis and the mounting 
political pressure on standard setters. However it is unlikely that standard setters will 
interfere in smaller crisis situations. It is also unlikely that the standard setters will 
demand stricter disclosure and more risk information because they modified 
accounting standards in this crisis situation by relaxing them. Therefore risk disclosure 
requirements will most probably not be adapted to the increased risk information needs 
of investors during a crisis. The standard setters rely on the willingness of companies 
to disclose more risk information than set by their accounting standards and to disclose 
the individualized effects on insurance groups that can hardly be prescribed in their 
form by accounting requirements.
How might these results affect the ongoing discussion of full fair value accounting? Fair 
values are considered one line risk indicators because all assets and obligations are 
rated at market value and sum up the value of the company in a single market-based 
number. At least in theory this sensitive information is based on the objectivity of the 
financial market. Due to the lack of a functioning market for insurance obligations the 
fair values of them must be calculated by the companies themselves using present 
value methods. However, these methods require assumptions that must be set by the 
management. This leaves the full fair value concept as a risk information that can be 
easily influenced by management -  an analogy to the risk information about mortgage 
portfolio-based financial instruments analyzed in this research study.
As stated in the expert interviews investors would prefer full fair value as a one line risk 
indicator and a coherent system in contrast to the current mixed method concept of 
cost and fair value accounting although they doubt that all insurance groups would 
disclose the same degree of risk information or would use the same assumptions that 
influence the calculations. There is a high likelihood that preparers of financial 
statements would end up as the same two groups that have been analyzed in this 
research study. One group would be highly motivated to disclose all assumptions and 
methods of their presented fair values. This would be an approach which would build 
trust in investors by the transparency it provides. Another group might use present full 
fair values but withhold necessary information about the assumptions that have been
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used to calculate fair values. This group might improve their disclosure when pressed 
by regulators, accounting standard setters or crisis situations. However, it is unlikely 
that such improvements would last because the attitude towards risk disclosure of the 
management remains stable over time according to quantitative results in this research 
study.
These different management approaches towards risk disclosure cannot be levelled 
out by very specific accounting requirements or diligent auditors because experts 
confirm that the insurance industry's business model is much too complex to dictate 
every calculation assumption that lead to fair market values. The willingness of 
managers to exceed risk disclosure requirements is a necessity in order to provide 
investors with the information they need to make their investment decisions. ‘Rules 
alone do not work; what matters is how they are applied’ (Anonymous, 2009b, p. 12). 
So it is up to investors to back the managers of those companies with good risk 
disclosure performances and penalize those with bad ones. Indicated by statistical 
results and supported by experts interviewed in this research study, this is what 
investors did during the crisis. Therefore the implementation of full fair values might 
succeed despite the complexity of its concept when investors’ demand pushes 
managers into more specific, up-to-date and understandable risk disclosure. Such 
pressure seems to be necessary because, as Bagnoli and Watts (2007) pointed out 
even before the financial crisis, the likelihood and content of voluntary disclosure 
depends on whether good or bad news is communicated. Therefore a constant 
pressure of the capital market should be maintained to ensure that all relevant 
information - whether good or bad from the standpoint of the companies - is disclosed.
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REFLECTIVE DIARY
The work on the DBA thesis has been a challenging experience. To find a topic, plan 
the process, coordinate with supervisors and information providers and to adapt the 
plan to diverting situations has changed the way I work.
The DBA programme should lead individuals to create new knowledge, to gain a 
systematic understanding of a body of knowledge and to conceptualise and design a 
research project that can be tested with applicable research techniques. Because the 
DBA programme is focused on professionals and set up as a part time programme that 
allows individuals to pursue their career in correspondence with the academic 
programme the thesis topic should be embedded in the business surrounding of the 
individual. These goals are to be pursued by an individual who is placed in a social 
environment with duties as well as demands by his or her spouses, children and 
friends.
The first problem is to ‘think outside the box’. After years of professional work as a 
preparer of consolidated financial statements of a European insurance groups it is a 
challenge to find a topic that is embedded in your professional work. As the daily 
workload is achieved by routine and standard procedures it is different to be ingenious 
and find new topics. The search for a topic starts with the search for a question. This 
question should not be superficial or too easy to solve. It should be something that has 
the potential to last during years of research and something that is not too far fetched 
or impossible to solve due to constraints.
During 2007 I invested private money in AIG shares. It looked to me like a good 
opportunity to step into the capital market. This investment turned out to be a disaster. 
I lost nearly all the money invested and had to ask myself whether or not I would have 
been able to prevent that loss if I had read the consolidated financial statements of AIG 
more thoroughly in order to detect the risk position that derived from the credit default 
swaps of which AIG had so many.
The topic of disclosure has been with me for several years during my career. The 
private loss in AIG shares led me to choose it as a topic of my DBA thesis. 
Consolidated financial statements offer a basis of information that is easy to access
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and available from every listed company. The financial crisis that started in 2007 at a 
time when I was searching for a topic offered a point in time that made the disclosure 
unique. It enabled me to apply established knowledge about disclosure to a new 
situational setting. The result has been a contribution to the professional practice of 
accounting from the empirical financial market point of view and from a non- 
quantitative disclosure point of view. The uniqueness of the topic has been the 
combination of these two points of view that was only possible because of the 
extraordinary circumstances through which the financial market and the European 
insurance groups were going in the recent financial crisis.
Flexibility in searching for a topic is essential. After having made it halfway through the 
literature review and side stepping other variations of the topic, the idea was finalized. 
However, a critical check for every idea is the complexity and the data availability. 
Although the relationship between investors and the communication of European 
insurance groups is quite complex assumptions had to be made in order to make 
research steps possible. Such assumptions are restrictions to the first idea but they 
need to be done and they should focus on the availability of data. Quarterly financial 
statements were not available from a lot of listed insurance groups, annual financial 
statements however were. They are posted on the internet sites of the companies. 
Conference calls or other investor interviews were not comparable between companies 
and ad-hoc messages about the disclosure of share price- sensitive information were 
not uniformly regulated at the locations or countries of listing. Getting deeper and 
deeper into the topic the research approach needed further refining. After checking the 
regulation requirements of annual financial statements a further restriction on 
international financial reporting standards limited the group of analysis even more. Well 
known insurance groups that report according to national accounting requirements that 
are not as explicit about risk disclosure had to be excluded from the research study. 
This included AIG because it reports according to US-GAAP accounting standards. 
However, at the end of this process a coherent group of listed insurance groups with a 
similar business structure had been refined. Unfortunately the number of European 
insurance groups that could be analyzed and compared in this research study was 
down to thirteen. This required a change in my perspective from choosing a 
quantitative approach towards a mixed method approach using interviews to verify the 
results that have been based on too small a statistical basis. The advantage of the 
rigorous restriction on comparable, international financial reporting standards using
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listed European insurance groups was that the group financial statements of the years 
within the financial crisis were available to the researcher and possible to access via 
computer. The advantage of this information availability stood in contrast to the 
availability of experts that could be interviewed on the statistical results. The 
researcher contacted a lot of friends and former co-workers in order to identify experts 
in the field of European insurance groups. However, it was difficult to contact them in 
advance without results of the research and ask whether or not they would sit 
interviews with the researcher. So the researcher trusted promises of friends that these 
experts would be willing to cooperate and be available for the interviews whenever the 
researcher wanted to hold them. When the time came and the researcher was willing 
to discuss his statistical results the experts were either busy or corporate policy did not 
allow them to speak directly and so on. Even contacts via friends and co-workers did 
not help in contacting them. This restriction on experts willing to take part in interviews 
endangered the process of completing the thesis. Again the availability of information 
is essential in the process of the thesis and can overthrow the timetable made. So 
researchers are encouraged to include some time slots for information gathering and 
some reserve time.
In the end it helped to persistently contact the experts, and a few agreed to take part in 
the semi-structured interview and to answer my questions. The quality of the content 
varied in the interviews. Some experts answered my questions in detail and were 
eager to provide additional information that helped my understanding. Other experts 
did not answer questions but generalized about the topic at best or talked about 
neighbouring topics that were not connected to the research question. During the 
interviews it was not possible to bring those experts back to my topic and approaches 
to question them were blocked.
When summarizing the results of the interviews however, it proved to be helpful that 
data existed aside from the questions asked. It was possible to connect information 
and to bridge data that I was not aware of before. It was necessary to plan research 
steps ahead and to discipline oneself in the work process by planning work steps and 
defining sub-goals. However, every work plan in this thesis needed adaptation and no- 
one was fully implemented. A significant degree of flexibility proved essential for the 
progress of this work.
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Flexibility is a key ability not only in this research process but in daily life as well. So 
why did it feel so hard to rely on this flexibility? I felt that the solitude of research has 
been a blessing and a curse. To work alone on a subject you have picked yourself is a 
very rewarding activity. It is a pleasure to see that the work you have done can be 
traced back to you. However, there is a certain price you have to pay that comes to 
mind when you need flexibility. You cannot discuss the problems you face with 
anybody. You do have friends, a spouse and other members of your DBA programme. 
You can use them to get motivated or to share disappointments. When you hit a limit 
and you have to give up your old plan and find a new opportunity that is when you are 
really alone. To give up the old plan for a new plan that no one has taken so far - that 
is when flexibility hurts.
The support of the university was readily available. Response by the supervisors was 
fast, helpful in the subject-matter and very supportive. Technical support is sometimes 
difficult to come by for long-distance students -  access to a helpline would be 
appreciated. Technical support is not just there when you face technical problems with 
your SPSS software and it takes valuable time until a solution is reached.
Another aspect that comes to my mind looking back is the need for persistency. This 
character trait seems to be more important than brilliance in order to pursue and finish 
the thesis. It helps to feel humble from time to time and not to allow oneself be 
discouraged by the inevitable setbacks but to carry on regardless without losing the 
flexibility mentioned above. Those who can be persistent should be grateful because 
their living and working conditions remain stable and supportive. When you face 
difficulties try to be persistent but do not break something worthy in order to continue.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.I.1. and A.I.2.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A. 1.1.
Investment risk shall be measured on the basis of the recognised risk-monitoring methods 
used by the group. (GRS 5-20 par. 29)
Depending on the type of risk involved, one of the following methods is generally appropriate to 
measure investment risk:
- determination of the anticipated loss using a pre-defined level of confidence and probability 
based models, such as stress tests to take account of crisis scenarios: the use of back testing 
techniques is recommended in this context,
- asset/liability management techniques
- scenario of sensitivity analysis (GRS 5-20 par. 30)
A.I.2.
The disclosures made on the market risk of investments shall, as a minimum, contain the 
following information, if this has not already been quantified by the risk monitoring methods 
used by the group. (GRS 5-20 par. 31)
- the effect of a 20% fall in the fair value of shares and other non-fixed interest securities 
the effect of a 1 % shift in the interest curve (upwards or downwards) on the market 
value of fixed interest securities and bonds
Results of the analysis:
# Name Scenarios 
interest and 
market value 
of equity 
variation
Effect on Embedded 
Value, Value of in- 
force business. Value 
at Risk or Earnings at 
risk quantified
Effect on
equity
quantified
Effect on 
earnings 
quantified
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No No 5
2 Standard Life Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No 5
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
5 Munich Re Yes Yes No Yes 5
6 ING Yes Yes No No 5
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes No 5
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 5
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 5
10 Aviva Yes Yes No No 5
11 Allianz Yes
12 AEGON Yes No Yes Yes 5
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 5
Summary:
All listed insurance companies quantify their investment risk using predominantly probability 
based models (European Embedded Value, Group Embedded Value, Value at Risk, Earnings 
at Risk or Value of in-force business) mentioned as accepted methods according to GRS 5-20 
par. 29 and 30. Only one of the listed companies uses the alternative method named under 
GRS 5-20 par. 31 disclosing information on sensitivities that affect equity or earnings. A little 
less than half of the listed insurance companies disclose that information in addition to tHe 
predominantly used methods.
All listed insurance companies fulfil the accounting requirements with a quantified investment 
risk disclosure in their financial statements as of December 31^, 2007.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A. 1.3.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.I.3.
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. To comply with this, an insurer 
shall disclose information about exposures to market risk arising from embedded derivatives 
contained in a host insurance contract if the insurer is not required to, and does not, measure 
the embedded derivatives at fair value. (IFRS 4 par. 38 and 39e)
A quantification of this criteria is not possible.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Scenarios interest and 
market value of equity 
variation
Disclosure that entire 
combined contract is treated 
in the accounting category 
“financial assets at fair value 
through profit/loss”
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes 3
3 Legal & General Yes No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes 3
5 Munich Re No No 3
6 ING Yes No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes 3
8 Generali Yes Yes 3
9 AXA Yes Yes 3
10 Aviva Yes No 3
11 Allianz Yes No 3
12 AEGON Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose that embedded derivatives are separated and 
measured at fair value. The majority of listed insurance companies does not disclose that 
certain embedded derivatives are not separable so that -  in order to measure them at fair 
value -  the entire combined contract is measured at fair value by classifying it to the IAS 39 
category “financial assets at fair value through profit/loss" All listed insurance companies fulfil 
the accounting requirements with a quantified investment risk disclosure in their financial 
statements as of December 31®*, 2007.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A. 1.4.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A. 1.4.
There are no accounting requirements about risk reducing policies. However this information is 
essential in a crisis situation for the investor. The knowledge how the company is preparing 
itself against the effects of the financial crisis allows investors to judge the company and how 
the management leads the company.
To name and describe risk reducing policies like use of derivatives, sale of certain financial 
assets or diversification of investments is required. A quantification of the effect of risk reducing 
policies is not possible, because not every policy con be accounted for as hedging under the 
strict hedging requirements of IAS 39.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Use of
derivatives as 
a risk 
reducing 
policy
Name the 
kid of 
derivative 
and what 
kind of risk it 
is reducing
Sale of equity 
as a risk 
reducing 
policy
Diversification 
as a risk 
reducing policy
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No Yes 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes No No 3
6 ING Yes Yes No Yes 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No Yes 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes No Yes 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
11 Allianz Yes Yes No No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes No No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies use derivatives as one policy to reduce market risk from interst 
bearing financial instruments and equity financial instruments. Additionally two companies sold 
equity financial instruments in order to reduce their market risk and nearly half of the listed 
insurance companies disclosed diversification as a policy to reduce their market risk. By 
naming and describing at least one risk reducing policy all listed insurance companies disclose 
specific qualitative information on this criteria in their financial statements as of December 31®*,
2007.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.II.1. credit risk
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.II.1.
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. (IFRS 4 par. 38) An insurer shall 
disclose information about credit risk that IFRS 7 par. 31-42 would require if the insurance 
contracts were within the scope of IFRS 7.(IFRS 4 par. 39d) An entity shall disclose information 
that enables users of its financial statements evaluate the nature and extent of risk arising from 
financial instruments to which the entity is exposed at the reporting date. (IFRS 7 par. 31) The 
disclosures focus on the risk that arise from financial instruments and how they have been 
managed. (IFRS 7 par. 32)
Following information are required for each credit risk arising from financial instruments:
• Quantification of maximum exposure to credit risk at the reporting date. (IFRS 7 par. 34 
and 36a)
• Information about the credit quality of financial assets (IFRS 7 par. 36c)
• Analysis of age of financial assets that are past due as at the reporting date but not 
impaired (IFRS 7 par. 37a)
Results of the analysis:
# Name Quantification 
of credit risk 
exposure by 
investments
Disclosure of 
rating
information
of
investments
Disclosure of 
age of 
investments 
that are past 
due but not 
impaired
Disclosure of 
change in fair 
value
attributable to 
change in 
credit risk
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes Yes No 5
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes Yes No 5
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes No No 3
6 ING Yes Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No No 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
11 Ailianz Yes Yes No No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes No No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies quantity their credit risk exposure mostly by disclosing it 
together with the ratings of their investments. The required disclosure of the aging of 
investments is disclosed by only three listed insurance companies and the non required 
disclosure of change in fair value attributable to changes in credit risk is provided by only one 
listed insurance company.
Quantification:
Required information about the ageing of investments are not disclosed by all listed insurance 
companies. Therefore quantitative information does not receive 5 point but only 3 points. If 
additionally the required information about ageing of investments is disclosed 5 points are 
granted.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.111.1.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.III.1.
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to 
evaluate the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. To comply with 
this an insurer shall disclose information about exposures to liquidity risk that IFRS 7 
par 31 -  42 would require if the insurance contracts were within the scope of IFRS 7 
(IFRS 4 par. 39d). An entity shall disclose a description of how it manages the liquidity 
risk (IFRS 7 Par. 39b). An insurer need not to provide the maturity analysis required by 
IFRS 7 par. 39a if it discloses information about the estimated timing of the net cash 
outflows resulting from recognised insurance liabilities instead.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Disclosure about liquidity risk inherent and Asset 
liability matching 
performed
Quantification of liquidity risk Result
Timing of returns from 
assets
Timing of obligations 
from insurance contracts
1 Old Mutual Yes No No 1
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No 5
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes 5
5 Munich Re Yes No Yes 3
6 ING Yes No No 1
7 Hannover Re Yes No No 1
8 Generali Yes No Yes 3
9 AXA Yes No No 1
10 Aviva Yes No Yes 3
11 Allianz Yes No No 1
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes 5
13 Zurich Yes No No 1
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose that they actively manage their liquidity risk. As 
recommended in the IFRS 7 requirements only three listed insurance companies 
describe their liquidity management by quantifying the timing of return from their 
assets. Five listed insurance companies fulfil the requirements by disclosing the timing 
of projected payments from their insurance obligations.
Quantification:
All information disclosed about the liquidity risk and how it is managed can be 
considered as general qualitative information (1 point). The legally required disclosure 
about the timing of obligations from insurance contracts can be considered a specific 
qualitative information (3 points) and the voluntary disclosure about the timing of 
returns from assets as a qualitative information (5 points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary;
Criteria: A.III.2.
Accounting requirements
A.III.2.
exact specification:
There is no accounting regulation that requires a sensitivity analysis in regard to 
liquidity risks by listed insurance companies. However as liquidity is essential to 
insurance companies significant changes in the market value of investments, in the 
credit risk of investment issuers and changes in the projected cash flow due to the 
crisis should be commented by listed insurance companies. This can be done most 
convincingly for investors by quantifying effects and scenarios.
The cash outflow of insurance related factors (lapse or mortality) can change as a 
result that these factors differ from historic assumptions. The cash inflow of 
investments can differ from historic assumptions due to a significant loss in market 
value or the default of creditors. These effects of changing cash flows can be disclosed 
as sensitivities to earnings/equity or Embedded Values.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Cash outflow sensitivity Cash inflow sensitivity Result
Effect on 
earnings or 
equity disclosed
Effect on 
Embedded Value 
disclosed
Effect on earning 
or equity 
disclosed
Effect on 
Embedded Value 
disclosed
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No Yes 5
2 Standard Life No Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
No Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
No Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re No Yes No Yes 5
6 ING No No No No 1
7 Hannover Re No Yes No Yes 5
8 Generali No Yes No No 3
9 AXA No No No No 1
10 Aviva Yes No No No 3
11 Allianz No No No No 1
12 AEGON Yes No Yes No 5
13 Zurich Yes No Yes No 5
Summary:
Ten out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the effect that changes in 
historic insurance related assumptions have on either earnings/equity or the 
embedded value. Five out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the effect 
that changes in their investment related assumptions have on either earnings/equity or 
the embedded value.
Quantification:
Since the disclosure is not required all listed insurance companies that do not provide 
information receive 1 point. All companies that disclose cash outflow sensitivities on 
either earning/equity or Embedded values receive about cash inflow or cash outflow
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receive 3 Points. Listed insurance companies that disclose sensitivities on cash in- and 
cash outflows receive 5 points.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.l.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
B.l.
Following general accounting regulation require information about how financial instruments on 
the debit side of the balance sheet are measured.
An entity shall disclose in the summary of significant accounting policies the measurement 
basis used in preparing the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 117a).
It is important for an entity to inform users of the measurement basis used in the financial 
statements, because the basis on which an entity prepares the financial statements 
significantly affects users'analysis (IAS 1 par. 118).
The implementation guide of the general accounting standards on financial instruments lines 
the goal of measuring as follows:
If a market for financial instruments is not active, an entity establishes fair value by using a 
valuation technique (IAS 39 AG 74).
The objective of using a valuation technique is to establish what the transaction price would 
have been on the measurement date in an arm's length exchange motivated by normal 
business considerations. A valuation technique would be expected to arrive at a realistic 
estimate of the fair value if it reasonably reflects how the market could be expected to price the 
instrument and the inputs to the valuation technique reasonably represent market expectations 
and measures of the risk return factors inherent in the financial instrument (IAS 39 AG 75)
Results of the analysis:
# Name Categories of IAS 
39 used and 
disclosure of their 
effect on the 
balance sheet and 
profit/loss
Fair value determination Specification 
of these 
alternative 
valuation 
technique
Quantification of 
financial assets 
measured at fair 
value without 
active markets
Directly 
measured by 
reference to 
an active 
market
Indirectly
measured
by
alternative
valuation
technique
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes Yes No No 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
6 ING Yes Yes Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes No No 3
8 Generali Yes Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes No Yes 5
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose the IAS 39 categories used and their effect on either 
earnings or equity. All companies disclose their directly measured references to an active
324
market but one listed company does not refer to alternative valuation techniques. Although 
using them only four listed insurance companies specify these valuation methods and only two 
quantify the financial instruments measured with these valuation techniques.
Quantification:
Disclosure requirements about the IAS 39 categories and the fair value measurement on active 
markets can be considered as general information (1 point). Explanations about alternative 
valuation techniques or the specification of these techniques can be considered specific 
qualitative information (3 points). The information how many financial instruments are 
measured using these alternative valuation techniques is a quantitative information (5 points).
/
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.ll.
Accounting requirements
B.ll.
exact specification:
Following general accounting regulation require information about how financial instruments on 
the debit side of the balance sheet are measured.
An entity shall disclose in the summary of significant accounting policies the measurement 
basis used In preparing the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 117a).
It is important for an entity to inform users of the measurement basis used in the financial 
statements, because the basis on which an entity prepares the financial statements 
significantly affects users'analysis (IAS 1 par. 118).
Results of the analysis:
# Name Categories of IAS 39 
used and disclosure 
of their effects on 
the balance sheet 
and profit/loss
Specific measuring 
techniques of fair 
values for financial 
liabilities
Disclosure about 
own credit risk 
considered in the 
valuation 
techniques of 
financial liabilities
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No 0
2 Standard Life No No No 0
3 Legal & 
General
No No No 0
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No 0
5 Munich Re No No No 0
6 ING Yes Yes No 0
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No 0
8 Generali Yes No No 0
9 AXA Yes No No 0
10 Aviva No No No 0
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes 0
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes 0
13 Zurich Yes Yes No 0
Summary:
Eight out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the IAS 39 categories they use for 
financial liabilities and six of them specify the valuation techniques used to measure the fair 
value of their financial liabilities. Only two of the listed insurance companies disclose 
information about their own credit risk being considered in the valuation techniques of their 
financial liabilities.
Quantification:
The disclosure on the valuation methods of financial liabilities is very limited. The reason might 
be that listed insurance companies do usually not depend on bonds as a financial instrument or 
that financial liabilities are connected only to certain insurance products (like unit linked 
products) being sold by the listed insurance companies. Due to these restrictions disclosure 
about financial liabilities differs strongly among the listed insurance companies and shall not be 
included in the analysis and therefore not quantified.
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B ill.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
B.lll.
Following general accounting regulation require information about reasons for measuring 
insecurities.
An entity shall disclose the judgements that management has made in the process of applying 
the entity's accounting policies and that have the most significant effect on the amounts 
recognized in the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 122).
An entity shall disclose information about the assumptions it makes about the future, and other 
major sources of estimation uncertainty at the end of the reporting period, that have a 
significant risk of resulting in a material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and 
liabilities within the next financial year (IAS 1 par. 125).
Results of the analysis:
# Name Statement that 
estimates and 
assumptions 
are used in the 
preparation of 
the financial 
statements
General 
reference that 
financial 
instruments 
that are not 
quoted on an 
active market
Other specific 
assumptions 
used for 
financial 
instruments in 
the financial 
statements
Specification 
of risk from 
change of 
assumptions 
of financial 
instruments
Quantification 
of risk from 
changes in 
assumptions 
(actual or 
pervious year)
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No No No 1
2 Standard Life No No No No No -1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re No No No No No -1
6 ING Yes Yes No No No 1
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No No No 1
8 Generali Yes Yes No No No 1
9 AXA Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes No No No 1
11 Allianz Yes No No No No 1
12 AEGON Yes Yes No No No 1
13 Zurich Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
Summary:
Eleven out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the statement that estimates and 
assumptions are used in the preparation of their financial statements and ten of them disclose 
general information about inactive market for financial instruments. Only three listed insurance 
companies provide detailed and specific information about the assumptions used and the 
associated risk. No company quantifies the risk from changes in assumptions.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). Statement of estimates and 
assumptions as well as reference to inactive markets can be considered as general information 
(1 point). Explanations about assumptions made and the resulting risk can be considered as 
specific qualitative information (3 points). The information about results from changes in 
assumptions in this calendar year or before can be considered a quantitative information (5 
points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: 0.1.1.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
0 .1.1 .
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 15. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information.
Management's expectations for the future development of the results of operations and 
financial position of the group shall be presented and described at a minimum, as either a 
positive or a negative trend. The effects of the significant influencing factors shall be discussed 
(GAS 15 par. 89).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General 
information 
about future 
trends
Discussion of 
significant influencing 
factors that have a 
negative impact on the 
company
Quantification of 
future negative 
impact of stated 
influencing factors
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life Yes No No No 1
3 Legal & 
General
No Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING Yes No No No 1
7 Hannover Re No No No Yes -1
8 Generali No No No Yes -1
9 AXA No Yes No No 3
10 Aviva No Yes No No 3
11 Allianz Yes No No No 1
12 AEGON No Yes No No 3
13 Zurich No No No Yes -1
Summary:
Five out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about future negative 
impact on their company. Three companies disclose general information about future trends. 
Five listed insurance companies discuss significant influencing factors and their negative 
impact on their company in the future. No company quantifies the negative Impact.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
future trends leads to a positive judgement (1 point). The discussion of significant influencing 
factors that have a negative impact on the listed insurance company can be considered as 
specific qualitative information (3 points). The quantification of future negative impact by stated 
influencing factors can be considered a quantitative information (5 points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: 0.1.2.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
0 .1.2 .
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 15. It is assumed that ail 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
Information.
The expected development of the group for the following two financial years shall be described, 
together with significant opportunities and risks associated with this development. The 
expected volume of future capital expenditures and the expected financial effects shall be 
discussed (GAS 15 par. 84).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information
about
development 
of the group 
in the 
follovwng two 
financial 
years
Specific information 
about risk that might 
significantly affect the 
group In the following 
two financial years OR 
negative statement that 
such an information is 
not disclosed
Quantified results 
or dividends for the 
following year or 
next two financial 
years
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual Yes No No No 1
2 Standard Life Yes No No No 1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes No No No 1
5 Munich Re No No Yes No 5
6 ING No Yes (neg. statement) No No 3
7 Hannover Re No No Yes No 5
8 Generali No Yes (neg. statement) No No 3
9 AXA No Yes (neg. statement) No No 3
10 Aviva No No Yes No 5
11 Allianz No No Yes No 5
12 AEGON No No No Yes -1
13 Zurich Yes No No No 1
Summary:
One out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no result forecast. Five companies 
disclose general information about developments in the next two years. Three companies 
disclose a negative statement when they state that a result forecast is not possibie. Four listed 
insurance companies provide forecasts on results or dividends for the next one or two financial 
years.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
the development of the group within the future time period ieads to a positive judgement (1 
point). The disclosure of specific risk information or a negative statement that no disclosure is 
provided is measured with three points. The disclosure of future dividends or results can be 
considered a quantitative information (5 points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: C.II.1
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
C.II.1
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 5. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information.
It is recommended that inter-dependencies between individual risks are described: it is 
mandatory to do so, where an appropriate assessment of the risk is otherwise not possible 
(GAS 5 par. 25)
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information about 
risk
interdependencies
Specific information 
about
interdependencies 
and how they are 
measured or 
recognized in the 
company
Quantification of 
risk
interdependencies 
effects or 
diversification 
effects
No information 
about risk 
interdependencies
Results
1 Old Mutual No No no Yes -1
2 Standard
Life
No No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING No No No Yes -1
7 Hannover
Re
No Yes No No 3
8 Generali No No No Yes -1
9 AXA No Yes No No 3
10 Aviva No No No Yes -1
11 Allianz No No No Yes -1
12 AEGON No Yes No No 3
13 Zurich No no No Yes -1
Summary:
Eight out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about future risk 
interdependencies in their company. One company discloses general information about risk 
interdependencies. Four listed insurance companies specify information about risk 
interdependencies in the future. No company quantifies risk interdependency effects or 
diversification effects.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk interdependencies leads to a positive judgement (1 point). Specific information disclosed 
about interdependencies and how they are measured or recognized in the company can be 
considered as specific qualitative information (3 points). The quantification of risk 
interdependency effects or diversification effects can be considered quantitative information (5 
points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: C.II.2.
Accounting requirements
C.II.2.
exact specification:
For each type of risk arising from financial instruments, an entity shall disclose concentration of 
risk (IFRS 7 par. 34c). If the quantitative data disclosed as at the reporting date are 
unrepresentative of entity's exposure to risk during the period, an entity shall provide further 
information that is representative (IFRS 7 par. 35).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information
about risk
concentration
arising from
financial
instruments
Specific and 
representative 
Information about risk 
concentration arising 
from financial 
instruments AND 
negative statement that 
no risk concentration 
exists
Ouantified data on 
risk concentration
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life No No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
No No No Yes -1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING No Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re No No Yes No 5
8 Generali No No No Yes -1
9 AXA No No No Yes -1
10 Aviva No No No Yes -1
11 Allianz No Yes No No 3
12 AEGON No No Yes No 5
13 Zurich No No No Yes -1
Summary:
Eight out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about risk 
concentration. Three companies disclose specific information about risk concentrations (for 
example investments by economic sectors). Two listed insurance companies provide 
quantitative information about risk concentration arising from financial instruments.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk concentration from financial instruments leads to a positive judgement (1 point). The 
disclosure of specific and representative information about risk concentration or a negative 
statement that no risk concentration exists is measured with three points. The disclosure of 
quantitative data on risk concentration can be considered quantitative information (5 points).
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Pre Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: CH.3.
Accounting requirements
C.II.3.
exact specification:
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 5. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information.
In the case of risk threatening the existence of an enterprise, the forecast period is generally 
one year (GAS 5 par. 24).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General information about 
risk threatening the 
existence of the company
Specific information about risk 
threatening the existence of the 
company OR Negative 
statement
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
No Yes (negative statement) No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No No Yes -1
6 ING No No Yes -1
7 Hannover Re No No Yes -1
8 Generali No No Yes -1
g AXA No No Yes -1
10 Aviva No No Yes -1
11 Allianz Yes No No 1
12 AEGON No Yes No 3
13 Zurich No Yes No 3
Summary:
Nine out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about risk threatening 
the existence of the company. One listed insurance company discloses general information. 
Two companies disclose specific information and one company makes a negative statement.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk threatening the existence of the company leads to a positive judgement (1 point). The 
disclosure of specific information about risk threatening the existence of the company or a 
negative statement that no such risk exists is measured with three points. A quantification of 
the risk is not possible.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.I.1. and A.I.2.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.I.1.
Investment risk shall be measured on the basis of the recognised risk-monitoring methods 
used by the group. (GRS 5-20 par. 29)
Depending on the type of risk involved, one of the following methods is generally appropriate to 
measure investment risk:
- determination of the anticipated loss using a pre-defined level of confidence and probability 
based models, such as stress tests to take account of crisis scenarios: the use of back testing 
techniques is recommended in this context,
- asset/liability management techniques
- scenario of sensitivity analysis (GRS 5-20 par. 30)
A.I.2.
The disclosures made on the market risk of investments shall, as a minimum, contain the 
following information, if this has not already been quantified by the risk monitoring methods 
used by the group. (GRS 5-20 par. 31)
the effect of a 20% fall in the fair value of shares and other non-fixed interest securities 
the effect of a 1 % shift in the interest curve (upwards or downwards) on the market 
value of fixed interest securities and bonds
Results of the analysis:
# Name Scenarios 
interest and 
market value 
of equity 
variation
Effect on Embedded 
Value, Value of in- 
force business. Value 
at Risk or Earnings at 
risk quantified
Effect on
equity
quantified
Effect on 
earnings 
quantified
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No No 5
2 Standard Life Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
3 Legal & 
General Yes Yes No No 5
4 CNP
Assurances Yes
Yes No No 5
5 Munich Re Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
6 ING Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes No 5
8 Generali Yes Yes Yes No 5
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 5
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes No 5
12 AEGON Yes No Yes Yes 5
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 5
Summary:
All listed insurance companies quantify their investment risk using predominantly probability 
based models (European Embedded Value, Group Embedded Value, Value at Risk, Earnings 
at Risk or Value of in-force business) mentioned as accepted methods according to GRS 5-20 
par. 29 and 30. Only eight of the listed companies uses the alternative method named under 
GRS 5-20 par. 31 disclosing information on sensitivities that affect equity or earnings. A little
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less than half of the listed insurance companies disclose that information in addition to the 
predominantly used methods. All listed insurance companies fulfil the accounting requirements 
with a quantified investment risk disclosure in their financial statements as of December 31®*, 
2008.
Quantification:
The accounting requirements can be fulfilled with scenarios showing the effect on equity, 
earnings and embedded value. This information can be considered quantitative and are 
granted 5 points.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.I.3.
Accounting requirements
A.I.3.
exact specification:
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. To comply with this, an insurer 
shall disclose information about exposures to market risk arising from embedded derivatives 
contained in a host insurance contract if the insurer Is not required to, and does not, measure 
the embedded derivatives at fair value. (IFRS 4 par. 38 and 39e)
Results of the analysis:
# Name Scenarios interest and 
market value of equity 
variation
Disclosure that entire combined 
contract is treated in the 
accounting category “financial 
assets at fair value through 
profit/loss”
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes 3
3 Legal & General Yes No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes 3
5 Munich Re No No 3
6 ING Yes No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes 3
8 Generali Yes Yes 3
9 AXA Yes No 3
10 Aviva Yes No 3
11 Allianz Yes No 3
12 AEGON Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose that embedded derivatives are separated and 
measured at fair value. The majority of listed insurance companies does not disclose that 
certain embedded derivatives are not separable so that -  in order to measure them at fair 
value -  the entire combined contract is measured at fair value by classifying it to the IAS 39 
category “financial assets at fair value through profit/loss” All listed insurance companies fulfil 
the accounting requirements with a quantified investment risk disclosure in their financial 
statements as of December 31 ®*, 2008.
Quantification:
Information about embedded derivatives that are separated and measured at fair value can be 
considered a specific qualitative disclosure (3 points).
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A. 1.1.crisis
Accounting requirements
A.I.1.crisis.
exact specification:
There are no accounting requirements about risk reducing policies. However this information is 
essential in a crisis situation for the investor. The knowledge how the company is preparing 
itself against the effects of the financial crisis allows investors to judge the company and how 
the management leads the company.
To name and describe risk reducing policies like use of derivatives, sale of certain financial 
assets or diversification of investments is required. A quantification of the effect of risk reducing 
policies is not possible, because not every policy con be accounted for as hedging under the 
strict hedging requirements of IAS 39.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Use of
derivatives as 
a risk 
reducing 
policy
Name the 
kid of 
derivative 
and what 
kind of risk it 
is reducing
Sale of equity 
as a risk 
reducing 
policy
Diversification 
as a risk 
reducing policy
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No Yes 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes Yes No 3
6 ING Yes Yes Yes No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes Yes 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes No 3
11 Ailianz Yes Yes Yes No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies use derivatives as one policy to reduce market risk from interst 
bearing financial instruments and equity financial instruments. Eight out of thirteen companies 
sold equity financial instruments in order to reduce their market risk and three the listed 
insurance companies disclosed diversification as a policy to reduce their market risk. By 
naming and describing at least one risk reducing policy all listed insurance companies disclose 
specific qualitative information on this criteria in their financial statements as of December 31®*.
2008.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk reducing policies lead to a positive judgement (1 point). The disclosure of specific 
information about risk reducing strategies is measured with three points. The disclosure of 
quantitative data policies is not possible, because not every policy can be accounted for as 
hedging under the strict hedging requirements of IAS 39.
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.1.3.crisis
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.I.3.crisis
There are no accounting requirements about the disclosure of how a listed insurance company 
is affected by changes in the market value of certain financial instruments. However this 
information is essential in the crisis situation for the investor. The investor gets to know through 
the media the names of defaulted banks and toxic assets. They want to understand to what 
degree the listed insurance company is affected by this.
This crisis specific risk disclosure can consist of three parts:
• To name the categories of investments by listed insurance companies that are 
predominantly affected by the financial crisis
• To mention the reaction by the listed insurance companies to handle the market risk 
arising from these specific investments
• To quantify the market risk of these investments by disclosing their book value, their 
current fair value, the unrealized losses and the realized losses (impairments) of these 
investments.
• To disclose the expectation of the capital market (rating) towards these investments. 
Results of the analysis:
# Name Category of critical 
investments
Reaction
towards
risk
Valuation of critical investments Specification Result
Exposure
to
subprime
Exposure 
to default 
banks
Reducing
mean
Book
value
Fair
value
Unrealized
loss
Impairment Investment 
grade of 
critical 
investments
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes 1
2 Standard
Life
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No Yes No Yes No No Yes 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes No Yes No No Yes No 1
5 Munich Re Yes Negativ Yes Yes No No Yes No 3
6 ING Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
7 Hannover
Re
Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes 1
8 Generali No No No No No No No No -1
9 AXA Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes No No No No No 3
11 Ailianz Yes No No Yes No No No No 1
12 AEGON Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Negativ Yes 3
13 Zurich No Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
Summary:
Listed insurance companies are affected differently by the fall in market value of critical 
investments. With the exception of Generali and Zurich all listed insurance companies state 
that they have subprime investments in the forms of asset backed securities, residual 
mortgage backed securities, commercial mortgage backed securities or commercial debt 
obligations. Generali and Zurich do not mention any involvement in subpr[me critical 
investments but do not state that they are not affected at all (negative statement). More than 
half of the listed insurance companies disclose their involvement in investments with critical 
banks such as Lehman, Washington Mutual and Monoliners. Only Munich Re gives a negative
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statement about this involvement. The other listed insurance companies do not disclose 
information about their risk exposure.
Half of the listed insurance companies disclose activities to reduce the exposure to either 
subprime or default bank risk. They name swaps, derivatives and sale of bank shares to 
reduce their risk exposure.
All but three listed insurance companies that disclose their exposure to subprime or bank 
default investment risk explicitly mention the book value of their Involvement. But only together 
with the disclosure of fair value or losses (unrealized or impaired) can investors evaluate how 
far the risk has been realized. Only half of the listed insurance companies provide this kind of 
information.
The loss that can be further expected from the subprime or default bank investments of each 
listed insurance company can be predicted on the basis of the opinion of rating agencies on 
the investments. Eight listed insurance companies disclose that information about their crisis 
specific risk investments.
Quantification:
Unless explicitly stated by a negative information It can be assumed that all listed insurance 
companies as major investors are affected by subprime or default bank investments. When no 
involvement is disclosed it is a no information -1 Point. General information are provided when 
the investment with market risk specific to the crisis are disclosed and the book or fair value 
disclosed 1 Point. Specific information are disclosed when additionally risk reducing means to 
cope with the risks are mentioned 3 Points. Quantitative information is provided when the 
historic and outlook are quantified with the amount of impairment and the rating of crisis 
specific investments are disclosed 5 Points.
Special advice:
Listed insurance companies can be affected by the crisis because they own crisis specific risky 
investments with a high market price erosion, or be not affected at all. These companies can 
either disclose their risk or they cannot. So four types of risk disclosure performance is 
possible: Type A: High market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, extensive 
risk disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type B: High market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, little or no risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type C: Low or no market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, extensive risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type D: Low or no market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, little or no risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
The extent of risk from crisis specific investments cannot be detected unless disclosed in the 
annual financial statements. However the reduction of equity from the beginning of the crisis 
until 2008 can be an indication of financial difficulties that arose as a result of market value 
erosion of crisis specific investments.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.II.1.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.II.1.
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. (IFRS 4 par. 38) An insurer shall 
disclose information about credit risk that IFRS 7 par. 31-42 would require if the insurance 
contracts were within the scope of IFRS 7.(1 FRS 4 par. 39d) An entity shall disclose information 
that enables users of its financial statements evaluate the nature and extent of risk arising from 
financial instruments to which the entity is exposed at the reporting date. (IFRS 7 par. 31) The 
disclosures focus on the risk that arise from financial instruments and how they have been 
managed. (IFRS 7 par. 32)
Following information are required for each credit risk arising from financial instruments:
• Quantification of maximum exposure to credit risk at the reporting date. (IFRS 7 par. 34 
and 36a)
• Information about the credit quality of financial assets (IFRS 7 par. 36c)
• Analysis of age of financial assets that are past due as at the reporting date but not 
impaired (IFRS 7 par. 37a)
Results of the analysis:
# Name Quantification 
of credit risk 
exposure by 
investments
Disclosure of 
rating
information
of
investments
Disclosure of 
age of 
investments 
that are past 
due but not 
impaired
Disclosure of 
change in fair 
value
attributable to 
change in 
credit risk
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes No No 3
6 ING Yes Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No No 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
11 Allianz Yes Yes No No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes No No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies quantify their credit risk exposure mostly by disclosing it 
together with the ratings of their investments. The required disclosure of the aging of 
investments is disclosed by only two listed insurance companies and the non required 
disclosure of change in fair value attributable to changes in credit risk is provided by three 
listed insurance companies.
Quantification:
Required information about the aging of investments are not disclosed by all listed insurance 
companies. Therefore quantitative information does not receive 5 points but only 3 points. If
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additionally the required information about the aging of investments is disclosed 5 points are 
granted.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria; A.II.1.crisis
Accounting requirements
A. 11.1. crisis
exact specification:
There are no accounting requirements about the disclosure of how a listed insurance company 
is affected by defaults of creditors of certain financial instruments. However this information is 
essential in the crisis situation for the investor. The investor gets to know through the media the 
names of defaulted banks. They want to understand to what degree the listed insurance 
company is affected by these defaults.
This crisis specific risk disclosure can consist of three parts:
• To describe the financial involvement of listed insurance companies by defaulted 
creditors in the financial crisis that are common knowledge to the public (Lehman and 
Iceland banks)
• To quantify the financial involvement of the listed insurance company with these 
creditors
• To quantify the loss the listed insurance company took as a result of the default of 
these creditors
Results of the analysis:
# Name Qualitative description 
of financial involvement
Quantification of 
involvement
Quantification of 
loss
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes Yes 5
2 Standard Life No No No -1
3 Legal & General Yes Yes Yes 5
4 CNP Assurances Yes Yes Yes 5
5 Munich Re Yes Yes Yes 5
6 ING Yes Yes Yes 5
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes 5
8 Generali No No No -1
9 AXA Negative No No 3
10 Aviva Yes No No 3
11 Ailianz No No No -1
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes 5
13 Zurich No No No -1
Summary;
Listed insurance companies are affected differently by the default of Lehman and Icelandic 
banks as creditors of their investments. Eight listed insurance companies state that they have 
investments by the above mentioned creditors. Four listed insurance companies do not 
mention any involvement with these creditors but only AXA states that it is not affected at all 
(negative statement). More than half of the listed insurance companies quantify their financial 
involvement in investments with critical banks such as Lehman, Washington Mutual or 
Icelandic banks which defaulted. The other listed insurance companies do not quantify their 
risk credit exposure.
Half of the listed insurance companies disclose activities to reduce the exposure to either 
subprime or default bank risk. They name swaps, derivatives and sale of bank shares to 
reduce their risk exposure.
Seven listed insurance companies disclose loss.
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Quantification:
Unless explicitly stated by a negative information it can be assumed that all listed insurance 
companies as major investors are affected by the default of the creditors Lehman, Washington 
Mutual or Icelandic banks. When no involvement is disclosed it is regarded as no information - 
1 Point. To name involvement in the default of the above mentioned creditors is considered a 
specific general information 3 Points. Quantitative information on the involvement and the loss 
are disclosed 5 Points.
Special advice:
Listed insurance companies can be affected by the crisis because they own crisis specific risky 
investments with a high market price erosion, or be not affected at all. These companies can 
either disclose their risk or they cannot. So four types of risk disclosure performance is 
possible: Type A: High market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, extensive 
risk disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type B: High market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, little or no risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type C: Low or no market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, extensive risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
Type D: Low or no market risk from crisis specific investments in their portfolio, little or no risk 
disclosure in their annual financial statements
The extent of risk from crisis specific investments cannot be detected unless disclosed in the 
annual financial statements. However the reduction of equity from the beginning of the crisis 
until 2008 can be an indication of financial difficulties that arose as a result of market value 
erosion of crisis specific investments.
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Appendix C: Scoring documents for measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: A.III.1.
Accounting requirements
A.III.1.
exact specification:
An insurer shall disclose information that enables users of its financial statements to evaluate 
the nature and extent of risk arising from insurance contracts. To comply with this, an insurer 
shall disclose information about exposures to liquidity risk that IFRS 7 par. 31 -  42 would 
require if the insurance contracts were within the scope of IFRS 7 (IFRS 4 par. 39d). An entity 
shall disclose a description of how it manages the liquidity risk (IFRS 7 par. 39b). An insurer 
need not to provide the maturity analysis required by IFRS 7 par. 39a if it discloses information 
about the estimated timing of the net cash outflows resulting from recognised insurance 
liabilities instead.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Disclosure about liquidity risk inherent and Asset 
liability matching 
performed
Quantification of liquidity risk Result
Timing of returns from 
assets
Timing of obligations 
from insurance contracts
1 Old Mutual Yes No No 1
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No 5
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No 1
4 CNP
Assuranœs
Yes Yes No 5
5 Munich Re Yes No Yes 3
6 ING Yes No No 1
7 Hannover Re Yes No No 1
8 Generali Yes Yes Yes 5
9 AXA Yes No No 1
10 Aviva Yes No Yes 3
11 Allianz Yes No No 1
12 AEGON Yes No Yes 3
13 Zurich Yes No Yes 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose that they actively manage their liquidity risk. As 
recommended in the IFRS 7 requirements only three listed insurance companies describe their 
liquidity management by quantifying the timing of return from their assets. Five listed insurance 
companies fulfil the requirements by disclosing the timing of projected payments from their 
insurance obligations.
Quantification:
All information disclosed about the liquidity risk and how it is managed can be considered as 
general qualitative information (1 point). The legally required disclosure about the timing of 
obligations from insurance contracts can be considered a specific qualitative information (3 
points) and the voluntary disclosure about the timing of returns from assets as a qualitative 
information (5 points).
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Appendix C: Scoring documents fo r measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-Llst Summary:
Criteria: A.III.2.crisis
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
A.III.2. crisis
There is no accounting regulation that requires a sensitivity analysis in regard to liquidity risks 
by listed insurance companies. However as liquidity is essential to insurance companies 
significant changes in the market value of investments, in the credit risk of investment issuers 
and changes in the projected cash flow due to the crisis should be commented by listed 
insurance companies. This can be done most convincingly for investors by quantifying effects 
and scenarios.
The cash outflow of insurance related factors (lapse or mortality) can change as a result that 
these factors differ from historic assumptions. The cash inflow of investments can differ from 
historic assumptions due to a significant loss in market value or the default of creditors. These 
effects of changing cash flows can be disclosed as sensitivities to earnings/equity or 
Embedded Values.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Cash outflow sensitivity Cash inflow sensitivity (investment 
related)
Result
Effect on 
earnings or 
equity disclosed
Effect on 
Embedded Value 
disclosed
Effect on earning 
or equity 
disclosed
Effect on 
Embedded Value 
disclosed
1 Old Mutual Yes No No No 3
2 Standard Life Yes No No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
No Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
No Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re No Yes No Yes 5
6 ING No No No No 1
7 Hannover Re No No No No 1
8 Generali No Yes No No 3
9 AXA No No No No 1
10 Aviva Yes No No No 3
11 Allianz No No No No 1
12 AEGON Yes No No No 3
13 Zurich Yes No No No 3
Assumption: Only the interest and market value sensitivity is recognized In this analysis and 
not changes in the foreign exchange rate.
Summary:
Nine out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the effect that changes in historic 
insurance related assumptions have on either earnings/equity or the embedded value. One out 
of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the effect that changes in their investment 
related assumptions have on either earnings/equity or the embedded value.
Quantification:
Since the disclosure is not required all listed insurance companies that do not provide 
information receive 1 point. All companies that disclose cash outflow sensitivities on either 
earning/equity or Embedded values receive about cash inflow or cash outflow receive 3 Points. 
Listed insurance companies that disclose in addition to that sensitivities on cash in- and cash 
outflows receive 5 points.
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Post Crisis Gheck-List Summary:
Criteria: B.l.
Accounting requirements
B.l.
exact specification:
Following general accounting regulation require information about how financial instruments on 
the debit side of the balance sheet are measured.
An entity shall disclose in the summary of significant accounting policies the measurement 
basis used in preparing the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 117a).
It is important for an entity to inform users of the measurement basis used in the financial 
statements, because the basis on which an entity prepares the financial statements 
significantly affects users'analysis (IAS 1 par. 118).
The accounting standard IFRS 7 on the disclosure of financial instruments specifies theses 
requirements:
An entity shall disclose the valuation techniques used, the assumptions applied in determining 
fair values of each lass of financial assets. (IFRS 7 par. 27a)
An entity shall disclose whether fair values are determined in whole or in part directly by 
reference to published price quotations in an active market or are estimated using a valuation 
technique. (IFRS 7 par. 27b and IAS 39 AG 71 -  79
Results of the analysis:
# Name Categories of IAS 
39 used and 
disclosure of their 
effect on the 
balance sheet and 
profit/loss
Fair value determination Specification 
of these 
alternative 
valuation 
technique 
(IFRS 7)
Quantification of 
financial assets 
measured at fair 
value without 
active markets
Directly 
measured by 
reference to 
an active 
market
Indirectly
measured
by
alternative
valuation
technique
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes Yes No No 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No No 1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
6 ING Yes Yes Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No No 1
9 AXA Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 5
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
All listed insurance companies disclose the IAS 39 categories used and their effect on either 
earnings or equity. All companies disclose their directly measured references to an active 
market but two listed companies do not refer to alternative valuation techniques. Although 
eleven companies using them six listed insurance companies specify these valuation methods 
and only two quantify the financial instruments measured with these valuation techniques.
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Quantification:
Disclosure requirements about the IAS 39 categories and the fair value measurement on active 
markets can be considered as general information (1 point). Explanations about alternative 
valuation techniques or the specification of these techniques can be considered specific 
qualitative information (3 points). The information how many financial instruments are 
measured using these alternative valuation techniques is a quantitative information (5 points).
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.ll.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
B.ll.
Following general accounting regulation require information about how financial instruments on 
the debit side of the balance sheet are measured.
An entity shall disclose in the summary of significant accounting policies the measurement 
basis used in preparing the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 117a).
It is important for an entity to inform users of the measurement basis used in the financial 
statements, because the basis on which an entity prepares the financial statements 
significantly affects users'analysis (IAS 1 par. 118).
Results of the analysis:
# Name Categories of IAS 39 
used and disclosure 
of their effects on 
the balance sheet 
and profit/loss
Specific measuring 
techniques of fair 
values for financial 
liabilities
Disclosure about 
own credit risk 
considered in the 
valuation 
techniques of 
financial liabilities
Result
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No 0
2 Standard Life No No No 0
3 Legal & 
General
No No No 0
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No 0
5 Munich Re No No No 0
6 ING Yes Yes No 0
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No 0
8 Generali Yes No No 0
9 AXA Yes No No 0
10 Aviva No No No 0
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes 0
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes 0
13 Zurich Yes Yes No 0
Summary:
Eight out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the IAS 39 categories they use for 
financial liabilities and six of them specify the valuation techniques used to measure the fair 
value of their financial liabilities. Only two of the listed insurance companies disclose 
information about their own credit risk being considered in the valuation techniques of their 
financial liabilities.
Quantification:
The disclosure on the valuation methods of financial liabilities is very limited. The reason might 
be that listed insurance companies do usually not depend on bonds as a financial instrument or 
that financial liabilities are connected only to certain insurance products (like unit linked 
products) being sold by the listed insurance companies. Due to these restrictions disclosure 
about financial liabilities differs strongly among the listed insurance companies and shall not be 
included in the analysis and therefore not quantified.
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.lil.
Accounting requirements
Bill.
exact specification:
Following general accounting regulation require information about reasons for measuring 
insecurities.
An entity shall disclose the judgements that management has made in the process of applying 
the entity's accounting policies and that have the most significant effect on the amounts 
recognized in the financial statements (IAS 1 par. 122).
An entity shall disclose information about the assumptions it makes about the future, and other 
major sources of estimation uncertainty at the end of the reporting period, that have a 
significant risk of resulting in a material adjustment to the carrying amounts of assets and 
liabilities within the next financial year (IAS 1 par. 125).
Results of the analysis:
# Name Statement that 
estimates and 
assumptions 
are used in the 
preparation of 
the financial 
statements
General 
reference that 
financial 
instruments 
that are not 
quoted on an 
active market
Other specific 
assumptions 
used for 
financial 
instruments in 
the financial 
statements
Specification 
of risk from 
change of 
assumptions 
of financial 
instruments
Quantification 
of risk from 
changes in 
assumptions 
(actual or 
pervious year)
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No No No 1
2 Standard Life No No No No No -1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re No No No No No -1
6 ING Yes Yes No No No 1
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No No No 1
8 Generali Yes Yes No No No 1
9 AXA Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
10 Aviva Yes Yes Yes No No 3
11 Allianz No No No No No -1
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes Yes No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No No 1
Summary:
Ten out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose the statement that estimates and 
assumptions are used in the preparation of their financial statements and all of them disclose 
general information about inactive market for financial instruments. Four listed insurance 
companies provide detailed and specific information about the assumptions used and the 
associated risk. No company quantifies the risk from changes in assumptions.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). Statement of estimates and 
assumptions as well as reference to inactive markets can be considered as general information 
(1 point). Explanations about assumptions made and the resulting risk can be considered as 
specific qualitative information (3 points). The information about results from changes in 
assumptions in this calendar year or before can be considered a quantitative information (5 
points).
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.l.crisis.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
B.l.crisis
There are not accounting regulations that require listed insurance companies to disclose 
information about the measuring methods of certain financial instruments that are affected by 
the financial crisis. However as the names of certain financial instruments have become public 
knowledge by information in the media, investors want to know how these critical financial 
instruments are measured especially when no valuation is possible on active markets. This 
information enables investors to make a judgement about the possible future risk of the listed 
Insurance company and about how the management is handling the crisis using aggressive or 
conservative valuation methods.
Results of the analysis:
# Name Disclosure of asset types for which inactive market 
exists (qualitative by 
naming or quantitative by 
amount)
Specification about 
valuation method 
used instead of 
market prices to 
determine fair value
Disclosure about 
alternative sources of 
data that are used to 
determine the fair value
1 Old Mutual No Yes Yes 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes Yes 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No Yes 3
4 CNP
Assurances
No No Yes 3
5 Munich Re No No Yes 3
6 ING Yes Yes Yes 3
7 Hannover Re No Yes Yes 3
8 Generali Yes Yes Yes 3
9 AXA Yes Yes Yes 3
10 Aviva Yes No Yes 3
11 Allianz Yes Yes Yes 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes Yes 3
13. Zurich No No No -1
Summary:
All but one listed insurance companies disclose specific information about alternative sources 
of data that are used to determine the fair value. Eight companies disclosed specific 
information about the valuation method. Only eight listed insurance companies disclosed 
general information of the asset types which are affected by inactive markets.
Quantification:
No information disclosed about alternative valuation methods for financial instruments 
accounted for at fair value when the valuation process cannot rely on active markets leads to 
negative points (-1 point). General information about the asset types for which inactive markets 
exists can be considered a general information (1 point). Specifications about the method used 
instead or the information sources to determine the fair value can be considered a specific 
information (3 points). A quantification is not possible.
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: B.IV.crisis
Accounting requirements
B.IV.crisis
exact specification:
The amendment to IAS 39 issued in October 2008 permits an entity to reclassily
• Non-derivative financial assets at fair value through profit or loss category and
• Non-derivative financial assets from the available-for-sale category 
to the loans and receivables category (IAS 39 amendment IN8A)
This entity shall disclose:
• The amount reclassified into and out of each category
• For each reporting period until derecognition, the carrying amounts and fair values of all 
financial assets that have been reclassified
• If a financial asset was reclassified the facts and circumstances indicating that the 
situation was rare
• For the reporting period when the financial asset was reclassified the fair value gain or 
loss on the financial asset recognised in profit or loss in that reporting period and in the 
previous reporting period (IFRS 7 amendment 12A)
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information about 
amendments and 
option to reclassify
Negative
statement about 
the use of 
reclassification 
option
Specific disclosure required when 
reclassification option is used by the 
entity
Result
Amount 
reclassified, 
carrying 
amount and fair 
value.
Specification of rare 
circumstances and 
quantification of 
profit and loss effect
1 Old Mutual Yes Yes No No 3
2 Standard Life Yes Yes No No 3
3 Legal & 
General
Yes Yes No No 3
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes Yes No No 3
5 Munich Re Yes Yes No No 3
6 ING Yes No Yes No 1
7 Hannover Re Yes Yes No No 3
8 Generali Yes Yes No No 3
9 AXA Yes Yes No No 3
10 Aviva No No No No -1
11 Allianz Yes Yes No No 3
12 AEGON Yes Yes No No 3
13 Zurich Yes Yes No No 3
Summary:
One listed insurance company does not disclose any information. One company used the 
reclassification option but did not provide all necessary disclosure requirements. Eleven out. of 
thirteen listed insurance companies provided general information and disclosed a negative 
statement that they did not make use of the reclassification.
Quantification:
Information about the IFRS 7 and IAS 39 amendments can be considered as general 
information (1 point). When no information is provided this is considered with minus one point
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(-1). Information required by IFRS 7 amendment 12A or a negative statement that the 
reclassification option is not used by the listed insurance company can be considered as 
specific qualitative information (3 points). Quantification that exceeds the disclosure 
requirements is not possible.
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: 0.1.1.
Accounting requirements
0.1.1.
exact specification:
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 15. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information. The financial crisis can be considered as a significant negative impact that should 
be addressed by the listed insurance companies in order to timely and sufficiently inform their 
investors
Management's expectations for the future development of the results of operations and 
financial position of the group shall be presented and described at a minimum, as either a 
positive or a negative trend. The effects of the significant influencing factors shall be discussed 
(GAS 15 par. 89).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General 
information 
about future 
trends
Discussion of 
significant influencing 
factors that have a 
negative impact on the 
company
Quantification of 
future negative 
impact of stated 
influencing factors
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual Yes No No No 1
2 Standard Life Yes No No No 1
3 Legal & 
General
No No No Yes -1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING No Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re No No No Yes -1
8 Generali Yes No No No 1
9 AXA Yes No No No 1
10 Aviva No Yes No No 3
11 Allianz No Yes No No 3
12 AEGON No Yes No No 3
13 Zurich Yes No No No 1
Summary:
Three out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about future negative 
impact on their company. Five companies disclose general information about future trends. 
Five listed insurance companies discuss significant influencing factors and their negative 
impact on their company in the future. No company quantifies the negative impact.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
future trends leads to a positive judgement (1 point). The discussion of significant influencing 
factors that have a negative impact on the listed insurance company can be considered as 
specific qualitative information (3 points). The quantification of future negative impact by stated 
influencing factors can be considered quantitative information (5 points).
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: 0.1.2.
Accounting requirements
0.1.2.
exact specification:
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 15. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information. It is recognized that as a result of the financial crisis it is harder to forecast results.
The expected development of the group for the following two financial years shall be described, 
together with significant opportunities and risks associated with this development. The 
expected volume of future capital expenditures and the expected financial effects shall be 
discussed (GAS 15 par. 84).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information
about
development 
of the group 
in the 
following two 
financial 
years
Specific information 
about risk that might 
significantly affect the 
group in the following 
two financial years OR 
negative statement that 
such an information is 
not disclosed
Ouantified results 
or dividends for the 
following year or 
next two financial 
years
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life No No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No No 1
4 CNP
Assurances
Yes No No No 1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING No Yes (neg. statement) No No 3
7 Hannover Re No No Yes No 5
8 Generali No Yes No No 3
9 AXA No Yes (neg. statement) No No 3
10 Aviva No No No Yes -1
11 Allianz No Yes No No 3
12 AEGON No No No Yes -1
13 Zurich Yes No No No 1
Summary:
Four out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no result forecast. Three companies 
disclose general information about developments in the next two years. Two companies 
disclose a negative statement when they state that a result forecast is not possible and two 
companies disclose specific information about future risk. One listed insurance company 
provides forecasts on results or dividends for the next one or two financial years.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
the development of the group within the future time period leads to a positive judgement (1 
point). The disclosure of specific risk information or a negative statement that no disclosure is 
provided is measured with three points. The disclosure of future dividends or results can be 
considered a quantitative information (5 points).
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: C.II.1
Accounting requirements
C.II.1
exact specification:
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 5. It is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information. Interdependencies between the financial crisis and the insurance business model 
must be explained when an appropriate assessment by investors should be possible.
It is recommended that inter-dependencies between individual risks are described: it is 
mandatory to do so, where an appropriate assessment of the risk is otherwise not possible 
(GAS 5 par. 25)
Results of the analysis:
# Name General
information about 
risk
interdependencies
Specific information 
about
1 nterdepe ndencies 
and how they are 
measured or 
recognized in the 
company
Quantification of 
risk
interdependencies 
effects or 
diversification 
effects
No information 
about risk 
interdependencies
Results
1 Old Mutual No no No Yes -1
2 Standard
Life
No No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
Yes No No no 1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No yes No No 3
6 ING Yes No No No 1
7 Hannover
Re
No No No Yes -1
8 Generali No No No Yes -1
9 AXA No Yes No No 3
10 Aviva Yes No No No 1
11 Allianz No Yes No No 3
12 AEGON No Yes No No 3
13 Zurich no No No Yes -1
Summary:
Six out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about future risk 
interdependencies in their company. Three companies disclose general information about risk 
interdependencies. Four listed insurance companies specify information about risk 
interdependencies in the future. No company quantifies risk interdependency effects or 
diversification effects.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk interdependencies leads to a positive judgement (1 point). Specific information disclosed 
about interdependencies and how they are measured or recognized in the company can be 
considered as specific qualitative information (3 points). The quantification of risk 
interdependency effects or diversification effects can be considered quantitative information (5 
points).
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Post Crisis Check-List Summary: 
Criteria: 0.11.2.
Accounting requirements
C.II.2.
exact specification:
For each type of risk arising from financial instruments, an entity shall disclose concentration of 
risk (IFRS 7 par. 34c). If the quantitative data disclosed as at the reporting date are 
unrepresentative of entity's exposure to risk during the period, an entity shall provide further 
information that is representative (IFRS 7 par. 35).
The requirements can be applied to financial instruments that are named in the financial 
crisis situation.
Results of the analysis:
# Name General 
information 
about risk 
concentration 
arising from 
financial 
instruments 
that are 
named in the 
financial crisis
Specific and 
representative 
information about risk 
concentration arising 
from financial 
Instruments named in 
the financial crisis AND 
negative statement that 
no risk concentration 
exists
Ouantified data on 
risk concentration
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life No No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
No No No Yes -1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No No 3
6 ING No Yes No No 3
7 Hannover Re No No Yes No 5
8 Generali No No No Yes -1
9 AXA No Yes No No 3
10 Aviva No No No Yes -1
11 Allianz No No Yes No 5
12 AEGON No No Yes No 5
13 Zurich No No Yes No 5
Summary:
Six out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about risk concentration. 
Three companies disclose specific information about risk concentrations. Four listed insurance 
companies provide quantitative information about risk concentration arising from financial 
instruments named in the financial crisis.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk concentration from financial instruments named in the financial crisis leads to a positive 
judgement (1 point). The disclosure of specific and representative information about risk 
concentration or a negative statement that no risk concentration exists is measured with three 
points. The disclosure of quantitative data on risk concentration can be considered quantitative 
information (5 points).
357
Appendix C: Scoring documents fo r measuring risk disclosure performance
Post Crisis Check-List Summary:
Criteria: C.II.3.
Accounting requirements - exact specification:
C.II.3.
German accounting requirements on risk disclosure are stated in GAS 5. it is assumed that all 
listed insurance companies can comply with these requirements by voluntarily disclosing such 
information.
In the case of risk threatening the existence of an enterprise, the forecast period is generally 
one year (GAS 5 par. 24).
Results of the analysis:
# Name General information about 
risk threatening the 
existence of the company
Specific information about risk 
threatening the existence of the 
company OR Negative 
statement
No information 
disclosed
Results
1 Old Mutual No No Yes -1
2 Standard Life No No Yes -1
3 Legal & 
General
No No Yes -1
4 CNP
Assurances
No No Yes -1
5 Munich Re No Yes No 3
6 ING No No Yes -1
7 Hannover Re No Yes (negative statement) No 3
8 Generali No No Yes -1
9 AXA No Yes No 3
10 Aviva No No Yes -1
11 Allianz No No Yes -1
12 AEGON No No Yes -1
13 Zurich No Yes (negative statement) No 3
Summary:
Nine out of thirteen listed insurance companies disclose no information about risk threatening 
the existence of the company. Two companies disclose specific information and two 
companies make a negative statement that no risk that threatens the existence of the company 
exists.
Quantification:
No information provided leads to a negative judgement (-1 points). General information about 
risk threatening the existence of the company leads to a positive judgement (1 point). The 
disclosure of specific information about risk threatening the existence of the company or a 
negative statement that no such risk exists is measured with three points. A quantification of 
the risk is not possible.
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n Numbor of insurance groups in the research study (13)
Rji the rate of return on the share price of an insurance group i on day t
Rrrt the rate of return on the insurance market benchmark index BEINSUR of Bloombergon day t
a the intercept term of the OLS market model regression of an msurance group I
b the systematic risk analysed In the OLS market model regression of stock i
j  summation variable coefficient
Si Standard error of the OLS market model regression of an insure nee group i
Ssquare residual variance on the market portfolio calculated during the estimation period
T Number of days in the estimation period (88) It started with 90 and after two confounding events was reduced to 88.
K N urn tier of days in the event study period (15) later modified to (14) and supermodified to (13) so confounding events
&  Mean return of the insurance group I over the estimation period
Roi Mean return of the insurance market benchmark Index calculated over the estimation penod
AR i  Abnonnal Return
SDg Standard Deviation
SARjt Standardized Abnormal Return
CAR Cumulatve Abnormal Return for each firm
ACAR Average standardized cumulative abnormal returns
2  Test statistic
AR i,»R(t-(a, + b*Rrt)
SD i,=(Si-((ROOT(1 +(1/T)+(SQUARE«Rrt-Ri).2FSUM(SQUARE((R„,-.R4>,2))
SAR,=AR (fSD ft
CAR=ROOT(l/K)*SUM(SARit)
ACAR=1/n*1/ROOT((T-2)f(T-4))*SUM(CAR)
2cACAR*(R00Tn)
Assumptions:
Markets are efficient 
The event was unanticipated
The value of CAR are independent and identically distributed 
There Were no confounding events during the event window
Confounding events:
1. active merger and aquisition process
2. diwdend announcements
3. unusual stodc market events
4. business specific events that caused unusual stock market reactions 
Resulting research restrictions:
To 1. Checked that ZEW-ZEPHYR M&A index of world vride M&A activities has been on 1st lowest level for four years in September 2003 v4ion the event took place 
To 2: Checked by corporate websides
To 3' September 14th has been a triple witch day with unusuat trading activities, eliminated from the research by supermodified variables
To 4: September 8th was influenced by floods in China and Hurrican season in the US while new contracte were negotiated in Monte Carlo by the biggest reinsurance companies, lead to modified %^riables
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General Results
modified ACARmod 
supermodified ACARsupermod
•36,5 The cumulative abnormal return Is s^nlficant so that the near insolvency of AIG had a significant impact on the values of the 13 researched insure nee groups
Results per Insurance Group 
insurance Group Aiiianz AXA
modified CAR -16,3
supermodified CAR -19
LegalSGenerai Zurich StandardLife HannoveiRe
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n
radlng days iJnos
4.09.08 iSO W ÊÊ-100 25.04.2008 129,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,06
-99 28.04.2008 131.1 0,9 0.8 0,4 1.0 1.0 0,4 2,12
-88 29.04.2008 -1,2 -1.4 -0.2 -0.2 3,25
-87 30.04.2008 0.6 1.5 -0.2 2.76
-M 02.05.2008 2.2 2.6 7.8 1.0 0.6 3,93
- - -95 05.05.2008 0.2 0.3 1.0 0,5 1,30
.. . : ■ -84 06.05.2008 -1,5 -1,7 -0,3 2,3 1.0 -0,3 3,18
-93 07.05.2008 0,2 0.2 0,1 0,1 1.0 0,1 2,26
-92 08.05.2008 '1,2 -0.6 -0,8 0,2 1.0 -0.7 2,79
-91 09.05.2008 -1.2 -1.1 -0.4 0.9 1,0 -0,4 2,65
: ....... -90 12.05.2008 0,5 0.0 0,6 0.0
.99 13.05.2008 0,1 -0.2 0,3 0.0 1,0 0,3 2,19
.88 14.05.2008 -0.2 0.2 0,2 1.0 -0,2
.87 15 05 2008 -0,5 -0.1 0.0 1.0 -0,4 2,37
16.05.2008 0,8 0,8 0,0 1,0 0,8 3,17
19.05.2008 129.4 -0,2 0,1 0,0 1,0 0,1
20 05.2008 129,2 -0,1 -1,5 0,9 1.7 1.0 0.9
.83 21 05.2008 126.0 -2,5 -2.2 -1,0 4,1 1,0 -1,0 6,04
22.05.2008 -5,6 -1.1 -4.9 1,0 -4.8 5,19
.81 23.05.2008 119.7 0,3 -0.9 1.0 1,0 3,43
26 05.2008 ■0,8 1.0 -0,5 1,22
.79 27.05.2008 117,7 -0.9 -0,2 -0,6 0,0 1.0 -0,6
78 28.05.2008 2,0 1,8 0,9 3,8 1.0 0.9
.77 29.05.2008 120,3 0.2 0,7 1,0 -0.1 2.01
.78 30.05.2008 1.4 1,5 1,0 1.4 2,52
.75 02.06.2008 -1.9 -0,7 -1.3 0,2 1,0 -1.3
.74 03.06.2008 0.3 -0.9 0,2 1,0 -0.9
73 04.06.2008 -0.6 -0.4 0.2 1.0 -0,4
72 05.06.2008 117.7 0.3 0.0 1,0 0.3 2,70
-71 06.06.2008 115.7 0.0 1.0 0,0
- . -70 09.06.2008 -0,5 -0,8 0,1 1.0 -0,8
-89 10.06.2008 -0.5 -0,5 0,1 1,0 -0,5
11.06.2008 -1,7 0.1 2,2 1.0 0.1 4,26 67
12 06.2008 0.1 -0.9 1,0 -0.8 4,87
13.06.2008 3.5 0,9 3,0 1.0 3.0 7,34
«r. ........ 16.06.2008 1.2 1.6 0,1 1,0 3.65
-64 17.06.2008 0.8 0,9 0,0
1.1
1,0 0.9
jm -  -83 18.06.2008 117.3 -1,3 -0.2 1.0 -0.2 2.69 64
-62 19.06.2008 118,3 0,9 0.4 1,0 1.5 5,46
20.06.2008 117.2 1,0 -1.6 0,2 2,0 1.0 0,2
23.06.2008 116,8 -0.4 -1,3 0,6 1.0 0,6
-89 24.06.2008 -0,8 -0,4 -0,5 0,0 1,0 -0.5
-58 25.06.2008 1,0
-57 26.06.2008 115,6 -0.2 10,1 1.0 -0.2
■ -56 27.06.2008 112,3 •2,9 -1,4 -2,0 1.4 1,0 -1.9
JSS 30.06.2008 111,2 -1,0 -0,2 -0,8 0,0 1,0 -0,8 3,72
01.07.2008 -2,1 -2,8 -0,3 6,8 1.0 -0.3 4,61
.......  ^ -68 02.07.2008 1,0
. :.-62 03.07.2008 -0,2 3,7 1,0 0,2 4.77
-51 04.07.2008
07.07.2008 110,8 0:7
■ ■ -49 08.07.2008 -0,7 -1,3 0.3 1,3 1,0 0,3
09.07.2008 2,3 2.4 0,9 6.7 1.0 0,9 74
■ -47 10.07.2008 -0,4 -1,4 0,6 1,0 0,6 3,22-- «• 11.07.2008 -3,4 3,0 1.4 7,6 1.0 1.4
.:.;....-46 14.07.2008 0,5 1,0 0.0 1.3 1,0 0,0 2,58
-44 15.07.2008 -6,4 -3.0 -4.3 8,0 1,0
-43 16.07.2008 -3,2 0.2 -3,2 0,1 1.0 -3,2
-42 17.07.2008 5,0 9.7 1.0 4.8 8,32
........ -41 18.07.2008 0,1 13,6 1.0 0,1 5,41
.40 21.07.2008 2.0 0.1 1.0 2,0
•89 22.07.2008 -1,1 -0.2 -0,9 0,0 1,0 -0,9
-38 23.07.2008 4,6 3.6 2.4 14,6 1.0
-37 24.07.2008 -0.6 -1,3 0.4 1,3 1.0 0.4 3,75
25.07 2008 -6,4 -4.1 -3.7 15,4 1.0 -3,5
. -36: 28.07.2008 ■0,6 -2,0 0,8 3.4 1.0 0.7
: .-34 29.07.2008 105,5 0.1 0,1 1,0 -1.6
-33 30.07.2008 2.4 1,5 6,6 1,0 1,4 56
-32 31.07.2008 0.0
-31 01.08.2008 -0,4 -0,3 -0.2 0.0 1,0 -0.2
■ . -30 04 08.2008 -0.6 0,2 0,2 1.0
-29 05.08.2008 3,5 4,5 0.7 22,2 0,7
-36 06.08.2008 1,0 0,4 0,8 0,3 0,8
-27 07.08.2008 111,1 1,0 2,2 5,41
-26 08.08.2008 111,4 0,3 1,0 -0,3 1,0 -0,3 3,26
4 -26 11.08.2008 2,0 1.4 2,6 1,0 1,2 59
...................:....-24 12.08.2008 0,2 -0,3 0,5 0.0 1,0 0.5
^  -23 13.08.2008 -3.0 -0,7 10,3 1,0 -0.7
-22 14.08.2008 -0,8 0,5 1,0
-21 15.08.2008 0.6 0.0 0.7 1,0
18.08.2008 -0,6 -0.3 0,2 1.0
.19 19.08.2008 -3,3 4.2 -0.6 1,0 -0,5
-18 20 08.2008 1.0 1,0 -0,5
-17 21 08.2008 1,5 -1,5 -0,4 1,8 1,0 -0,4
, , -16 22 08 2008 2,4 2,8 0,7 9.0
-15 25.08.2008 2.1 0,0
.14 26.08.2008 0.1 0,0 0,1 0,0 1,0
-13 27.08.2008 0.3 -0,9 0.9 0,5 1.0 0,9. :.-iz 28.08.2008 2.4 0.8 8,2 1.0 0,7
-11 29 08.2008 1.9 0.2 1.9 0.1 1,0 1,9 60
. -10 01.09.2008 -0.3 -0,1 0,0 1,0 -0,1
-9 02.09.2008 1.5 -0.1 8,5 1,0 0,1 0,1
-8 03.09.2008
-7 04.09.2008 112,6 2,3 2,7 -0.5
-6 05.09.2008 4,1 -2,3 -2,6 4,3 1,0 -2:5
-5 08.09.2008 113.2 4,5 0,0 4.5 0.0 1,0
-4 09.09.2008 1,3 5,1 -1.9 28,2 -1,8 -1.8 5,29
-3 10 09.2008 -2,4 1,5 1,0 -1.5 1,5
-2 11.09.2008 -1,7 -1,4 -0.7 1.5 1,0 -0,7 0,7
■ -1 12.09.2008
■ n ü É R
1 15.09.2008 -6,8
2 16.09.2008 -5.7 -3.4 -3,5 1,0 -3.3 -3.3
17.09.2008 97,5 -0,3 -1,0 0.4
4 18.09.2008 7,6 ■1-1 -6.8 0.8 1,0 -6,7 6,7 14,40
' 5 19.09.2008 100,9 1,06
2 4 3 ,9Source: Bloomberg and Goldman Sachs -1 6 .3
-1 9 .0
mod. SARk supermodifie SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period 
-0 .1 9 1 2 6 9 8T is the number of days in the estimation period considering confou modified CARt 
88  -61,11/T
0 .0 1 1 3 6 4S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1 .00 86 66 57square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1 .01 7 .4 08  sum of (RmrBm squared)
24 3 .3
-46 ,9
supermodlfied CARt 
-68 ,6
A R i t  =  R i t  — ( -0 .0 9  +  0 ,6 4  •  R jm t)
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axa g  ' . M B #■ i 9HWÊÊÊÊÊ^ U^
25.04.2008 22,9 0,0 0.0 0,0 0.0 — 0,0 9,08 3.68
28.04.2008 23,2 1,5 0,8 1,2 1,0 1,0 1,3 9,11
29.04.2008 23,0 -1,1 -1,4 -0,3 1,4 1,0 -0.3 7,36
30.04.2008 23,2 1,2 1,5 0,5 2,8 1,0 0,6 7,48
02.05.2008 24,2 3,9 2,6 2,7 7,8 1,0 2.8 15,62
05.05.2008 0,7 -0,3 -0,4 0.0 1,0 -0,4 5,90
06.05.2008 23,6 -2,0 1,7 -0,9 2,3 1,0 -1,0
07.05.2008 23,7 0,4 0,2 0,5 0,1 1,0 0,5 9.87
08.05.2008 23,6 -0,4 0,0 0,2 1,0 0,0 10,75
09.05.2008 22,9 -2,8 -1,1 -2,1 0,9 1,0 -2.2 10.76
12.05.2008 23,1 0.9 0,0 1.1 0.0 1,0 1,1 4,59
13.05.2008 23,3 0,8 -0,2 1.0 0.0 1,0 1.1 10,02
14.05.2008 23,3 0,1 0,2 0,1 0,2 1,0 0,1 9,42
15.05.2008 23,2 -0,6 -0,1 -0,4 0,0 1,0 -0.5 8.18
16.05.2008 23,3 0,5 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,0 0,7 10.13
19.05.2008 23,1 -0,2 -0,9 0,0 1,0 -0.9 9,16
20.05.2008 22,8 1,1 -1,5 -0,2 1,7 1,0 -0,2 10.37
21.05.2008 22,3 -2,2 -2,2 -0,9 4,1 1,0 -1,0 14.86
22.05.2008 21,9 -1,9 -1,1 -1,3 0,8 1,0 -1,3
23.05.2008 21,7 -0,8 -0,9 -0.2 0,5 1,0 -0.2 9.83
26 05.2008 21,5 -1,1 -0,3 -0,8 0,0 1,0 -0,8
27 05.2008 21.3 -0,6 -0,4 0,0 1,0 -0,4 9.31
28.05.2008 22,0 3,1 1,8 2.3 3,8 1,0 2,4
29.05.2008 22,2 1,0 0,7 0,8 0.7 1,0 0.8
30.05.2008 22,3 0.5 0,0 0.6 0,0 1,0 0.6
02.06.2008 21,6 -3,3 -0,7 -2.9 0,2 1,0 -3.0 11,41
03.06.2008 21,3 -1,6 0,3 -1,6 0,2 1,0 -1,6 13.25
04.06.2008 21,0 -1.1 0,6 0.6 0.2 1,0 -0.7 10,72
05.06.2008 21,3 -0.2 1,3 0.0 1,0 1,3 8,53
06.06.2008 -1,9 -2,5 -0.4 5.3 1,0 -0,5 13.32
09.06.2008 20,3 -2.6 -0,5 -2,2 0.1 1,0 -2,3 10.22
10.06.2008 20,2 -0.6 -0,5 -0,2 0,1 1,0 -0.2
11.06.2008 0.6 -1,7 1,6 2.2 1,0 1,6
12.06.2008 20,5 0,5 1,6 -0.2 3,1 1,0 -0.2 13,84
13.06.2008 20,7 1,1 0,9 0.8 1,3 1,0 0.8 11,59
16.06 2008 21,1 1,9 -0,4 2.2 0.1 1,0 2.4 11,15
17.06.2008 21,2 0.6 0,0 0.7 0,0 1,0
18.06.2008 2,8 -1,3 -2,0 1.1 1,0 -2.1
19.06.2008 -0,9 -0,9 -0,3 0.4 1,0 -0,3
20 06.2008 20,2 -1,2 -1,6 -0,2 2.0 1,0 -0.2 17.63
23.06.2008 19,8 -2,0 -1,3 -1,2 1,3 1,0 -1,2 9,95
24.06.2008 19.5 -1,5 -1.2 0,0 1,0 -1,2 13,04
25.06.2008 2,0 1,0 1,6 1,5 1,0 1,7 8,75
26.06.2008 -3,3 -3,4 -1,4 10,1 1,0 -1,4
27.06.2008 18,4 -5,1 -1.4 -4,2 1,4 1,0 -4,4
30.06.2008 18,3 0,1 0,2 0.2 0,0 1,0 0,2
01.07.2008 17,7 -3,5 -1,9 1,0 17.70
02.07.2008 17,8 0,5 0,1 0,6 1,0 13,68
03.07.2008 17,9 0,8 1,7 0,0 3.7 1,0 0,0 19,98
04.07.2008 17,9 -0,2 -2.5 1,2 5.2 1,0 1,3 8,50
07.07.2008 0,4 1,3 -0,1 2,2 1,0 -0,1 9,67
08.07.2008 17,6 -2,3 -1.3 -1.5 1,3 1,0 -1,5 16,58
09.07 2008 18,5 4,7 2,4 3,6 6,7 1,0 3,7 15,24
10.07 2008 18,3 -0,9 -1,4 0.0 1,5 1.0 0.0 13,92
11.07.2008 17,6 -4,2 -3.0 -2,5 7.6 1,0 -2,6 15.12
14.07.2008 17,7 0,9 1,0 0,5 1,3 1,0 0,5 11.19
15.07.2008 -5,1 -3,0 -3,4 8.0 1,0 -3,5
16.07.2008 16,4 0,2 -2,7 0.1 1.0 -2.9
17.07.2008 17,8 7,8 2,9 6.4 9.7 1,0 6,6
18.07.2008 18,3 2,9 3,5 1,2 13,6 1,0 1,2
21.07.2008 18,7 1,9 0,2 2.0 0.1 1,0 2,1
22.07.2008 18,4 -1,6 -0.2 -1,4 0,0 1.0 -1,4 11.53
23 07.2008 19,5 5,9 3,6 4.1 14.6 1,0 4,2 18,84
24 07.2008 19,6 0,5 -1,3 1.3 1,3 1,0 1,4 13,20
25 07.2008 18,3 -7,2 -4,1 -4,9 15,4 1,0 -5,0
28 07.2008 -1,8 -2,0 -0,6 3.4 1,0 -0.7
29.07.2008 17.4 -3,1 0,1 -3.0 0,1 1.0 -3,2
30.07.2008 18,3 4.7 2,4 3,6 6,6 1,0 3.7 14.33
31.07.2008 18,5 1.1 0.0 1,2 0.0 1,0 1,3 11,72
01.08.2008 18,4 -0,4 -0,3 -0,1 0.0 1,0 -0,1 10.83
04.08.2008 18,3 -0,4 -0,6 0,0 0.2 1,0 0.0
05.08.2008 19.2 4,7 4,5 2,5 22,2 1,0 2,5
06.08.2008 2.6 0,4 2.5 0.3 1,0 2.7 13,92
07.08.2008 5,8 0,1 5,9 0.1 1,0 6.1 25,67
08.08.2008 21,5 2,2 1,0 1,8 1,5 1,0 20,86
11 08.2008 21,8 1,6 1.4 1,0 2.6 1,0 1.0 11.61
12.08.2008 21,7 -0,5 -0.3 -0,2 0.0 1,0 0,2 13.92
13.08.2008 -3,8 -3,4 -1,9 10,3 1,0 -1,9 13,91
14.08 2008 20,7 -0,9 0,5 -1,0 0,5 1,0 -1,0 9.59
15.08 2008 21,3 2,8 0,6 2.6 0.7 1,0 2.7 10.31
18.08.2008 21,2 -0.6 -0.6 -0.2 0.2 1,0 -0,2 7.61
19.08 2008 20,2 -5,1 -4,2 -2,8 1,0 -2,8 14.41
20.08.2008 -1.1 0,8 -1,4 1,0 -1,5
21.08.2008 19,7 1,1 -1.5 -0,2 1,8 1,0 -0.2 102
22.08.2008 20,3 3,0 2,8 1,7 9.0 1,0 1,7 11,12 96.5
25.08.2008 20,5 0,9 0,0 1,1 0,0 1,0 1,1 6,37 96.5
26.08.2008 20,2 -1,7 0,0 -1.6 0,0 1.0 -1.6 9,33 98,5
27.08.2008 20,0 -0,9 -0,9 -0.3 0,5 1,0 -0.3 9,15
28 08.2008 20,7 3,3 2,7 2,0 8,2 1.0 2.1 14,91
29.08 2008 2,9____ 3.0 1,0 3.1_______
01.09.2008 21,2 -0,7 -0.1 -0.6 0,0 1,0 -0,6
02.09.2008 22,3 5,1 2,7 3,8 8,5 1,0 3.9 3.9 24,70
03.09.2008 22,3 0,1 -1,2 0.9 1,0 1,0 0,9 0.9 13,15 3.68
04.09.2008 21,8 -2,4 -2,7 -0.8 6,1 1,0 -0.9 -0,9 14,89 3.68
05.09.2008 -4,5 -2.3 -3.2 4,3 1,0 -3.3 3,68
08.09.2008 23,1 9,8 0,0 0,0 1,0 10,4 38.29
09.09.2008 23,0 -0,5 5,1 -3,0 28.2 1,0 -3.0 -3,0 19,73
10 09.2008 22.3 -3.4 -1,3 -2,6 1,1 1,0 -2.7 -2.7 15,64
11.09.2008 21,4 -4,1 -1,4 -3.3 1,5 1,0 -3.4 -3,4 20.91
12.09.2008 0,5 1,0 0,8 12.93
15.09.2008
16.09.2008
17.09.2008
18.09.2008
19.09.2008
19,7
19,1
23,3
-9,6
-3,2
4,5
-0,2
14,3
-6,3
-3,4
- 1,0
- 1,1
11,0
-6,1
-1,3
5.1
0,5
8,7
37,9
0,6
0,8
125.4
243,9
- 6,0 
-1,3
5.3 
0.6
7.4
Sum SARk 
mod. SARI 
supermodi’ SARk
1.0
1,0
1,0
1,0
1,2
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period
-0.1912698
T is the number of days in the estimation period
-6.0 40.30 3,68
-1,3 34,04 3,68
5.3 34,51 3,68
0.6 27,26 3.68
7.4 56,92 3.68
8.1 1130.00
-2.4 Without 6.9.2008
-9.7 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
31.3
modified CARt
- 8.8
0.011364
S standard error of the OLS-yfarKpt model regression 
0.949595
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
0.9017312 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
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EQ3Hf l i
24.04.2008 28,6 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,7 0,1 5,43 1,89
25.04.2008 29,0 1,2 0,8 1,2 1,0 1,7 0,7 4,29
28.04.2008 28,7 -1,0 -0,7 1,4 1,7 -0,4 7,28
29.04.2008 28.4 -0,9 1,5 -0,9 2,8 1.7 -0,6 5,99
30.04.2008 28,5 0,2 2,6 0,0 7,8 1,7 0,0 11,45
02.05.2008 28,8 1,2 -0.3 1,4 0,0 1,7 0,8 11,19
05.05.2008 28,7 -0,5 -1.7 -0,1 2,3 1,7 0,0 4,17
06.05.2008 28,4 -0,9 0.2 -0,8 0,1 1,7 -0.5
07.05.2008 28,5 0,4 -0,6 0,6 0,2 1,7 0,4 7,03
08.05.2008 28,4 -0,6 -1,1 -0,3 0,9 1,7 -0,2
09.05.2008 28,2 -0,7 0.0 -0,6 0,0 1.7 -0,3 8,21
12.05.2008 28,1 -0,1 -0,2 0,1 0,0 1,7 0.0 8,24
13.05.2008 28,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,2 1,7 0,1 14,12
14.05.2008 28.1 -0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 1,7 0,1 10,59
15.05.2008 -0,3 0,0 -0,2 0,0 1,7 -0,1 7,17
16 05.2008 0,0 -0,2 0,2 0,0 1,7 0,1
19.05.2008 27,3 -2,8 -1,5 -2,4 1,7 1.7 -1,4 5,58
20.05.2008 27.0 -1,1 -2,2 -0,7 4,1 1,7 -0,4 7,02
21.05.2008 -0,7 -1,1 -0,4 0.8 1,7 -0,2 8,70
22.05.2008 26,4 -1,4 -0,9 -1,1 0,5 1,7 -0,7 11,71
23.05.2008 -0,1 -0,3 0,1 0,0 1,7 0,1
26.05.2008 -0,7 -0,2 -0,5 0,0 1,7 -0,3
27.05.2008 26,1 -0,3 1,8 -0,4 3,8 1,7 -0,2
28.05.2008 26,5 1,4 0,7 1,5 0,7 1,7 0,9 12,59
29.05.2008 26,5 0,1 0.0 0,3 0,0 1,7 0,2 4,78
30.05.2008 0,9 -0.7 1,2 0,2 1,7 0,7 5,72
02.06.2008 26,4 -1,3 0,3 -1,2 0,2 1,7 -0,7 4,31
03.06.2008 0.6 0,6 0,8 0,2 1,7 0,5 4,16
04.06.2008 0.1 -0,2 0,2 0,0 1,7 0,2 4,52
05.06.2008 -0,2 -2.5 0,3 5,3 1,7 0,2 3.93
06.06.2008 26,2 -1,3 -0,5 -1,1 0,1 1.7 -0,7
09.06.2008 26,1 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4 0,1 1,7 -0,3
10.06.2008 25,9 -0,6 -1,7 -0,2 2,2 1,7 -0,1
11.06.2008 0,2 1,6 0,2 3,1 1,7 0,1 5,02
12.06.2008 26,0 -0,1 0,9 0,0 1,3 1,7 0,0
13 06.2008 25,8 -0,4 -0.4 0,2 0,1 1,7 -0,1 4,22
16.06.2008 25,8 -0,3 0.0 -0,1 0,0 1,7 -0.1 5.57
17.06.2008 25,4 1,6 -1,3 -1,2 1,1 1,7 -0,7
18 06.2008 25,1 -1,3 -0.9 -1.0 0,4 1,7 -0,6
19.06.2008 25,1 0,3 -1,6 0,7 2,0 1,7 0,4 4,78
20.06.2008 24.8 -1,2 -1,3 -0,9 1,3 1,7 -0,5 10,26
23.06.2008 24,7 -0,5 -0.4 -0,3 0,0 1,7 -0,2 4,81
24 06.2008 24,4 -1,2 1,0 -1,2 1,5 1,7 0,7
25.06.2008 24,6 0,8 -3,4 1,4 10,1 1,7 0,8 4,38
26.06.2008 24.7 0,1 -1,4 0.4 1,4 1,7 0,3 5,71
27.06.2008 1,7 -0.2 -1,5 0,0 1,7 -0,9
30.06.2008 24,2 -0,3 2,8 0,2 6,8 1,7 0,1
01.07.2008 -0,7 0,1 -0,5 0.1 1,7 -0,3
02 07.2008 24,1 0,5 1,7 0,4 3,7 1,7 0,2
03 07.2008 -0,5 2,5 0,0 5,2 1,7 0,0 7,17
04.07.2008 23,8 -0,8 1,3 -0,8 2,2 1.7 -0,5 5,65
07.07.2008 23,7 -0,6 -1,3 -0.2 1,3 1,7 -0,1 5,36
08.07.2008 23,4 1,2 2,4 -1,3 6,7 1.7 0,8 7,62
09.07.2008 23,6 0,8 1,4 1,1 1,5 1,7 0,7 6,25
10.07.2008 23,6 0,1 -3,0 0,6 7,6 1,7 0.4 6,16
11 07.2008 23,0 -2,6 1.0 -2,5 1,3 1,7 -1,5 10,61
14 07.2008 23,1 0,5 -3,0 1,0 8,0 1,7 0,6 5,08
15.07.2008 22,6 -2,3 0.2 -2,2 0,1 1,7 -1,3 9,52
16.07.2008 22,3 -1,5 2,9 -1,7 9.7 1,7 -1,0
17.07.2008 22,6 1,3 3,5 1,0 1,7 0,6
18.07.2008 22,6 0,0 0.2 0,1 0,1 1,7 0,1 7,44
21.07.2008 22,8 1,2 0,2 1.4 0,0 1,7 0,8 5,78
22.07.2008 22,7 -0,7 3,6 -1,0 14,6 1,7 -0,6
23.07.2008 23,3 2,5 -1.3 2,9 1,3 1,7 1,7
24.07.2008 23,3 0,0 -4.1 0,7 15,4 1,7 0,4
25.07.2008 22,6 -2,8 -2,0 -2,4 3,4 1,7 -1.4 12,32
28.07.2008 22,3 -1,6 0.1 -1,5 0,1 1.7 -0,9 7,35
29.07.2008 22,2 -0,4 2,4 -0,5 6.6 1,7 -0,3 6,57
30.07.2008 22,6 1,8 0.0 2,0 0,0 1,7 1,2
31.07.2008 22,5 -0,3 -0,3 -0,1 0,0 1,7 -0,1 9,77
01.08.2008 22,3 -1,2 -0,6 -0,9 0,2 1,7 -0,6
04.08.2008 22,2 -0,5 4,5 -0,9 22,2 1,7 -0,5 3,46
05.08.2008 22,8 2,7 0.4 2,8 0,3 1.7 1,7 7,27
06.08.2008 22,9 0,7 0.1 0,8 0.1 1.7 0,5
07.08.2008 23,0 0,3 1,0 0,3 1,5 1,7 0,2 4,38
08.08.2008 22,8 -0,8 1,4 0,8 2.6 1.7 -0,5
11.08.2008 23,2 1,6 0,3 1,8 0,0 1,7 1,1
12.08.2008 23.2 0,1 -3.4 0,7 10,3 1,7 0,4
13.08.2008 23.1 -0,7 0,5 -0,6 0,5 1,7 -0,3 4,79
14.08.2008 22,9 -1,0 0,6 -0,9 0,7 1,7 -0,5 3,67
18.08.2008 22,8 -0,2 -0,6 0,0 0,2 1.7 0,0 3,67
19.08.2008 22,6 -1,2 -4,2 -0,4 16,0 1.7 -0,3 4,81
20.08.2008 22,4 -0,6 0,8 -0,5 1,0 1.7 -0,3 3,57
21.08.2008 1,1 -0,7 1.8 1,7 -0,4 4,34
22.08.2008 22,4 0,7 2,8 0,5 9,0 1,7 0,3 3,75 58,5
25.08.2008 22,4 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,7 0,1 58,5
26.08.2008 22,2 -0,6 0,0 -0,5 0.0 1.7 -0.3 60.5
27.08.2008 22.2 -0,1 -0,9 0,2 0,5 0,1 3,45
28.08.2008 22,6 1,7 2,7 1.5 8,2 0.9 5.33
29.08.2008 1.0 1,1 0.1 1,7 0,7______
01.09.2008 22,7 -0,4 -0.1 -0,2 0,0 1,7 -0,2 -0,2 3,31 1,89
02.09.2008 23,1 1,7 2,7 1,5 8,5 1.7 0,9 0,9 6,79 1,89
03.09.2008 23,1 0,1 -1,2 0,4 1,0 1.7 0,3 0,3 3,33 1,89
04.09.2008 22,9 -0,9 -2,7 -0,4 6,1 1,7 -0,2 -0,2 5,03 1,89
05.09.2008 22,2 -3,2 -2,3 -2,7 4,3 1.7 -1.6 -1,6 1,89
08.09.2008 22,8 2,4 0,0 2,6 0,0 1.7 1,6 1.6 1,89
09.09.2008 22,9 0,5 5,1 0,0 28,2 1.8 0,0 0.0 1,89
10 09.2008 22,7 -0,6 -1,3 -0,3 1,1 1,7 -0,2 -0,2 5,61 1,89
11.09.2008 22,6 -0,6 -1,4 -0,2 1,5 1,7 -0,1 -0,1 5,32 1,89
12.09.2008 22,6 -0,1 0,5 0,0 0.5 1.7 0.0 0.0 5.20
15.09.2008 21,7 -4,1 -6,3 37,9 1,8 -1,7 -1.7 1.89
16.09.2008 21,2 -2,3 -3,4 -1,7 1,7 -1,0 -1,0 14,22 1,89
17.09.2008 21.4 0,8 -1.0 1,1 0,6 1,7 0.7 0,7 8,25 1,89
18.09.2008 -2,4 -1,1 2,1 0,8 1,7 -1,3 -1,3 12,77
19.09.2008 22,1 5,6 11,0 4,3 125,4
243,9
2,0 2,1
Sum SARk
2,1
mod. SARI 
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period -3.3
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period modified CARt
0.011364 o / " 0  supermodlfied CARt
S standard error of the OLS m a rk ^ Q ^ e l regression -16,3
1.649947
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
2,7223 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
-2,4 Without 5.9.2008
-4.5 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
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share R,t Rmt AR
price on change change In Abnormal 
the Date in% share % Return
Rmi * SD it SAR = AR Sum SAR Vofumen of Minimum
mean standard it/SD „ k traded Trade
Return deviation shares In Volume Is
Spreads
(hp)
23.04.2008
24.04.2008
25.04.2008
28.04.2008
29.04.2008
30.04.2008
01.05.2008
02.05.2008
06.05.2008
07.05.2008
08.05.2008
09.05.2008
12.05.2008
13.05.2008
14.05.2008
15.05.2008
16 05.2008
19.05.2008
20.05.2008
21.05.2008
22.05.2008
23.05.2008
27.05.2008
28.05.2008
29.05.2008
30.05.2008
02.06.2008
03.06.2008
04.06.2008
05.06.2008
06.06.2008
09.06.2008
10.06.2008 
11.06.2008 
12.06.2008
13.06.2008
16.06.2008
17 06.2008
18 06.2008 
19 06.2008 
20.06.2008
23.06.2008
24.06.2008
25.06.2008
26.06.2008 
27.06 2008
30.06.2008
01.07.2008
02.07.2008
03.07.2008
04.07.2008
07.07.2008 
08 07.2008
09.07.2008
10.07.2008
11.07.2008
14.07.2008
15.07.2008
16.07.2008
17.07.2008
18.07.2008
21.07.2008
22.07.2008
23.07.2008 
24 07.2008
25.07.2008
28.07.2008
29.07.2008
30.07.2008
31.07.2008
01.08.2008
04.08.2008
05.08.2008
06.08.2008
07.08.2008
08.08.2008 
11.08.2008 
12.08.2008
13.08.2008
14.08.2008
15.08.2008 
18 08.2008
19.08.2008
20.08.2008 
21.08.2008 
22.08.2008 
26.08.2008
27.08.2008
28.08.2008 
29.08 2008
01.09.2008
02.09.2008
03.09.2008
04.09.2008
05.09.2008
08.09.2008
09.09.2008
10.09.2008
11.09.2008
12.09.2008
642.6
635.3
637.9
633.3
610.7 
605,2
620.9
623.1
619.9
588.1
577.0
587.4
585.5
588.2
590.2
574.9
555.7
545.1
533.2
482.0
492.9
495.9
529.4
521.7
486.7
475.5
517.0
517.6
526.1
526.9
526.9 
533,5
0,0
- 2 ,0
0,1
1,9
-1,9
0,7
0,0
4.3 
-0,5 
- 0,6 
- 1,1 
- 1,1
0,4
0,5
1.4 
-1,5
2 ,1
- 0,2
- 2,1
-3,7
-0,9
1,8
-1,3
2,1
0,8
1,6
- 2,6
0,4
-0,5
-0.3
-0,5
-2,3
- 2 ,2
-1,9
1,6
-0,3
0,5
0,3
-2,7
-1,5
-1.9
-1,9
- 2,2
-0.5
-3,0
- 2 ,2
-1,0
-3,5
2,2
0,6
-1.3
0,5
-0,2
4.8 
-2,6 
-1,7
0,9
-4,3
-0,6
5.6
4.0 
-0,8 
-3,3
4.6 
-1,5 
-7,2 
-2,4 
-1,4
6.3 
0,1 
0,3
-1,6
5.3 
-1,0
0,1
1.6
2.8
1.3 
-4,0
0.0
1,2
-1,4
-5,5
-0,3
-2,9
3.2 
-0,1
0,2
3.2 
-0,2 _
1.1
3.4 
-1,4 
-1,1 
-4.8
5.7
2.8 
-1,7 
-1,9
0,8
-1,4
1.5
2.6 
-0,3 
-1,7
0.2
-0,6
- 1,1
0,0
-0,2
0,2
0,1
0,0
- 0 ,2
-1,5
-2,2
- 1,1
-0,9
-0,3
-0,2
1,8
0,7
0,0
-0,7
0,3
-0,6
-0,2
2.5 
0,5
-0,5
-1,7
1.6 
0,9
-0,4
0,0
-1,3
-0,9
-1,6
-1,3
1,0
-3,4
-1,4
0,2
-2,8
0,1
1.7 
-2,5
-1,3
2.4 
-1,4 
-3,0
1,0
-3,0
0,2
2,9
3.5 
0,2
-0,2
3.6 
-1,3 
-4,1 
-2.0
0,1
2.4 
0,0
-0,3
-0,6
4.5
1,0
1.4 
-0,3 
-3,4
0,5
0,6
0,8
1.5
2.8 
0.0 
0,0
-0.9
2.7
-2,7
-2,3
0,0
5,1
-1,3
-1,4
- 1,8
0,3
2,0
- 1,8
0,9
0,2
4.5 
-0,3 
-0,4 
-0,9 
- 1.0
0,6
-0,3
1.6 
-1,3
2.3 
0,0
-1,9
-3,5
-0,7
2,0
-1,2
2.3 
1,0 
1,8
-2,4
0.6
0,3
0,0
-0,3
-2,1
- 2,0
- 1,8
1,9
-0.1
0,6
0,5
-2,4
-1,3
-1,7
- 1,8
-0,2
-2,8
-2,0
-0.8
-3,3
2.3 
0,8
-1,2
0.7
0,0
5.0 
-2,3 
-1,6
1.1 
-4,1 
-0,5
5.7
4.2 
-0.6 
-3,2
4.8 
-1,2 
-6,9 
-2,2 
-1,3
6.5 
0,3 
0,5
-1,5
5.4 
-0,9
0,3
1.7 
3,0
1.6 
-3,9
0,2
-1.1
-5,4
0,1
-2,8
3.4 
0,1 
0,4
3.3 
0,0^
1.3
3.5 
-1,2 
-0,8 
-4.6
5.9
2.8 
-1,5 
-1,7
0,9
1,0
1.4 
2,8 
7,8 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,9
0.0
0,0
0.2
0,0
0,0
0,0
1.7
4.1 
0.8 
0,5 
0,0 
0,0
3.8 
0,7 
0,0 0,2 0,2 0,2 
0,0
5.3 0,1 0,1
2.2
3.1
1.3 
0,1
1.1 
0,4 
2,0
1.3 
0,0
1.5 
10.1
1.4 
0.0
6.8 
0,1
3.7
5.2
2.2
1.3
6.7
1.5
7.6
1.3 
8,0 
0,1
9.7
13.6 
0,1 
0,0
14.6
1.3 
15,4
3.4 
0,1 
6,6 
0,0 
0,0 
0,2
2 2 ,2
0.3
1.5
2.6 
0,0
10,3
0,5
0.7
0.2
1,0
1.8
9.0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,5 
8,2
0,0
8.5
1.0 
6,1 
4.3 
0.0
28,2
1,1
1.5
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.7
1.8
1.7
1.7
0,0
- 1.1
0,2
1.2
- 1,1
0.6
0.1
2.7 -0.2 -0.2 
-0.5 
-0.6
0.3
-0.2
1.0
- 0,8
1.4 
0.0
- 1,1
- 2 .1
-0.4
1,2
-0.7
1.4 
0.6 
1,1
-1,4
0.3
0.2
0.0
- 0.2
-1.3
- 1,2
- 1,11,2
-0.1
0.4
0,3
-1.5
-0.8
-1,0
-1,1
-1.2
-0.1
-1.7
1,2
-0,5
-2.0
1.4 
0.5
-0,7
0.4
0,0
3.0 
-1,4 
-0.9
0,7
-2.5
-0.3
3.3
2.5 
0.3
-1,9
2.9 
-0.7 
-4.1 
-1,3 
-0,8
3.9 
0.2 
0,3
-0,9
3.3 
-0.5
0.2
1.0
1.8 
0.9
-2.3
0.1
0.9
-0.6
3,2
0,0
-1.6
2,0
0,0
0.2
1.9 
0,0 _ 
0,8 
2,1
-0.7
-0.5
-2.7
3.5
1.6 
-0.9
0,8
2.1
-0.7
-0.5
-2.7
3.5
1.6 
-0.9 
- 1,0
0,5
4.71
7.42 
7,59
2.55
12.97
7.31 
8.29
7.97
4.16
7,49
6.25
10,82
9.80
7.71 
9,38
8.43
7.41
5,87
7.67 
8.00
7.80
9.32
7.33 
7.82 
8.91 
8.09
10,22
7.63
9.63
13,26
19,55
16,01
12,14
9,01
12.06
9.89
20,91
9.98
15,67
8.19
8,96
9.67
9,32
7,85
9.12
12.98
9,28
8.56
11,01
7.22
11.25
107
99,5
101,5
15.09.2008 -7.7 -6,3 -7,3 37.9 1,8 -4.1 21,11
16 09.2008 -6,7 -3.4 -6.5 1,7 -3,8 25.60
17.09.2008 1,4 1,6 0,6 1,7 1,0 1,0 18.90
18.09.2008 1,7 1,9 0.8 1,7 1,1 1,1
19.09.2008 15.7 125.4
243,9
2.0 7,6
Sum SARk 
mod. SARI
7.6 36.24
4.6 937,53
1.0 Without 5.9.2008
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period 
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period
-6.6 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
modified CARt
3.9
0.011364
S standard error of the OLS marketj^Qd& regression
1,653157
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
2,7329 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243,3
supermodlfied CARt
-23,7
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* ING g B |
15.09.2008
16.09.2008
17.09.2008 
18 09.2008
19.09.2008
18,4
18.7
18.7 
19,3
19.2
19.3
18.7
18.9
19.4
19.7
19.7
19.6
19.5
19.1
18.5
18.3
18.7
18.6
18.9
18.3
18.1
17.6
17.3
17.2
17.3
17.4
17.7
17.8
17.3
17.0
16.5
16.3
16.3 
16,7
15.6
15.4
15.1
15.4
15.5
15.4
15.4
15.1
15.7
15.5
15.0
14.9
14.2
14.1
15.1
15.5
16.3
16.1
16.9
16.9
15.9
15.5
16.1
16,2
16.3
16.7
17.1
17.1
17.0
17.3
17.6 
17.5
16.9
16.9
16.2
15.9
15.7
16.1
15.9
16,2
16.4
16.5
16.9
16.4
15.8
16.9
16.9
16.5
1 6 ^
15.4
14.1
13.2 
15.0
0.0
1.7 
-0,8
0.8
2.9 
-0,3 
-1,2
1.3 
- 1,2 
-2,0
1.1
0,0
2.6
1.9 
-0.4 
-0,3 
-0,5 
-2.0 
- 1.6 -1,0 
-0,8 •1,0
2.1
-0,7
1,6
-1,7
-0,8
-0.4
1.5 
-3,0 
-3,0 
-1,3 
-0,5
0.1
1,1
1.4 
0.8
2.9
1.8 
-2,9 
- 1,2
0,0
2.3 
-4,2 
- 2,6
1.7 
-1,9
1.9 
0,8
-0.6
0.0
-2.2
4.0 
-1,5 
-3,2 
-0,5 
-5,2 
-0,7
6.8
2.7
4.7 
-1,6
4.8 
0,1
-5,5
-0,8
-2.2
3.0 
0.5 
0,4 
0,7
2.6
2.4 
0.1
-1,2
2.1
1.4 
-0,2 
-4.6
0.8
-0,2
-4.2
-1.7
-1,5
2.2
0.4
-1,2
0.3
1.8 
1.1 . 
0.2 
2.6
-0.7
-2,5
-3,4
6.1
0,4
-2,3
3.1
-6,0
-8.9
-1,1
-6.1
12.0
0.0
0.8
-1,4
1.5
2.6 
0,3
-1.7
0,2
-0.6
- 1,1
0.0
-0.2
0.2
-0,1
0,0
- 0,2
-1,52.2
- 1.1
-0,9
-0.3
-0.2
1,8
0,7
0,0
-0.7
0,3
-0.6
-0.2
-2.5
0,5
-0,5
-1,7
1,6
0,9
-0.4
0.0
-1,3
-0,9
-1,6
-1.3
-0.4
1,0
-3,4
-1,4
-0,2
-2.8
0,1
1.7 
2.5
1.3 
-1,3
2.4 
-1,4 
-3,0
1,0
-3,0
0.2
2,9
3.5 
0,2
3.6 
-1,3 
-4.1 
-2.0
0.1
2.4 
0.0
-0.3
-0.6
4.5 
0.4 0,1 1,0 
1,4
-0,3
-3.4
0,5
0.6
-0.6
-4.2
0.8
-1,5
2.8 
0,0 
0.0
-0,9
2.7
0,1
2.7 
-1,2 
-2.7 
-2.3
0.0
5.1
-1,3
-1,4
0.0
1.3 0,1 0.1 
1,6 
0,0
-0,1
1.3 
-0,7 
-1,3
1.3 
0,2 
2,6 
2,1
-0,4
-0,1
0,5
-0.6
-0,9
-0,4
-0,5
-0,81,2
- 1,0
1.7 
- 1,2 
-0,9
0.0
1.7 
-1.5 
- 2,6 
-0,9
0,5
-0,7
0,6
1.7 
0.9
-2.1
- 1,2
-1,9
-0.4
0,3
1.8 
-2.3 
-1,7 
-1,5 
-0,2
2,0
-0,1
0,9
-0,7
-1.4
2,8
-0,6
-1.5
-0,9
-3.4
-0.7
5.3 
0.8
4.7 
-1,4
2,9
0,9
-3.1
0.4
-2.2
1.8 
0,6 
0,7 
1,2 
0,2
2.3 
0.2
-1,6
1.4
1.7
1.8 
-4.8
0.6
0.3
-1.8
-2,1
-0,6
0.7
0,6
-1.2
0.9
0.4
1,2,
0.3
1.1
0.1
-0,9
-2.0
6,2
-2.4
-1.5
2,2
1.5
0.0
1,0
1.4 
2.8 
7,8 
0,0
2.3 
0.1 
0,2 
0.9 
0.0 
0,0 
0.2 
0.0 
0.0 
0,0
1.7
4.1 
0.8 
0,5 
0.0 
0.0
3.8 
0.7 
0,0 0.2 0.2 0.2
5.3 0,1 0.1
2.2
3.1
1.3 
0.1
1.1 
0.4 
2.0
1.3 
0.0
1.5 
10.1
1.4 
0.0
6.8 
0.1
3.7
5.2
2.2
1.3
6.7
1.5
7.6
1.3 
8,0 
0.1
9.7
13.6 
0.1 
0.0
14.6
1.3 
15.4
3.4 
0.1 
6.6 
0.0 
0,0 
0.2
2 2 . 2
0.3
0.1
1.5
2.6 
0.0
10.3
0,5
0.7
1.0
1.8
9.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0,5 
8,2
0.0
8.5
1.0 
6.1 
4.3 
0.0
28.2
1,1
1.5
0.0
1,2
0.1
0.1
1.4 
0.0
-0.1
1,2
-0,7
-1,1
1.1
0.2
2.3
1,9
-0,3
-0,1
0.4
-0.6
-0,8
-0,4
-0.4
-0.7
1,1
-0,9
1.5 
- 1,1 
-0,8
0.0
1.5 
-1.4 
-2,3 
-0.8
0.4
-0,6
0,6
1.6 
0.8
-1,9
- 1,1
-1,7
-0.3
0.3
1,6
- 2 .0
-1,5
-1,3
-0.2
1,8
-0,1
0,8
-0.6
-1.2
2.5 
-0.5 
-1,3 
-0,8 
-3,0 
-0.6
4.6 
0.7
4.2 
-1,3
2.5 
0,8
-2.7
0.4
-2.0
1.6 
0.5 
0,6 
1,1 
0.1 
2.1 
0.2
-1,5
1.3
1.5
1.6 
-4.3
0.5
0.2
-1,6
-1,9
-0.5
0.6
0.5
-1,0
0.8
0.3
1,0_
0,3
1,0
0.1
-0.8
-1,8
5.5
-2.0
-1,4
-1,9
1,0
0,1
- 0.8
- 1,8
5.5
- 2,0
1,4
1,9
1,3
13.06 
20,50
5.88
26.11
9.32
20.64
18.33
18.38
29.66
19.06
23.36
27.27 
11.56
23.55
17.75
18.24
21.25 
21.40 
19.79 
18,72
19,48
29.2821.66
13.97 
6.17
20.98 
10.19
8.11
22,13
12,10
20.33 
25.54
22.24
21.59
24.75
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
5.62
- 2.0
-6.1
-0.4
-4.8
4.3
-8.7
-6.3 -2.4 37.9 1,2 -2.0
-3.4 -6.9 10.4 1.1 -6.1
-1.0 -0.5 0.6 1,1 -0,4
-1.1 -5,4 0,8 1,1 -4.8
11.0 5.9 125.4 1.4 4.3
243.9 Sum SARk
mod. SARI 
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period -33,7
T is the number of days in the estimation period modified CARt
86 -53,2
1/T
0.011364 supermodlfied CARt
S standard error of the OLS market^n-nral regression -66.8
1,111773
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1.2360 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
70,85 5,62
57.03 5.62
41.64 5.62
80.36 5,62
1722.95 
-14.2 Without 5.9.2008 
-18.5 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
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25.04.2008 10,1
28 04.2008 10,2
29.04.2008 10,1
30.04.2008 10.2
02.05.2008
05.05.2008 10,7
06.05.2008
07.05.2008 10,2
08.05.2008 10.2
09.05.2008 10,1
12.05.2008 10,1
13.05.2008 10,1
14.05.2008 10,1
15.05.2008 10.1
16.05.2008 10.2
19.05.2008 10,1
20.05.2008
21.05.2008 9.9
22.05.2008 9.7
23 05.2008 9,6
26.05.2008 9.5
27.05.2008 9,5
28 05.2008 9,7
29.05.2008 9.7
30.05.2008 9,9
02.06.2008
03.06.2008 9.8
04.06.2008 9.6
05.06.2008 9.6
06.06.2008 9,4
09.06.2008 9.1
lO 06.2008 9.0
11.06.2008 9.1
12.06.2008 9.2
13.06.2008 9.3
16.06.2008 9.3
17.06.2008 9.3
18.06.2008 9.0
19.06.2008 8,8
20.06.2008
23.06.2008 8.4
24.06.2008 8.3
25.06.2008 8.5
26.06.2008 8,5
27.06.2008 8.3
30.06.2008 8.4
01.07.2008 8,1
02.07.2008 8.2
03.07.2008 8.2
04.07.2008 8.2
07.07.2008 8,1
08.07.2008 7.9
09.07.2008 8.2
10.07.2008 8,1
11.07.2008 7.9
14.07.2008 7.9
15.07.2008 7.4
16.07.2008 7,3
17.07.2008 7,8
18.07.2008 8,0
21.07.2008 8.2
22.07.2008 7.9
23.07.2008 8.2
24.07.2008 8.2
25.07.2008 7.7
28.07.2008 7,4
29.07.2008 7.3
30.07.2008 7,5
31.07.2008 7.5
01.08.2008 7.5
04.08.2008 7.6
05.08.2008 8,0
06.08.2008 8.2
07.08.2008 7.7
08.08.2008 7.6
11.08.2008 8,0
12.08.2008 8,3
13.08.2008 8,1
14.08.2008 8,1
15.08.2008 8,2
18.08.2008 8.1
19.08.2008 7,9
20.08.2008 7.8
21.08.2008 7.7
22.08.2008 7.9
25.08.2008 7.9
26.08.2008 7.8
27.08.2008 7,8
28.08.2008 8.0
29 08.2008
01.09.2008 8,1
02.09.2008 8.4
03.09.2008 8,3
04.09.2008 8.2
05.09.2008 7.9
08.09.2008 8,5
09.09 2008 8,6
10 09.2008 8.5
11.09.2008 8.3
12.09.2008
15.09.2008 7.6
16.09.2008 7.2
17 09.2008 6.9
18.09.2008 6.5
19.09.2008 7.5
0,0
1.6
-0,8
0,5
3.9 
0.4
-2.9
-1,3
-0.1
- 1.2
0.5
-0.3
- 0.2
0.2
1.3 
- 1,1 
-0,9
1,6
2 .0
-0.5
-1.4
-0,4
2,6
-0.1
1.3
1.4 
-1.5 
-2.3
0.2
- 2.6
2.9 
-1.3
1.4 
0.7 
0.7 
0.1 
0.3
-3.1
-2.9
-2,5
-1,9
-1,4
3.0 
-0.3 
-1,9
0.6
-3.3
0,7
0.7
-0,9
-0,3
3.1
3.8 
- 1.2 
-3.0
0.0
- 6.2
1.2
5.6
2.5
2.8 
-3,8
4.2 
-0,2 
-7.1 
-3,5 
-2.2
2.6 
0,6 
0,2
1.7
4.3
2.5 
-6,0 
-1,7
5.5
2.8 
-2.3 
-0.2
1.6 
-0.9 
-3.4 
-1,0 
-1,1
2.5
0,1
-1.2
-0.3
2.1
1.6.
-0.1
3.9
-1.7
-3.7
6.4
2.3 
-1.5
3,0
2 ^
-10.7
-6,5
3.3 
-6.3 
12,4
0
■ K H I ■
0,0 0.0 0,0 ,1 0,0 3,93
0,8 1.3 1.0 ,1 1.1 11.40
-1.4 -0.1 1,4 ,1 0,0 7.95
1.5 -0.2 2.8 ,1 -0.2 10.44
2.6 2,6 7.8 2.2 14,02
-0.3 0.6 0.0 ,1 0,6 6.33
-1,7 -2.0 2.3 ,1 -1,8 17.34
0.2 1.4 0.1 ,1 1,2 17,82
-0.6 0,3 0.2 ,1 0.3 11.50
-1.1 -0.5 0.9 .1 -0.5 15.67
0.0 0,5 0.0 ,1 0.5 6.75
-0.2 -0,2 0.0 ,1 -0.1
0.2 -0.2 0,2 ,1 0.2 9,63
-0.1 0,3 0.0 .1 0.3 8,99
0.0 1,3 0.0 ,1 1,2 10,61
-0.2 0,9 0.0 ,1 -0.8 6,85
-1,5 -0.1 1.7 ,1 -0.1 6.60
-2,2 0.4 4.1 ,1 0.4 11,85
1.1 -1.4 0.8 ,1 1,3 10,50
-0.9 0.0 0.5 ,1 0.0 9,04
-0.3 -1.2 0.0 ,1 1.0 3.87
-0.2 -0.2 0.0 ,1 -0.2 8.17
1,8 1.8 3.8 ,1 1,6 12.05
0.7 -0.3 0.7 ,1 •0.3 8.46
0.0 1,3 0.0 ,1 1.1 9.85
-0.7 1.8 0.2 ,1 1.6 17.63
0.3 -1.6 0.2 ,1
-0.6 -1.9 0.2 ,1 13.68
-0,2 0,3 0.0 ,1 0.3 11.53
-2.5 1,3 5.3 ,1 1,1 15.13
0.5 -2.6 0,1 .1 2.3
-0.5 -1.0 0.1 .1 -0,9
1,7 2.3 2.2 ,1 2.0
1.6 -0.1 3.1 .1 •0.1 14,01
0.9 0.2 1,3 .1 0.2 8.32
-0.4 0.3 0.1 ,1 0.3 9.90
0.0 0.4 0.0 .1 0.3 9.86
1.3 -2.4 1.1 ,1 -2.1 9.74
-0.9 -2,5 0.4 ,1 2.2 18.73
-1.6 -1.6 2.0 ,1 -1,4
-1,3 -1.2 1,3 ,1 -1,0 13.24
-0,4 -1.2 0,0 ,1 -1,0 15.16
1.0 2.5 1.5 ,1 2.2 9.57
-3.4 1.4 10.1 1.2 28,36
-1.4 -1,2 1.4 ,1 -1,0 20.05
-0.2 0.7 0.0 .1 0.7 37.71
-2.8 -1,8 6.8 ,1 -1,6 20,67
0.8 0.1 ,1 0.7 13.49
1.7 -0.2 3,7 ,1 -0,1 16.43
-2.5 0.4 5.2 ,1 0.4 7,51
1,3 -0.9 2.2 ,1 -0,8 9,59
-1,3 -2.4 1.3 .1 2.1 15,65
2,4 2,6 6,7 ,1 2,3 12.29
-1.4 -0,4 1.5 -0.4
-3.0 -1.4 7.6 -1.3 15.31
1,0 -0.4 1,3 .1 -0.4 12.04
-3.0 -4.6 8.0 -4.0 29.07
0.2 -1.2 0.1 ,1 -1.1
2.9 4.2 9,7 3.6
3.5 0.7 13.6 0.6
0.2 2.7 0.1 ,1 2.4
-0.2 -3.7 0.0 ,1 3,2
3.6 2,4 2.0 18.25
-1,3 0.5 1,3 ,1 0.5 11.17
-4.1 -5.0 15.4 4.3 21,41
-2.0 2.5 3.4 ,1 2.2
0.1 -2,2 0,1 .1 -2.0 15.40
2.4 1,5 6,6 .1 1.3 15.02
0.0 0,7 0.0 ,1 0.6 14.82
-0.3 0.4 0.0 ,1 0.4
0.6 2.1 0.2 ,1 1.8
4.5 2.1 22.2 1,7
0.4 2.3 0.3 ,1 2.0
0.1 -6.0 0.1 ,1 -5.3
1.0 -2.2 1,5 ,1 -1,9 21.36
1.4 4.8 2.6 ,1 4.2 24.36
-0.3 3,0 0.0 .1 2,7 17.30
-3,4 -0.6 10,3 -0.5 15.70
0.5 -0.5 0,5 ,1 -0.4
0.6 1,5 0,7 ,1 1.3 11,40
-0.6 -0.5 0.2 ,1 -0.5 7,17
-4.2 1,2 -1.1 11.28
0,8 -1.4 1,0 ,1 -1,2 8,33
-1.5 -0.3 1,8 ,1 -0,2 7,93
2.8 1,1 9.0 1.0 7.81 135.5
0,0 0,2 0,0 ,1 0.2 3.46 135.5
0.0 -1.2 0.0 .1 -1,0 137,5
-0.9 0.2 0.5 .1 0.2
2.7 0.8 8,2 0.7 9.81
1,5 ,1 1.4
-0.1 0.0 0,0 .1 0.0 0,0 6.15 3,93
2,7 2.5 8.5 2.2 2,2 15,26 3.93
-1.2 0.1 1.0 ,1 0.0 0.0 3.93
-2.7 -0.3 6.1 ,1 0.2 -0.2 12.75 3.93
-2,3 2,5 4.3 .1 -2.2 -2.2 13.33 3,93
0.0 6.4 0,0 ,1 5,7 5.7 18.45 3.93
5.1 -0.3 28.2 -0.2 0.2 19.53 3,93
-1.3 -0.8 1,1 ,1 -0.7 -0.7 11.27 3,93
-1.4 2,3 1,5 ,1 -2,0 2.0 12.88 3.93m 12,94
6,3 -7.5 37,9 .2 -6,1 -6,1 37,40 3,93
-3.4 -4.7 10,4 -4,1 -4.1 31,03 3.93
1.0 2.8 0,6 ,1 -2.4 -2,4 31.13 3.93
-1.1 5,6 0.8 ,1 -5.0 -5.0 25.85 3,93
11,0 6.8 125.4 4.9 4.9 44,27 3,93
243.9 Sum SARk -8.4 1204.52
mod. SARI -14.1 Without 5.9.2008
supermodil SARk -19.0 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period -32.6
-0,19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period
3660,011364
S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1,127421
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1,2711
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
supermodlfied CARt
-68.3
Appendix D; 
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AR Sum SAR volumon Minimum 5Y CDS 
it k of traded Trade Spreads
shares In Volum e Is fb '
25.04.2008
28.04.2008
29.04.2008
30.04.2008
02.05.2008
05.05.2008
06.05.2008
07.05.2008 
08 05.2008
J 09.05.2008
12.05.2008
13.05.2008
14.05.2008
15.05.2008 
16 05.2008
19.05.2008
20.05.2008
21.05.2008
22.05.2008 
23 05.2008
26.05.2008
27.05.2008
28.05.2008
29.05.2008
30.05.2008
02.06.2008
03.06.2008 
04 06.2008
05.06.2008
06.06.2008
09.06.2008
10.06.2008 
11.06.2008 
12.06.2008
13.06.2008
16.06.2008
17.06.2008
18.06.2008
19.06.2008
20.06.2008
23.06.2008
24.06.2008
25.06.2008
26.06.2008
27.06.2008
30.06.2008
01.07.2008
02.07.2008
03.07.2008
04.07.2008
07.07.2008 
08 07.2008
09.07.2008
10.07.2008
11 07.2008
14.07.2008
15.07.2008
16.07.2008
17.07.2008
18.07.2008
21.07.2008
22.07.2008
23.07.2008
24.07.2008
25.07.2008
28.07.2008
29.07.2008
30.07.2008
31.07.2008
01.08.2008
04.08.2008
05.08.2008
06.08.2008
07.08.2008
08.08.2008 
11.08.2008
12 08.2008
13.08.2008
14.08.2008
15.08.2008
18.08.2008
19.08.2008
20.08.2008 
21 08.2008 
22.08.2008
25.08.2008 
26 08.2008
27.08.2008
28.08.2008
29.08.2008
01.09.2008
02.09.2008
03.09.2008
04.09.2008
05.09.2008
08.09.2008
09.09.2008
10.09.2008
11.09.2008
12.09.2008
71,5032
71,8332
71,1356
71,6222
73,2991
73,4586
75,4786
75,3111
75,0155
71,9111
71,21
70,0906
68,0614
66,2062
66,8063
66,9464
66,7508
69,6506
66,4764
74,8358
74,3325
75,7681
78,4745
75,7439
78,1939
77,521
0,5
- 1,0
0,7
2.3 
0.2
-0.3
-0,3
- 1,2
1.7 
0,0
-0.6
1.7
2.4 
1,0 
0,5
-0,2
-2,3
-0,8
-0,3
-0,6
2,6
-0,2
-0,4
-0,4
0,3
-0,7
0.4
-0,3
-1,9
-1,7
1.5 
-0,7 
-1,51,1
1,2
-0.5
-0,2
-0,8
- 1,0
-0,9
-0,2
-0,5
-3,0
-0,5
-2,3
0,9
-1,4
-0,1
- 1,6
2,0
3,3
-1,5
-1,4
-3,5
-0.4
4.8
3.2 
2,0
-1,0
3.0 
0,6
-3.5
-2.7
-2,3
1.9 
0.3
1.3 
-0.6
3.3 
2.2
0,1
1.3 
0,7
-1,6
1.9
1.3 
0.2
-0,4
-0,7
1.9 
0,8
-0,5
-1,6
1.6
-0,1
1,2
0,0
-0,1
-3.6
3.1 
-0,9 
-1,1 
-2,0
0,8
-1,4
1.5
2.6 
-0,3
1.7 
0,2
- 0,6
- 1,1
0,0
-0,2
0,2
-0.1
0,0
- 0 ,2
-1,5
- 2 .2
- 1,1
-0.9
-0,3
-0,2
1.8 
0,7 
0,0
-0,7
0,3
- 0.6
- 0,2
-2,5
-0,5
-0,5
-1,7
1,6
0,9
-0,4
0,0
-1,3
-0,9
-1,6
-1,3
-0,4
1,0
-3,4
-1,4
0,2
-2,8
0,1
1.7 
2,5
1.3 
-1.3
2.4 
-1,4 
-3,0
1,0
-3,0
0,2
2,9
3.5 
0,2
-0,2
3.6 
-1,3 
-4,1 
-2,0
0,1
2.4 
0,0
-0,3
-0,6
4.5 
0,4 0,1 1,0 
1,4
-0,3
-3,4
0,5
0.6
-0,6
-4,2
0.8
-1.5
2.8 
0,0 
0,0
-0.9
2.7
-0.1
2.7 
-1,2 
-2,7 
-2,3
0.0
5,1
-1.3
-1.4
0,2
0,2
0,0
0,8
0,7
0,8
-0,2
0,3
-0,2
2,0
0,4
-0,6
2,0
2,6
1.4
1.7
1.5 
-1,3
0,0
0,1
-0,2
1.7 
-0,4 
-0,2
0,3
0,4
0,0
0,7
1.6 
-1.4 
-1.1
2.8 
-1.5 
-1,9
1,6
1.5 0,6 0,6 
0,5 
0,0
-0,4
0,6
1.9 
-1.9 
-0,1 
-0,2
1,1
-2,3
1,8
-1.3
-0,5
0,7
4.5 
0,6
-1,8
-1.3
-0,2
3.11.2 2,1 
0,6 
0,9
1.7 
-0,6 
-1.1 
-2,2
0,6
0,6
1.7 
0,1 
0,6 
2,2 
1,1
-0,3
0,6
1,1
0,8
1.8 
1.2 
0,8
1.9 
-0,7
0,6
0,3
1,0
-0,3
-0,8
0,1
2,3_
0,2
-0,3
1.0
1,8
-1.9
3,4
-4,0
0,0
-0,8
1.6
0,0
1.0
1.4 
2,8 
7,8 
0,0
2.3 
0,1 0,2 
0,9 
0,0 
0,0 0.2 
0,0
0.0
1.7
4.1
0,5
0,0
0,0
3.8 
0,7 
0,0 0,2 0,2 0,2 
0,0
5.3 0,1 0,12.2
3.1
1.3 
0,1 
0,0
1.1 
0,4 
2.0
1.3
1.5 
10,1
1.4 
0,0
6.8 
0,1
3.7
5.2
2.2
1.3
6.7
1.5
7.6
1.3 
8,0 
0,1
9.7
13.6 
0,1 
0,0
14.6
1.3 
15,4
0.1
6,6
0,0
0,0
0,2
22,2
0,3
0,1
1.5
2.6 
0,0
10,3
0,5
0,7
0,2
1.8
9.0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,5 
8,2
0.0
8.5
1.0 
6,1
4.3 
0,0
28,2
1,1
1.5
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3 
1-3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.4
1.3
1.3
0,0
0.1
0,1
0.0
0,6
0,5
0,6
-0,1
0,3
-0,2
1.5 
0,3
-0.4
1.5 
2,0 
1.1
1.3 
1.1
- 1,0
0,0
0,1
-0,2
1.3 
-0,3
0,1
0.2
0.3
0.0
0,61,2
- 1.0
-0,8
2.1
- 1.2
-1.5
1,2
1,1
0.4
0,4
0,4
0,0
-0.3
-0,5
1.5 
-1,4 
-0.1
0,2
0.8
1.4 
-1,0 
-0.4
0,5
3.4 
0,5
-1,4
-1,0
-0,2
2.4 
0,9
1.6 
-0,5
0,7
1.3 
-0,5 
-0,8 
-1,7
0,5
0,5
1.3 
0,1 
0,4 
1,7 
0,8
-0,2
0,5
0,9
0,6
1.4 
0.9
1.4 
-0,5
0.4
0,2
0,8
-0,2
-0,6
0.1
1.8.
0.1
-0,3
0,8
1.4 
-1.4
2,6
-2,9
0,0
-0.3
0,8
1.4
-1,4
2.6
-2.9
0,0
-0.6
0,32
0,25
0,22
0,35
0,26
0.17
0,27
0.23
0,32
0.25
0,23
0,27
0,21
0,51
0,35
0,22
0,21
0,17
0,27
0,23
0,17
0,21
0,32
0,31
0,25
0,31
0,27
0,31
0,28
0,46
0,22
0,33
0,57
0,32
0,32
0,25
0,230,21
0,25
0,25
0,18
0,30
0,21
0,22
0,21
0,23
0,17
0,12
0,22
0,25
0,20
0,05
0.18
0,31
0,23
0.24
0,11
0,31
0,33
0,32
0,32
0,37
0,33
0,08
0,08
0,08
15.09.2008 -2,3 2,1 1,4 1,5 1,5 0,33
16.09.2008 -1,0 1.5 1.3 1,1 1,1 0,39
17.09.2008 -0,7 0,2 0,590428 1.3 0,1 0,1 0,42
18 09.2008 -2,1 1,1 1,2 0,831295 1,3 -0,9
19.09.2008 4,6 11,0 2,3 125,4039
243.9
1,6 1,4
Sum SARk 
mod. SARI
1.4
1.4 
-1.2
0,52 
23.49 
Without 5.9.2008
0,08
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period 5.3
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period modified CARt
88 -4.7
0.011364 .
S standard error of the OLS m a r k ^ 0 ^ e l  regression 
1.286832
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1.6559 
sum of (Rm t-Rm squared)
243.3
0.2 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
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BBB
23.04.2008 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 35,08 9,24
24.04.2008 -0,6 0,8 -0,5 1,0 1,7 -0,3 32,10
25.04.2008 1,7 -1,4 2,0 1.4 1,7 1,2 20.05
28.04.2008 128,5 1,2 1.5 1,4 2.8 1,7 0,8 18.25
29.04.2008 126,6 -1,5 2.6 -1,5 7,8 1,7 -0,9
30.04.2008 126,5 0,0 -0.3 0,2 0.0 1,7 0,1
01.05.2008 125,1 1,1 -1,7 -0,8 2.3 1.7 -0,5
02.05.2008 127,2 1,6 0,2 1,8 0.1 1,7 1.1
06.05.2008 127,7 0.4 -0,6 0,6 0,2 1,7 0,4
07.05.2008 -0,3 -1,1 -0,1 0,9 1,7 0,0
08.05.2008 -0,2 0,0 0.0 0.0 1.7 0,0
09.05.2008 -1.8 -0,2 -1,6 0.0 1.7 -1.0
12.05.2008 0.2 0,2 0.4 0.2 1,7 0,2 16,46
13.05.2008 -0,8 0,1 0,7 0.0 1.7 0,4 27.48
14.05.2008 -0,4 0.0 -0,3 0.0 1.7 -0,2 40,18
15.05.2008 -1,1 -0.2 -0,9 0.0 1,7 -0,6
16.05.2008 1,5 -1.5 1,7 1.7 1.7 1,0 23,03
19.05.2008 0,1 -2,2 0,3 4.1 1.7 0,2 21,12
20.05.2008 -0,6 -1.1 -0,4 0.8 1.7 -0,2 25,46
21.05.2008 -2,6 -0,9 -2,4 0.5 1,7 -1,5
22.05.2008 -1.6 -0,3 1,4 0.0 1.7 0,8
23.05.2008 119,2 0,8 -0.2 1,0 0,0 1,7 0.6
27.05.2008 117,7 -1,2 1.8 -1,1 3,8 1,7 -0,7
28.05.2008 119,7 1,6 0,7 1,8 0,7 1,7 1,1 18,13
29.05.2008 -0,6 0,0 -0,4 0.0 1,7 -0,3 31,30
30.05.2008 1,4 -0.7 1,6 0.2 1,7 1.0 34,21
02.06.2008 117,4 -2,8 0,3 -2,7 0,2 1,7 -1.6
03.06.2008 118,5 0,9 -0,6 1,1 0,2 1,7 0,7
04.06.2008 117,9 0,5 -0,2 -0,3 1.7 -0,2
05 06.2008 118,6 0,6 -2.5 0.8 5,3 1,7 0,5
06.06.2008 117,5 0,9 -0,5 -0,7 0,1 1.7 -0,4
09.06.2008 115,5 1,8 -0,5 '1,6 0,1 1.7 1,0
10.06.2008 113,9 -1.4 -1,7 -1.1 2,2 1.7 -0,7
11.06.2008 112,4 -1,3 1,6 -1,2 3,1 1.7 -0,7
12.06.2008 112,7 0,3 0,9 0,4 1,3 1,7 0,2 48,36
13.06.2008 112,5 -0,2 -0,4 0,0 0,1 1,7 0,0 17,72
16.06.2008 114,0 1,3 0.0 1,5 0.0 1,7 0.9 29,22
17.06.2008 116,3 2,0 -1,3 2,2 1,1 1,7 1.4 24,43
18.06.2008 -4,0 -0,9 -3,8 0,4 1,7 2,3 66.36
19.06.2008 108,8 -2,8 -1.6 -2,5 2,0 1,7 1,5 33,20
20.06.2008 107,2 -1,5 -1,3 -1,3 1.3 1,7 -0,8
23.06.2008 105,8 -1.3 -0,4 -1,1 0.0 1.7 -0,7
24.06.2008 1,0 0,1 1.5 1.7 0,1
25.06.2008 -3.4 0,3 10.1 1.7 0,2
26.06.2008 -4,0 -1,4 -3.8 1.4 1.7 -2,3
27.06 2008 100,1 -1,5 -0,2 -1,3 0,0 1,7 -0.8 26,43
30.06.2008 -0,3 -2,8 0,0 6,8 1,7 0,0 26,11
01.07.2008 97,6 -2,2 0,1 -2,0 0,1 1,7 -1.2 28,17
02.07.2008 99,5 1,9 1,7 2,0 3,7 1.7 1,2 35,41
03.07.2008 99,2 -0,3 -2.5 0,0 5,2 1,7 0.0 51,15
04.07.2008 95,2 -4,3 1,3 -4,1 2.2 1,7 -2,5 30.76
07.07.2008 95,8 0,7 -1.3 0,9 1.3 1,7 0.5 35,77
08 07.2008 95,3 -0,5 2,4 -0,4 6,7 1,7 -0,3 23,22
09.07.2008 5,5 -1,4 5,7 1,5 1,7 3,4 37.52
10.07.2008 -1,9 -3,0 -1,6 7,6 1.7 -1.0 33,10
11.07.2008 95,5 -3,6 1,0 -3,4 1.3 1,7 -2,1 41,26
14.07.2008 95,8 0,3 -3,0 0,6 8,0 1,7 0,4 29,79
15.07.2008 91,3 -4,9 0.2 -4,7 0.1 1.7 -2,9 27,51
16.07.2008 91,2 -0,1 2.9 0,0 9,7 1,7 0.0 34,04
17.07.2008 95,3 4,2 3,5 4,3 13,6 1.7 2,5
18.07.2008 99,8 4,5 0,2 4,7 0,1 1,7 2,8
21.07.2008 0,4 -0,2 0,6 0,0 1.7 0.3 25,07
22.07.2008 99,9 -0,3 3,6 -0,2 14,6 1.7 -0,1 31,73
23.07.2008 105,6 5,5 -1,3 5,7 1.3 1,7 3,4 41.50
24.07.2008 106,2 0,5 -4,1 0.8 15.4 1,7 0.5
25.07.2008 -7,2 -2.0 -7,0 3,4 1,7 -4,2 39,32
28.07.2008 -2,7 0,1 -2,6 0,1 1,7 -1,5 23,22
29.07.2008 3,6 2,4 -3,5 6,6 1,7 2,1 29.08
30.07.2008 98,1 5,2 0,0 5,4 0.0 1,7 3,2
31.07.2008 97,2 -0,9 -0,3 -0,7 0,0 1,7 -0,4 29,06
01.08.2008 97,1 -0,1 -0,6 0,1 0,2 1.7 0,1 23,95
04.08.2008 97,1 0,0 4,5 0,0 22,2 1,7 0,0 15,22
05.08.2008 105,0 7,5 0,4 7.7 0,3 1.7 4.6 75,44
06.08.2008 0,8 0,1 1.0 0,1 1.7 0.6
07.08.2008 2,6 1,0 2,8 1,5 1.7 1.7
08.08.2008 0,7 1,4 0,8 2,6 1,7 0.5 33,61
11.08.2008 0,6 -0,3 0.8 0,0 1,7 0,5 26,52
12.08.2008 111,0 0,8 -3.4 1.1 10,3 1,7 0,6 24,21
13.08.2008 106,1 -4,6 0,5 -4,4 0,5 1,7 -2,7
14 08.2008 105,7 -0,4 0.6 -0.3 0,7 1,7 -0,2
15.08.2008 -0,3 -0,6 -0.1 0.2 1.7 -0,1
18.08.2008 103,2 -2,1 -4,2 -1.8 1.7 -1.0
19.08.2008 97,6 -5.7 0,8 5,5 1,7 -3,3
20.08.2008 96,2 -1,4 1,5 -1,2 1.8 1,7 -0.7
21.08.2008 95,4 -0,9 2,8 -0,8 9,0 1,7 -0,5
22.08.2008 2,6 0,0 2,8 0,0 1,7 1,7 64,30
26.08.2008 -1,4 0.0 -1,2 0,0 1.7 -0.7 23,61
27.08.2008 -0,3 -0.9 -0.1 0.5 1.7 -0.1 44.21
28.08.2008 4,3 2.7 4.4 8,2 1.7 2.6
29.08.2008 0,3 0.2 0,5_ 1,7 0,3 _
01.09.2008 0,8 -0,1 1.0 0,0 1,7 0,6 0,6 9,24
02.09.2008 2,7 2,7 2,8 8,5 1,7 1.7 1,7 9,24
03.09.2008 -4,4 -1,2 -4,2 1.0 1,7 -2,5 -2,5 9,24
04.09.2008 97,4 -2,9 -2,7 -2,6 6,1 1,7 -1,5 -1,5 9,24
05.09.2008 94,5 -3,0 -2,3 -2.7 4.3 1,7 -1.6 -1.6 9.24
08.09.2008 100,0 5,4 0.0 5.6 0,0 1,7 3,4 3,4
09.09.2008 3,1 5,1 3.0 28,2 1,8 1.7 1.7 9,24
10.09.2008 100,8 -2,3 -1,3 -2,1 1,1 1.7 1.3 -1.3 9,24
11.09.2008 98,1 2,7 -1,4 -2,5 1,5 1,7 1.5 -1,5 9,24
12.09.2008 0,2
wêêbÊm WÊÈM BHBniiH
15.09.2008 93,5 -5,2 -6.3 -4,8 37,9 1.8 -2,7 -2,7 51.05 9,24
16.09.2008 -7,0 -3.4 -6.7 1,7 -3,9 -3.9 91,92 9,24
17.09.2008 3,3 -1,0 3,5 0,6 1,7 2,1 2,1
18.09.2008 -1,2 -1,1 -1,0 0,8 1,7 -0,6 -0,6
19.09.2008 15,8 11,0 15,5 125,4 2,0 7,6 7.6
243.8714 SARk 1.7 2835.00
-1.7 Without 5.9.2008
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period 6.6
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period modified CARt
88 -6.3
1/T
0.011364 ^  .
S standard error of the OLS market^ÿnM regression 
1.651721
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
2.7282 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243,3
-9.3 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
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share R,t R„,t AR „ Rmt - SD a SAR = AR Sum SAR Volumon of Minimum SY CDS
price on change change in Abnormal mean standard n/SD k traded Trade Spreads
the Date |n% share % Return Return deviation shares in Volume is (bp)
23.04.2008
24.04.2008
25.04.2008
28.04.2008
29.04.2008
30.04.2008
02.05.2008
05.05.2008
06.05.2008
07.05.2008
08.05.2008
09.05.2008
13.05.2008
14.05.2008
15.05.2008
16.05.2008
19.05.2008
20.05.2008
21.05.2008
22.05.2008
23.05.2008
26.05.2008
27.05.2008
28.05.2008
29.05.2008
30.05.2008
02.06.2008
03.06.2008
04.06.2008
05.06.2008
06.06.2008
09.06.2008
10.06.2008 
11.06.2008 
12.06.2008
13.06.2008
16.06.2008
17.06.2008
18.06.2008
19.06.2008
20.06.2008
23.06.2008
24.06.2008
25.06.2008
26.06.2008
27.06.2008
30.06.2008
01.07.2008
02.07.2008
03.07.2008
04.07.2008
07.07.2008
08.07.2008
09.07.2008
10.07.2008
11.07.2008
14.07.2008
15.07.2008
16.07.2008
17.07.2008
18.07.2008
21.07.2008
22.07.2008
23.07.2008
24.07.2008
25.07.2008
28.07.2008 
29 07.2008
30.07.2008
31.07.2008
04.08.2008
05.08.2008
06.08.2008
07.08.2008
08.08.2008 
11.08.2008 
12.08.2008 
13 08.2008
14.08.2008
15.08.2008
18.08.2008
19.08.2008
20.08.2008 
21.08.2008 
22.08.2008
25.08.2008
26.08.2008
27.08.2008
28.08.2008
29.08.2008
01.09.2008
02.09.2008
03.09.2008
04.09.2008
05.09.2008
08.09.2008
09.09.2008
10.09.2008
11.09.2008
12.09.2008
15.09.2008
16.09.2008
17.09.2008
18.09.2008
19.09.2008
304,9
313.2 
315,8
324.1 
318,5
319.0
311.7
312.4
314.3
321.5
320.6
318.3
274.2
269.3
268.0
254.1
252.3
267.8
257.7
254.8
265.2
268.9
271.1
270.1
288.2
281.5
284.1
285.6 
282,0
279.2
277.2
283.8
293,5
288.9
282.3
272.0
265.1
278.5
277.5 
293.9
-0,9
2,6
0,8
-0,3
0.0
3.1 
-0.2 
- 1,8
0,2
-1,8
0,2
0,6
2.8
-0,6
-0,3
-0.7
- 1,2
-2,3
0,72.2 
-0,4 
-0,6
1,11,2
- 1,1
-0.6
-0,7
1,1
- 1,8
- 1,2
- 1,0
-0,1
-1,8
-1,5
2,0
0,3
2,2
-1,6
-1,1
-1,8
-0,5
0,8
-2,8
-2,5
0,8
-0,9
-0,3
-0,3
0,0
-0,5
-2,6
2,8
-0,7
5.8 
-0,4 
-3,4 
-1,1
3.9
1.3 
0,8
4.3
1.3 
-4,2 
-1,4 
-0,8
2,6
0,3
-0,9
1.5 
1,8 
0,0
-0,1
1.5 
0,4
-2,4
0,9
0,5
-1,3
-2,4
-0,3
-0,2
1,7
1,2
-1,1
-0,7
2.3 
1 ^ \ 
1,2
2.3 
-0,4 
-1,7 
-2,5
4.0
1.1 
-1,6 
-2,3
-0,9
3.0 
0,8
-0,6
0,2
3.5 
-0,1 
-1,5
0,5
-0,4
- 1,6
0,4
0.8
3.0 
-0,4
0,2
-0,2
-0,8
-2,0
0,9
- 2,0
1.5 
- 1,0
0,3
-0,5
1.7 
-1,5 
-0,9 
-0,5 
- 0,2 
- 1,8 
-1,3
2.1 
0,7
- 1,8
- 1,1
-0,7
- 1,6
-0,51.6 
-2,4 
-2,3
1.4 
- 0,8 
-0,5
0,3
-0,1
-0,1
2.8
3.2 
0,0
5.8 
0,3
-3,3
-1,5
3.5
1.5 
1,0
-0,8
4.7
2.2 
-3,7 
-1,2
1,0
2.7 
0,5
-0,6
1,0
1.9 
0,1
-0,1
1.5 
0,6
-1,6
1,0
0,6
-1.0
-1,5
-0,2
0,2
1.4
1.4 
-0,9 
-0.4
2,0
1,8^
1,1
2,0
0,0
-1,1
-1,9
4.1 
0,4
1.2
1.9
0,0
1,0
1.4 
2,8 
7,8 
0,0
2.3 
0,1 
0,2 
0,9 
0,0 
0,0 
0 ,2 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0
1.7
4.1 
0.8 
0,5 
0,0 
0,0
3.8 
0,7 
0,0 
0,2 
0,2 
0,2 
0,0
0,1
0,1
2 . 2
3.1
1.3 
0,1 
0.0
1.1 
0,4 
2,0
1.3 
0,0
1.5 
10.1
1.4 
0,0
6.8 
0,1
3.7
5.2
2.2
1.3
6.7
1.5
7.6
1.3 
8,0 
0,1
9.7 
13,6
0,1
0,0
1.3 
15,4
3.4 
0,1 
6,6 
0,0 
0,0 
0,2
22,2
0,3
0,1
1.5
2.6 
0,0
10,3
0,5
0,7
1.8
9.0 
0,0 
0,0
8.2
0,0
8.5
1.0 
6,1 
4.3 
0,0
28,2
1,1
1.5
1,6
1.6
1,6
1.6
1.7 
1.6
1.6
1,6
1,6
1.6
1,6
1,6
1.6
1.6
1,6
1,6
1.7 
1.6 
1,6 1,6 
1,6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1.6 
1,6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1.6 
1.6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6 
1.6 
1,6
1.7 
1.6 
1,6
1.7 
1,6
1.7
1.7 
1,6 
1,6
1.7 
1,6
1.7 
1,6
1.7 
1,6
1.7
1.7 
1,6 
1.6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6
1.7 
1.6 
1,6 
1,6
1.7 
1.6
1,6
1,6
1,6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6
1.7 1.6 
1.6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6 
1,6
1.7 1,6 
1,6
1.7 
1.6
1.7
1.7 
1,6
1.7 
1,6 
1,6
0,0
-0,5
1,8
0,5
-0,4
0,1
2.1
0,0
-0,9
0,3
-0,2
-1,0
0,2
0,5
1,8
-0,2
0.1
-0,1
-0,5
-1,2
0.5
-1,2
-0,3
-0,3
0,8
0,9
-0,6
-0,2
-0,3
1,0
-0,9
-0,6
-0,3
-0,1
-1,1
-0.8
1.3 
0,4 
1,1
-0,7
-0.5
-1,0
-0,3
1,0
-1.4
-1,4
0,9
-0,5
-0,3
0,2
-0,1
-0,1
-1,7
2,0
0,0
3.5 
0,2
-2.0
-0,9
2,1
0,9
0,6
-0,5
2,8
1.3 
-2.2 
-0,8 
-0,6
1,7
0,3
-0,4
0.6
1.1
-0,1
0.9
0,4
-1,0
0.6
0.4
-0.6
-0,9
-0,1
0,1
0,8
0,8
-0,2
1,2
IJ . .
-0.6
1,2
0,0
-0,6
-1,2
2.5 
0,2
-0,7
-1,2
-0,6
1,2
0,0
- 0,6
- 1.2
2,5
0,2
-0,7
- 1,2
-4,6
- 2,6
4.8
-0,3
-3,3
- 1,8
5,1
0,0
37,9
0,6
0,8
125,4
243.9
1,6
1.6
1,6
1,6
1,6
-2,0
- 1.1
3,1
0,0
2.4
2.4
1,68
1,55
1,12
1,20
0,73
1.34 
1,45
1.05
1.69
1.19
1.30 
1,01
0,51
1.27
0,75
0,72
0,72
1,21
1.19
1.34 
1.41 
1,03 
1,00 
1,44
2.19
1.37
1.05
1.63
1.64 
1,21
1.13
1.15
1.25 
0,52
1.37
1.26
3.75
1.27
1,91
1,90
1,10
1,23
1.70 
1,36 
2,17
1.13
1.16 
1,53
1.31 
0,89 
0,77 
1,15
1.14 
1,01 
1,39 1,22
1.76 
1,10 
1,09
2,37
2,85
2.91
104.68
-2,0 
-1,1 
3,1 
0,0 
2,4
Sum SARk 
mod. SAR) 
supermodtl SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period
T is the number of days in the estimation period modified CARt
0.011364 _  _ _ supermodified CARt
S standard error of the OLS marketJroWl regression -8.9
1.629493
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
2,6552 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
0.1 Without 6.9.2008
2.5 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
9,3
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25.04.2008 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,0 1,3
28.04.2008 123,7 0,4 0,8 -0,1 1,0 1,2 -0,1 1,1
29.04.2008 122,5 -1,0 -1,4 0,1 1,4 1,2 0,1 1,3
30.04.2008 123,5 0,7 1,5 -0,3 2,8 1,2 -0,2 1,4
02.05.2008 126,4 2,3 2,6 0,5 7,8 1,3 0,4 2,3
05.05.2008 126,8 0.3 -0,3 0,6 0,0 1,2 0,5 0,6
06.05.2008 -1,7 -1,7 -0.4 2,3 1.2 0,3
07.05.2008 124,8 0,1 0,2 0,0 0,1 1,2 0,0 1,1
08.05.2008 121,7 -2,6 -0,6 -2,1 0,2 1,2 -1,7 3,3
09.05.2008 121,1 -0,4 -1,1 0,5 0,9 1.2 0,4 1,5
12.05.2008 122,3 0,9 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,2 0,8 0.6
13.05.2008 122,2 -0,1 -0,2 0,1 0,0 1,2 0,1 1.2
14.05.2008 122,4 0,2 0,2 0,1 0,2 1.2 0,1 1.3
15.05.2008 -1,0 -0,1 -0,9 0,0 1,2 -0,7 1.4
16.05.2008 0,6 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,2 0,5 1.7
19.05.2008 -0,9 -0,2 -0,7 0,0 1,2 -0,6 1.3
20.05.2008 -0,5 -1,5 0,7 1,7 1,2 0,5 1,2
21.05.2008 -1.0 -2,2 0,7 4,1 1,3 0,6 1.6
22.05.2008 -0.6 -1,1 0,2 0,8 1,2 0,2 1,0
23.05.2008 -0,9 1,2 0,5 1,2 0,9 1,5
26.05.2008 -0,8 -0,3 0,5 0,0 1,2 -0,4 0.5
27.05.2008 0,0 -0,2 0,2 0,0 1,2 0,1 1.1
28.05.2008 1,4 1,8 0,1 3,8 1,3 0,1 1.4
29.05.2008 0,3 0,7 -0,1 0,7 1,2 -0,1 1.3
30.05.2008 0,6 0,0 0,7 0,0 1,2 0.5 1,1
02.06.2008 -1,0 -0,7 -0,5 0,2 1,2 -0,4 0,9
03.06.2008 119,1 -0,2 0,3 -0,4 0,2 1,2 -0,3 1.1
04.06.2008 118,8 -0,2 -0,6 0,3 0,2 1.2 0.2 1,4
05.06.2008 119,8 0.8 -0,2 1,0 0,0 1,2 0.8 1.6
06.06.2008 -0.2 -2,5 1,7 5,3 1,3 1,3 2.1
09.06.2008 -0,6 -0,5 -0,1 0,1 1,2 -0,1 1,2
10.06.2008 0,6 -0,5 -0,2 0,1 1,2 -0,2 1,5
11.06.2008 0,5 -1,7 1,8 2,2 1,2 1.5 2.2
12.06.2008 0,9 1,6 -0,2 3,1 1,3 -0,1 2.3
13.06.2008 120,9 0,8 0,9 0,2 1,3 1,2 0,2 1,6
16.06.2008 121,7 0,6 -0,4 1,0 0,1 1,2 0,8 1,4
17.06.2008 121,7 0,0 0,0 0.1 0,0 1,2 0,1 1,1
18.06.2008 -0,9 -1,3 0,1 1,1 1,2 0,1 1,3
19.06.2008 120,3 -0,2 -0,9 0,5 0,4 1,2 0,4 1,5
20.06.2008 119,1 -1,1 -1,6 0,2 2,0 1,2 0.1 4,2
23.06.2008 117,3 -1,5 -1,3 -0,5 1,3 1,2 -0,4 2,0
24.06.2008 115,5 -1,5 -0,4 -1,1 0,0 1,2 -0,9 2,3
25.06.2008 0,3 1.0 -0,4 1,5 1.2 -0,3 1,4
26.06.2008 -1,1 -3,4 1,4 10,1 1,3 1,1 1,7
27.06 2008 -2,4 -1,4 -1,3 1,4 1,2 -1.0 2,3
30.06.2008 -1,0 -0,2 -0,8 0,0 1,2 -0,6 2.1
01.07.2008 -1,0 2,8 1,1 6,8 1,3 0,8 1.7
02.07.2008 -0,4 0,1 -0,4 0,1 1,2 -0,3 2,2
03.07.2008 -0,6 1,7 -1,8 3,7 1,3 -1,4 2,1
04.07.2008 0,0 -2,5 1,9 5,2 1.3 1.5 0,9
07.07.2008 0.4 1,3 -0,5 2,2 1,2 -0.4 1.0
08.07.2008 -0,6 -1,3 0,4 1,3 1,2 0.3 2.1
09.07.2008 1,7 2,4 0,0 6,7 1,3 0,0 1,8
10.07.2008 -0,6 1,4 0,5 1,5 1,2 0.4 1,5
11.07.2008 -0,5 -3,0 1,7 7,6 1,3 1,3 2,2
14.07.2008 0,3 1,0 -0,4 1,3 1,2 -0.3 1,2
15.07.2008 -2.4 -3,0 -0,2 8,0 1,3 -0,1 3,0
16.07.2008 -0,5 0,2 -0,6 0,1 1.2 -0.5 2.5
17.07.2008 2,0 2,9 0,0 9,7 1,3 0.0 2.0
18.07.2008 2,2 3,5 -0,3 13,6 1,3 -0,2 3,1
21.07.2008 1,6 0,2 1,5 0,1 1.2 1,2 1.6
22.07.2008 112,7 0,1 -0,2 0,3 0,0 1,2 0.2 1.3
23.07.2008 115,7 2,6 3,6 0,0 14,6 1,3 0.0 1,9
24.07.2008 116,4 0,6 -1,3 1,6 1,3 1,2 1,3 1.5
25.07.2008 105,6 -10,2 -4,1 -7,1 15,4 1,3 -5,6 11.7
28.07.2008 105,3 -0,2 -2,0 1,3 3,4 1.3 1,0 2.6
29.07.2008 -0,4 0,1 -0,4 0,1 1,2 -0.4 2,1
30.07.2008 0.7 2.4 -1,0 6,6 1,3 -0,8 1.6
31.07.2008 106,6 0,9 0,0 1,0 0,0 1,2 1,8
01.08.2008 107,1 0,4 -0,3 0,7 0,0 1,2 0,6 1,5
04.08.2008 106,4 -0.7 -0,6 -0,2 0,2 1,2 -0,2 1.1
05 08.2008 3,3 4,5 0,1 22,2 1,3 0,1 2,3
06.08 2008 111,9 1,7 0.4 1,4 0,3 1,2 1.2 2,4
07.08.2008 111,1 -0,7 0,1 -0,7 0,1 1,2 -0,6 1.8
08.08.2008 109,3 -1,6 1,0 2,3 1,5 1,2 -1.9 1,8
11.08.2008 0,5 1,4 0,4 2,6 1,2 -0,4 1,0
12.08.2008 109,6 -0,2 -0.3 0,1 0,0 1,2 0,0 1,1
13.08.2008 108,5 -1,0 -3,4 1,5 10,3 1,3 1.2 1,4
14.08.2008 107,7 0,5 -1,2 0,5 1,2 -0,9 1,2
15.08.2008 -0,9 0,6 -1,3 0,7 1,2 -1,1 1,7
18 08.2008 -0,6 -0,6 -0,1 0,2 1,2 0,8
19.08.2008 -1,8 -4,2 1,3 1,3 1.7
20.08.2008 -0,2 0.8 0,8 1,2 0,9
21 08.2008 -0,8 -1,5 0,4 1,8 1,2
22.08.2008 0,8 2,8 -1,2 9,0 1,3 -1,0 1,1
25.08.2008 0,5 0,0 0,6 0,0 1,2 0,5 0,5
26.08.2008 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,8
27.08.2008 -0,5 -0,9 0,2 0.5 1,2 0,2 1.0
28.08 2008 1,2 2,7 -0,7 8.2 1,3 1,4
29.08.2008 1,1 1 ^_ 1.2 0,9
01.09.2008 -0,7 -0,1 -0,5 0,0 1,2 0,4 -0,4 0,7 0,50
02.09.2008 2,4 2,7 0,5 8,5 1,3 0,4 0,4 1.5 0,50
03.09.2008 107,4 -0,7 -1,2 0,2 1,0 1,2 0.2 0,2 1,0 0,50
04.09.2008 105,3 -2,0 -2,7 0,0 6,1 1,3 0,0 0,0 1.6
05.09.2008 102,9 -2,3 -2,3 -0,6 4,3 1,3 -0,5 -0,5 2,0
08.09.2008 3,4 0,0 3,5 0,0 1.2 2,8 2,8 2,4
09.09.2008 0,1 5,1 -3,5 28,2 1.3 -2,7 -2,7 1.6
10.09.2008 -0,1 1,3 0,9 1,1 1.2 0,7 0,7 1,8
11.09.2008 -2,0 -1,4 -1.0 1,5 1.2 -0,8 -0,8 1,6
ÉÉââîHÜi
15.09.2008 lOO, 1 -5,0 -0,3 37,9 1,3 -0,2 -0,2 5,0 O 50
16.09.2008 -3,8 -3,4 -1,2 1,3 -1.0 -1.0 5.1
17.09.2008 97,2 0,8 -1,0 1,5 0,6 1,2 1,2 1.2 4,1
18.09.2008 96,9 -0,2 -1,1 0,6 0,8 1,2 0,5 0,5 3,3
19.09.2008 7.0 11,0 -1,0 125,4
243.9
1,5 -0,7 
Sum SARk
-0,7
-0.2
6,4
152,4
0.50
mod. SAR) 
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during t)ie estimation period 
-0,19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period
0,011364 .
S standard error of the OLS markeMrybn^ regression 
1.235524
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1.5265 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
-3.0 Without 5.9.2008
-2.4 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
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M u tu a T
23.04.2008 
24 04.2008
25.04.2008
28.04.2008
29.04.2008
30.04.2008
01.05.2008
02.05.2008
06.05.2008
07.05.2008
08 05.2008
09.05.2008
12.05.2008
13.05.2008
14.05.2008 
15 05.2008
16.05.2008
19.05.2008
20.05.2008
21.05.2008
22 05.2008
23.05.2008
27.05.2008
28 05.2008
29 05.2008
30 05.2008
02.06.2008
03.06.2008
04.06.2008 
05 06.2008
06.06.2008
09.06.2008
10.06.2008 
11.06.2008 
12.06.2008
13.06.2008
16.06.2008
17.06.2008
18.06.2008
19.06.2008
20.06.2008
23.06.2008 
24 06.2008
25.06.2008 
26 06.2008
27.06.2008 
30.06 2008 
01 07.2008
02.07.2008
03 07.2008
04.07.2008
07.07.2008
08.07.2008
09.07.2008
10.07.2008
11.07.2008
14.07.2008 
15 07.2008
16.07.2008
17.07.2008
18.07.2008
21.07.2008
22.07.2008
23 07.2008
24 07.2008
25.07.2008
28.07.2008
29.07.2008
30 07.2008
31 07.2008
01.08.2008
04 08.2008
05.08.2008
06.08.2008
07.08.2008 
08 08.2008
11.08.2008 
12.08.2008
13.08.2008
14.08.2008
15.08.2008
18.08.2008
19.08.2008 
20 08.2008
21.08.2008 
22 08.2008 
26.08.2008
27.08.2008
28.08.2008
29.08.2008
01.09.2008
02.09.2008
03.09.2008
04.09.2008
05.09.2008
08.09.2008
09 09.2008
10.09.2008
11.09.2008
12.09.2008
125.7
127.2
126.8
133.8
119.4
120.4 
123,1
111.9
113.3
112.3
115.0 
115,7
117.1
93.8
91.9
91,4
90.6
88.3
89.4
86,1
94.2
98.4
99.5
94.5
101.2 
102,6
95.7
94.3
97.8
99.3
104.1
96.5
95.3
95.3 
100,0
99.7
97.4 
96,2
93.8
93.4
96.5
95.1
 -99-il
101.1
98.5
98.2
99.6
- 0,8
3.4
1.4 
-2,4
1,2
-0,3
5.2 
- 1,6 
-4,2 
- 2,1 
- 2,6
0,0
- 1,0
0,0
0,8
2 .2  
-0,9 
- 2,1 
-4,4
2.3 
1,2
-0,9
1.5 
0,2
3.0 
-2,4
0,6
1 .2
0,2
2.5
2.1 
-1,8 
- 1,2
1.5 
-1,2
0,9
0,6
-2,4
2,2
-1,1
-3,7
-3,1
-2,7
-1,7
2,1
0,1
-3,5
3.3 
-0.1 
-2,7
1.1
-2,5
3.5 
-0,9 
-2,6
1.3 
-3,5 
-0,4
8.6
4.3 
1,0
-5,3
6,7
1.4 
-4.3 
-2,8 
-1,5
5.0 
-1,4
2.1 
-0,6
4.6 
-7.8 
-1,3
0.0
4.7 
-0,3 
-2,4 
-1.3
-4.0
1.5 
-0,4
3.2 
-2.0
0,5
3.3 
0,2 _ 
0.4
2.6 
- 2,6 
-0,3 
-3,5
4.8
1.9 
4,7
-3,0
3,0
-1,4
1.5
2.6 
0,3
0,2
-0,6
- 1,1
0,0
- 0,2
0,2
-0,1
0.0
-0,2
-1,5
- 2 ,2
- 1,1
-0,9
-0,3
-0,2
1,8
0,7
0,0
-0,7
0,3
-0,6
-0 ,2
-2,5
-0,5
-0,5
-1,7
1,6
0,9
-0,4
0.0
-1,3
-0,9
- 1,6
-1,3
-0,4
1,0
-3.4
-1,4
-0,2
-2,8
0,1
1.7 
-2,5
1.3 
-1,3
2.4
1.4 
-3,0
1,0
-3,0
0.2
2,9
3.5 
0,2
3.6 
-1,3 
-4,1 
-2.0
0,1
2.4 
0,0
-0,3
-0,6
0.4
0.1
1,0
1.4 
-0,3 
-3,4
0,5
0,6
-0.6
-4.2
0,8
-1,5
2.8 
0,0 
0,0
-0.9
2.7
-0,1
2.7 
-1,2 
-2,7 
-2.3
0,0
5,1
1.3
1.4
-0,6
3.6
1 .6  
- 2 ,2
1.4 
-0,1
5.4 
-1,4 
-4,0 
-1,9 
-2,4
0,2
-0,8
0,2
1.0
2.3 
-0,7 
-1,9 
-4,2 
- 2,1
1.4 
-0,7
1.7 
0,4
3.2 
- 2 ,2
0,8
1.4
-2,3
-1,9
-1,6
-1,1
1.7 
- 1,0
1,1
0,8
- 2 ,2
- 2,0
-0,9
-3,5
-2,9
-2.5
-1,5
-1,9
0,3
-3,3
3.5 
0.1
-2.5
1.3 
-2,4
3.7 
-0,7 
-2,4
1.5 
-3,3 
-0.2
8.8
4.5 
1,2
-5,1
6,8
1.6 
-4,1 
-2.6 
-1,3
5.1 
-1,3
2.2 
-0,4
4.8 
-7,6 
-1,1
0,2
4.9 
-0.1 
-2,2 
-1,1
0,1
0,2
-3,8
1.7 
-0,2
3.4 
-1,8
0,7
3.5 
-0,1.
0,6
2.8 
-2,4 
-0,1 
-3.3
4.9 
2,0
-4,5
-2,8
2,8
7,8
0.0
2.3 
0.1 
0,2 
0,9 
0.0 
0.0 
0,2 
0.0 
0,0 
0,0
1.7
4.1 
0,8 
0.5 
0,0
3.8 
0,7 
0,0 
0.2
0,0
5.3 
0,1 
0,1
2.2
3.1
1.3 
0,1 
0,0
1.1 
0,4 
2,0
1.3 
0,0
1.5 
10,1
1.4 
0.0
6.8 
0,1
3.7
5.2
2.2
1.3
6.7
1.5
7.6
1.3 
8.0 
0.1
9.7
13.6 
0,1
14.6
1.3 
15,4
3.4 
0.1
6.6 
0,0 
0,0 
0,2
2 2 , 2
0.3
0,1
1.5
2.6 
0,0
10,3
0,5
0.7
0,2
16,0
1,0
1.8
9.0 
0,0 
0,0 
0,5 
8.2
8.5
1.0 
6,1 
4.3 
0,0
28,2
1,1
1.5 
0,5
0,0
-0,4
2 ,2
1,0
0,8
0,1
3.2 
-0,8 
-2,4 
- 1,1 
-1,5
0,1
-0,5
0,1
0,6
1,4
-0,4
- 1,1
-2,5
-1,3
0.9
-0.4
1,0
0,2
1.9
0,3
-1,4
- 1,2
- 1,0
-0,6
1,0-0,60.6
0,5
-1,3-1,2
-0,5-2,1
1.7 
-1,5 
-0,9 -1,1
0.2
-2,0
2,1
0.0
-1.5
0.8
-1,4
2.2 
-0,4 
-1.5
0,9
-2.0
-0.1
5.1
2.7 
0,7
-3,0
4.1 
0,9
-2.5
-1,6
-0,8
3.1 
-0,8
1,3
-0,2
2.9 
-4.6 
-0,7
0,1
2.9 
0,0
-1,3
1.0
-0,1
2.1 
-1,1
0.4
2.1
o.o_
0,3
1,6
-1,5
-0,1
-2,0
3.0
1,2
-2,7
1.7
1.9
0,31,6
-1,5
- 0,1
- 2 .0
3,0
1,2
2.7
1.7
21.33
14.02
12.97 
14,92
24.27 
4,11
15.62 
21,08
21.37 
16,79
19.96
14.33 
19,31 
32,59
20.98 
19,86
18.30
15,73
22,85
22.29
27,00
13,66
18.58 
13,72 
19,71
25.02
30.37 
26,26
28.05
22.59
31.96
35.59
20.27
29.06
28.62 
35,22 
20,81
28.03
42,78
35.15
38,45
20,24
19,49
21,63
23,36
19,57
32.93 
24,74 
12.67 
26,08
44.94 
25,76 
47,56
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
7.61
-4.4
-3,1
-0,4
4,9
-8.3
15.09.2008 89,9 -8.0 -6.3 -7.8 37,9 1,8 -4.4
16.09.2008 85,3 -5,4 -3,4 5,2 10.4 1,7 -3.1
17.09.2008 84,5 -0,9 -1,0 -0,7 0,6 1,7 -0,4
18 09.2008 77,2 -9,4 -1,1 -9,2 0,8 1,7 -5,5
19.09.2008 85,7 9,9 11,0 10,1 125,4 2,0 4.9
243.9 Sum SARk
mod. SAR) 
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period -32.2
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period modlflzlertes CARt
88 -42.2
1/T
0,011364 .  _ _  supormodlfled CARt
S standard error of the OLS market iJiVdJi regression -58,4
1.655075
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
2,7393 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
43,70 7,61 167
47,73 7.61 205
48,57 7,61 205
46.09 7.61 205
57,82 7,61 195
2333,98 
-11.3 Without 5.9.2008 
-16,2 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
Appendix D: 
Formulas, 
Variables, 
Results and 
Data of the 
event study 
method
S ta n d . rd  L ife m m m m
23.04.2008 243.7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,7 0,0 5,89 2,08
24.04.2008 246,4 1,1 0,8 1,3 1,0 1,7 0,8 3,95
25.04.2008 252,8 2,5 -1,4 2,7 1,4 1,7 1.6 3,79
28.04.2008 251,1 -0,7 1,5 -0.5 2,8 1,7 -0,3 3,31
29.04.2008 248,2 -1,2 2,6 -1,0 7,8 1,7 -0,6
30.04.2008 0,6 -0.3 0.8 0,0 1,7 0,5 6,31
01.05.2008 0,4 -1,7 0.6 2,3 1.7 2,05
02.05.2008 4,5 0,2 4.7 0,1 1.7 2,8 5,43
06.05.2008 -0,8 -0,6 -0,6 0,2 1.7 -0,4 5,12
07.05.2008 0,3 -1,1 0,5 0,9 1.7 0,3
08.05.2008 -1,4 0.0 -1.2 0,0 1,7 -0,7
09.05.2008 -1,0 -0,2 -0,8 0,0 1,7 -0,5
12.05.2008 2,3 0,2 2,5 0,2 1,7 1.5 3,81
13.05.2008 2,2 -0,1 -2,1 0,0 1,7 -1,2
14.05.2008 255,3 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,0 1,7 0.1 3,17
15.05.2008 256,0 0,3 -0,2 0,5 0,0 1,7 0,3 3,53
16.05.2008 258,8 1,1 -1,5 1,3 1,7 1,7 0,8
19.05.2008 -0,9 -2,2 -0,6 4,1 1.7 -0,4 2.50
20.05.2008 -1,0 -1,1 -0,8 0,8 1,7 -0,5 4,17
21.05.2008 -4,6 -0,9 -4,4 0,5 1.7 -2,6
22.05.2008 -1,6 0,3 1,4 0.0 1.7 -0,9 6,21
23.05.2008 0,8 -0,2 1.0 0,0 1.7 0,6
27.05.2008 238,7 -0,9 1,8 -0,8 3,8 1.7 -0.5 4,72
28.05.2008 243,0 1,8 0,7 1,9 0,7 1,7 1,2 3,12
29.05.2008 241,2 -0,8 0,0 -0,6 0,0 1,7 -0,3 4,58
30.05.2008 251,0 3,9 -0,7 4,1 0,2 1,7 2,5 15,71
02.06.2008 249,1 -0,7 0,3 -0,6 0,2 1.7 -0,3 11,47
03.06,2008 2,7 -0,6 2,9 0,2 1.7 1,7 7,34
04.06.2008 3,9 -0,2 0,0 1,7 2,5 13,11
05.06.2008 266,2 -0,1 -2,5 0.2 5,3 1,7 0.1 8,99
06.06.2008 251,1 -6,0 0,5 -5,8 0,1 1,7 -3,5 12,71
09.06.2008 247,5 -1,5 -0,5 -1,3 0,1 1,7 -0,8 5,35
10.06.2008 244,5 -1,2 -1,7 -1.0 2,2 1,7 -0,6
11.06.2008 237,9 -2,8 1,6 -2,6 3,1 1,7 -1,6 9,09
12.06.2008 239,7 0,7 0,9 0,9 1,3 1,7 0,5 16,21
13.06.2008 240,5 0,3 -0,4 0.5 0,1 1,7 0,3 4,55
16.06.2008 -0,8 0,0 -0.6 0,0 1.7 -0.4
17.06.2008 242,9 1,8 -1,3 2,0 1,1 1.7 1.2
18.06.2008 239,3 1,5 0,9 -1,3 0,4 1.7 -0,8 7,58
19.06.2008 231,6 3,3 -1,6 -3,1 2,0 1.7 -1,9 11,11
20.06.2008 -2,5 -1,3 -2.3 1.3 1.7 -1,4 11,18
23.06.2008 -1,3 -0,4 -1,1 0,0 1,7 -0,7 4,27
24.06.2008 1,0 1,0 -0,8 1.5 1,7 -0,5
25.06.2008 0,8 -3.4 1,1 10,1 1,7 0,7
26.06.2008 216,9 -2,6 -1,4 -2,4 1,4 1,7 -1,4
27.06.2008 211,1 -2,8 -0,2 -2,6 0,0 1,7 -1,5 7,76
30.06.2008 208,6 -1,2 -2,8 -0,9 6,8 1.7 -0,5 5,07
01.07.2008 -3,2 0,1 -3,0 0,1 1,7 -1,8
02.07.2008 2,0 1,7 2,2 3,7 1,7 1,3 9,61
03.07.2008 0,8 -2,5 1,1 5.2 1,7 0.6 7,81
04.07.2008 -2,3 1,3 -2,1 2,2 1.7 -1,3 5,61
07.07.2008 206,0 1,2 -1,3 1,5 1,3 1,7 0,9 5,92
08.07.2008 207,1 0,6 2,4 0,7 6,7 1,7 0,4 9,75
09.07.2008 214,6 3,5 1,4 3,7 1,5 1.7 2,2 10,25
10.07.2008 -2,2 -3,0 -2,0 7,6 1,7 -1,2 5,89
11.07.2008 -3,5 1,0 -3,3 1,3 1.7 -2,0 7,72
14.07.2008 1,8 -3,0 2,1 8,0 1,7 1,2 5,10
15.07.2008 -4,2 0,2 -4.0 0,1 1.7 -2,4 13,84
16.07.2008 -1,1 2,9 -1.0 9,7 1.7 -0,6
17.07.2008 5,0 3,5 5,1 13,6 1,7 3,0
18.07.2008 3,0 0,2 3.2 0,1 1,7 1,9
21.07.2008 1,8 -0,2 2,0 0,0 1,7 1,2
22.07.2008 -1,1 3,6 -1,0 14,6 1,7
23.07.2008 228,0 6,0 -1,3 6,2 1,3 1,7 3,7
24.07.2008 231,7 1.6 -4,1 1,9 15,4 1,7 1,1
25.07.2008 219,8 -5,4 -2,0 -5,1 3,4 1,7 -3,1 12,09
28.07.2008 215,7 -1,9 0,1 -1,7 0,1 1,7 -1,0 4,39
29.07.2008 213,8 -0,9 2,4 -0,8 6,6 1,7 -0,5 5,83
30.07.2008 223,3 4,3 0,0 4,4 0,0 1,7 2,7 5,75
31.07.2008 224,9 0,8 -0,3 0,9 0,0 1,7 0,6 7,47
01.08.2008 225,8 0,4 -0,6 0,6 0,2 1,7 0,3
04.08.2008 223,4 -1,0 4,5 -1,0 22,2 1,7 -0,6 3,24
05.08.2008 7,0 0.4 7,1 0,3 1,7 4.3 8,50
06.08.2008 -0,8 0,1 -0,6 0,1 1.7 -0,4
07.08.2008 1,2 1,0 1,3 1.5 1,7 0,8
08.08.2008 3,1 1,4 3.2 2,6 1,7 1.9 7,14
11.08.2008 0,7 -0,3 0,9 0,0 1,7 0,6 5,39
12.08.2008 249,7 -0,4 -3,4 -0,1 1.7 -0,1 6,76
13.08.2008 242,0 -3,1 0,5 -3,0 0,5 1,7 -1,8 7,17
14.08.2008 241,8 -0,1 0,6 0,1 0,7 1,7 0,0
15.08.2008 0,4 -0,6 0,6 0.2 1,7 0,4
18.08.2008 -1,2 -4,2 -0.9 1,7 -0,5 3,18
19.08.2008 -4,9 0,8 -4.7 1,0 1.7 -2,8 5,78
20.08.2008 0,3 -1,5 0,5 1,8 1,7 0,3
21.08.2008 0,8 2,8 9,0 1.7 0,6
22.08.2008 4,3 0,0 0,0 1,7 2,7
26.08.2008 -0,1 0,0 0.0 0,0 1,7 0.0 6.32
27.08.2008 0,5 -0,9 0.7 0,5 1,7 0.4 4.79
28.08.2008 251,4 3,5 2,7 3,6 8,2 1,7 2,1 6,22
29.08.2008 0,2. 0,3__ 1,7 0,2
01.09.2008 252,1 0,1 -0,1 0.3 0,0 1.7 0,2 0,2 3,65
02.09.2008 258,8 2,6 2,7 2,7 8,5 1,7 1,6 1.6
03.09.2008 -2,4 -1,2 -2,1 1,0 1,7 -1,3 -1,3 5,54
04.09.2008 -2,9 -2,7 -2,6 6,1 1,7 -1,6 -1,6
05.09.2008 -5,0 -2.3 -4,8 4,3 1,7 -2,8 -2,8 9,26
08.09.2008 258,3 9,4 0,0 9,6 0,0 1,7 5.8 5,8 5,12
09.09.2008 255,3 -1,2 5,1 -1,1 28,2 1.8 -0,6 10,62
10.09.2008 244,2 -4,6 -1,3 -4,3 1,1 1,7 -2,6 -2,6 10,11 2,08
11.09 2008 240,3 -1,6 -1,4 -1,4 1.5 1.7 -0,8 -0,8 5,89 2,08
12.09.2008 239,9 2.08
Spreads
(bp)
15.09.2008
16.09.2008
17.09.2008
18.09.2008
19.09.2008
'3.2
-0.8
2,5
- 2.6
11,4
-6,3
-3,4
- 1.0
- 1.1
11,0
- 2,8
-0,5
2,7
-2,4
11,3
-0,3
1,6
1.4
5.5 
1.7
22,92
637.91
37,9 1,8 -1,6
10,4 1,7 -0,3
0,6 1,7 1,6
0,8 1,7 -1,4
125,4 2,0 5,5
243.9 Sum SARk
mod. SAR) 
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during t)>e estimation period 
-0.19127
T is t)>e number of days in tfie estimation period modlflzlertes CARt
88 -15.3
1/T
0.011364 _ _  _ supermodlfled CARt
S standard error of ttie OLS market j i ÿ % l  regression -34.7
1,653148
square of S standard error of ttie OLS market model regression 
2,7329 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243,3
-4.1 Without 5.9.2008
-9.6 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
6,5
Appendix D: 
Formulas, 
Variables, 
Results and 
Data of the 
event study 
method
t . ----- "....... Hanppyj^ r R# ......B i
[Em
25.04.2008 33,4872 0,0 1,4 0,21
28.04.2008 33,7627 0,8 0,8 0,6 1,0 1,4 0,4
29.04.2008 33,9913 0,7 -1,4 1,3 1,4 1,4 0,9
30.04.2008 1,4 1.5 0,9 2,8 1.4 0,7
02.05.2008 3,7 2.6 2,8 7,8 1.4 2,0
05.05.2008 -0,1 -0,3 0,2 0,0 1,4 0,1
06.05.2008 0,7 -1,7 1,5 2,3 1,4 1,1
07.05.2008 -9,4 0,2 -9,4 0,1 1,4 6,6 1,24
08.05.2008 1,7 -0,6 2,0 0,2 1.4 1,4 1,16
09.05.2008 0,9 -1,1 1,5 0,9 1.4 1,0
12.05.2008 0,6 0,0 0.8 0.0 1,4 0.5
13.05.2008 -0,1 -0,2 0,1 0.0 1,4 0,1
14.05.2008 34,3273 1.0 0.2 1,0 0,2 1,4 0.7 0,52
15.05.2008 34,2112 -0,3 -0.1 -0,2 0,0 1,4 -0,1 0,32
16.05.2008 34,7429 1,5 0.0 1,6 0,0 1.4 1,2
19.05.2008 0,3 -0,2 0,5 0,0 1.4 0,3
20.05.2008 0,0 -1,5 0,7 1,7 0,5 0,52
21.05.2008 -0,4 -2.2 0,5 4,1 1.4 0.4
22.05.2008 0,4 -1.1 0,9 0,8 1.4 0,6
23.05.2008 -2,2 -0,9 -1,7 0,5 1.4 -1,2
26.05.2008 0,1 -0,3 0,3 0,0 0.2
27.05.2008 33,9759 -0,4 -0.2 -0,2 0,0
28.05.2008 34,3112 1,0 1,8 0,4 3,8 0,3
29.05.2008 34,8196 1,5 0,7 1,3 0,7 0,9
30.05.2008 1,7 0,0 1,9 0,0 1,3
02.06.2008 0,5 -0,7 0,8 0,2 0,6
03.06.2008 -0,7 0.3 -0,7 0,2 1.4 -0,5
04.06.2008 -1,5 -0,6 -1,1 0,2 1,4 -0,8
05.06.2008 0,7 0,2 0,9 0,0 1.4 0,7
06.06.2008 0,4 -2.5 1.4 5,3 1.4 1.0 0,49
09.06.2008 -0,7 -0,5 -0,4 0,1 1.4 -0,3
10.06.2008 -2,9 -0,5 -2,6 0,1 1,4 1,8
11.06.2008 -0,2 -1,7 0,5 2,2 1.4 0,4
12.06.2008 0,2 1,6 -0,2 3,1 1.4 -0,2
13.06.2008 2,1 0,9 1.8 1,3 1,4 1,3
16.06.2008 -0,6 -0.4 -0,3 0,1 1.4 -0,2 0,21
17 06.2008 0,8 0.0 0,9 0,0 1.4 0.7
18.06.2008 -1,7 -1,3 -1,1 1,1 1.4 -0,8 0,48
19.06.2008 -0,3 -0,9 0,2 0,4 1,4 0,1 0,36
20.06 2008 0,3 -1,6 1,0 2,0 1.4 0,7 0,82
23.06.2008 33,2044 -2,9 -1,3 -2,3 1,3 1.4 -1,6
24.06.2008 33,1157 -0,3 -0,4 0.0 0,0 1.4 0,0
25.06.2008 32,5472 -1,7 1,0 -2,0 1,5 1.4 -1,4
26.06.2008 -2,2 -3,4 -0,9 10,1 -0,6
27.06.2008 -3,1 -1,4 -2,5 1,4 -1,7
30.06.2008 0,8 -0,2 1,0 0,0 0,7
01.07.2008 30,6645 -1,5 -2,8 -0,3 6,8 -0,2
02.07.2008 32,1022 4,5 0,1 4.6 0.1 1,4 3,2 1.16
03 07.2008 32,1795 0,2 1,7 -0,3 3,7 1.4 -0,2 1,14
04.07.2008 -1,1 -2,5 0.0 5,2 1,4 0,0 0,35
07.07.2008 0,5 1,3 0.2 2.2 1,4 0,1
08 07.2008 -1,9 -1.3 -1,3 1,3 1,4 -0,9
09.07.2008 2,8 2,0 6,7 1,4
10.07.2008 -1,6 1,4 -0,9 1,5 1.4 -0,6
11.07.2008 -1,7 -3,0 -0,5 7,6 1,4 -0,4
14.07.2008 30,8363 -1,4 1,0 -1,6 1.3 1.4 -1,1
15.07.2008 29,8821 -3,2 -3,0 -1,9 8,0 1,4 -1,3
16.07.2008 29,5379 -1,2 0,2 -1,1 0,1 1.4 -0,8 0,73
17.07.2008 2,1 2,9 1,1 9,7 1.4 0.7
18.07.2008 2,4 3,5 1,2 13,6 1.4 0,8
21.07.2008 1,8 0,2 1,8 0,1 1,3
22.07.2008 0,5 0,2 0,3 0.0 -0,2
23.07.2008 3,7 3,6 2,4 14.6 1.5 1,7
24 07.2008 -0,2 -1,3 0,4 1,3 1,4 0.3
25.07.2008 -12,4 -4.1 15,4 1.5 -7,4
28.07.2008 29,7168 2.9 -2,0 3.8 3.4 2.7
29.07.2008 29,766 0,2 0,1 0,2 0.1 1,4 0,2
30.07.2008 30,0472 0,9 2,4 0,1 6,6 1,4 0,1
31.07.2008 2,1 0,0 2.2 0.0 1.4 1,6 0,67
01.08.2008 -1,3 -0,3 -1.1 0,0 1.4 -0,7
04.08.2008 -1,2 -0,6 -0,8 0,2 1.4 -0,6
05.08.2008 30,8306 2,9 4,5 1,3 22,2 1,5 0,9
06.08.2008 31,2377 1,3 0,4 1,3 0,3 1.4 0.9 0,57
07.08.2008 30,4268 -2,7 0,1 -2,6 0.1 1.4 -1.8 63
08.08.2008 29,7133 -2,4 1,0 -2,7 1,5 1.4 -1,9
11.08.2008 29,7519 0,1 1,4 -0,3 2,6 1,4 -0,2
12.08.2008 29,9498 0,7 -0,3 0,9 0.0 1.4 0,6 0,55
13.08.2008 28,8486 -3,8 -3,4 -2,4 10,3 1,4 -1,7 1,08
14.08.2008 28,7722 -0,3 0,5 -0,3 0,5 1,4 -0,2 0,57
15.08.2008 28,9092 0,5 0,6 0.4 0,7 0,2
18.08.2008 -0,9 -0,6 0,2 -0.4
19.08.2008 -1,0 -4,2 0,5
20.08.2008 0,5 1,4 -0,5
21.08.2008 -0,2 -1,5 0,5 1.8 1.4 0.4
22.08.2008 3,3 2,8 2,3 9,0 1,4 1.6 61,5
25.08.2008 0,9 0.0 1,0 0,0 1,4 0,7 61,5
26.08.2008 -1,5 0,0 -1,4 0,0 1,4 -1.0 63,5
27.08.2008 -1,7 -0.9 -1.2 0.5 1.4 -0,9
28.08.2008 1,8 2,7 0,9 8,2 1.4 0,7
29 08.2008 1,3 ......0,2 1,4_ 1.4 1,0
01.09.2008 -1,3 -0,1 1,1 0,0 1,4 -0,8 -0.8 0,32 0,21
02.09.2008 2,8 2,7 1.9 8,5 1,3 1,3 0,21
03.09.2008 -0,9 -1,2 1,0 -0,3 -0,3 0,69 0,21
04.09.2008 -2,5 -2,7 -1,4 6,1 1,4 -1,0 -1,0 0,80 0,21
05.09.2008 -3,2 -2,3 -2,2 4,3 1,4 -1,6 -1.6 0.63 0.21
08.09.2008 4,0 0,0 4.2 0,0 1,4 3,0 3,0 0,21
09.09.2008 0,1 5,1 28,2 1,5 -1,2 -1,2 0,21
10.09.2008 28,1422 -3,6 -1,3 -3,0 1,1 1.4 -2,1 -2,1 0,21
11.09.2008 27,5379 2,2 -1,4 -1,5 1,5 1,1 -1,1 0,21
12.09.2008 27,205 -1,2 0,5 -1,3 0,5 -0,9 -0,9 0.21
15.09.2008 -4,8 -2,3 37,9 1.5 -1,5 0.21 91
16.09.2008 -4,1 -2,7 1.4 -1.8 0,21
17.09.2008 -1,9 -1.0 -1.4 0,6 1,4 -1.0 -1.0 0,21
18.09.2008 -2,2 -1,1 -1,7 0,8 1,4 -1,2 1.2 0,91 0,21
19.09.2008 25,7083 6,9 11,0 2,8 125,4
243.9
1,7 1.6
Sum SARk
1,6
-8.5 ea'.o? 0,21
mod. SAR) -11.5 Without 5.9.2008
supermodil SARk
R mean return of BEINSUR during the estimation period -33.0
-0.19127
T is the number of days in the estimation period modlflzlertes CARt
88 -42.9
1/T
0.011364 _ _  _ supermodlfled CARt
S standard error of the OLS market^ycjal regression -47.2
1.401592
square of S standard error of the OLS market model regression 
1,9645 
sum of (Rmt-Rm squared)
243.3
-13.1 without 8.9.2008 and 19.9.2008
Reference Index
25.04.2008 128,99 O
28.04.2008 130,07 0,83
29 04.2008 128,31 -1,37
30.04.2008 130,25 1 ,49
02.05.2008 133,73 2,60
05.05.2008 133,28 -0,34
06.05.2008 131,03 -1 ,72
07.05.2008 131,27 0,18
08.05.2008 130,45 -0,63
09.05.2008 128,98 -1,14
12.05.2008 128,93 -0,04
13.05.2008 128,65 -0,22
14.05.2008 128,96 0,24
15.05.2008 128,84 -0,09
16 05.2008 128,87 0,02
19.05.2008 128,63 -0,19
20.05.2008 126,75 -1 ,48
21.05.2008 124,01 -2,21
22.05.2008 122,71 -1 ,06
23.05.2008 121,58 -0,93
26.05.2008 121 ,23 -0,29
27.05.2008 120,98 -0,21
28.05.2008 123,16 1 .77
29 05.2008 123,97 0,65
30.05.2008 123,97 0,00
02.06.2008 123,12 -0,69
03 06.2008 123,43 0,25
04.06.2008 122,66 -0,63
05.06.2008 122,42 -0,20
06.06.2008 1 19,45 -2,49
09.06.2008 118,83 -0,52
10.06.2008 1 18,2 -0,53
11.06.2008 1 16,27 -1 ,66
12.06.2008 1 18,14 1,58
13.06.2008 119,27 0,95
16.06.2008 1 18,74 -0,45
17.06.2008 118,74 0,00
18 06.2008 1 17,27 -1,25
19.06.2008 1 16,28 -0,85
20.06.2008 1 14,46 -1,59
23.06.2008 1 12,98 -1 ,31
24 06.2008 1 12,56 -0,37
25.06 2008 1 13,74 1 ,04
26.06.2008 1 10,04 -3,36
27 06.2008 108,56 -1 ,36
30.06.2008 108,29 -0,25
01.07.2008 105,35 -2,79
02.07.2008 105,42 0,07
03 07.2008 107,27 1 ,72
04 07.2008 104,69 -2,46
07.07.2008 106,05 1 .28
08 07.2008 104,65 -1 ,34
09.07.2008 107,23 2,41
10.07.2008 105,72 -1 ,43
11.07.2008 102,69 -2,95
14 07.2008 103,68 0,95
15.07.2008 100,64 -3,02
16.07.2008 100,81 0,17
17.07.2008 103,85 2,93
18 07.2008 107,62 3,50
21.07.2008 107,81 0,1 8
22.07.2008 107,62 -0,18
23.07.2008 1 1 1 ,68 3,64
24.07.2008 1 10,22 -1,32
25.07.2008 105,86 -4,12
28 07.2008 103,76 -2,02
29.07.2008 103,89 0,1 3
30 07.2008 106,43 2,39
31.07.2008 106,38 -0,05
01.08.2008 106,08 -0,28
04.08.2008 105,44 -0,61
05.08.2008 1 10,43 4,52
06.08.2008 1 10,85 0,38
07.08.2008 1 10,92 0,06
08 08.2008 1 12,06 1,02
11 08.2008 1 13,68 1 ,43
12.08.2008 1 13,3 -0,34
13.08.2008 109,57 -3,40
14.08.2008 1 10,16 0,54
15.08.2008 1 10,87 0,64
18 08.2008 1 10,18 -0,63
19.08.2008 105,75 -4,19
20.08.2008 106,63 0,83
21.08.2008 105,03 -1 ,52
22 08.2008 108,06 2,80
25.08.2008 108,01 -0,05
26 08.2008 108,04 0,03
27 08.2008 107,05 -0,92
28.08.2008 109,98 2,66
29 08.2008 1 10,15 0,15
01.09.2008 1 10,08 -0,06
02.09.2008 1 13,16 2,72
03.09.2008 1 1 1 ,83 -1,19
04 09.2008 108,93 -2,66
05.09.2008 106,51 -2,27
08 09.2008 106.51 0,00
09.09.2008 1 12,26 5,12
10.09.2008 1 10,87 -1 ,25
11.09.2008 109,34 -1 ,40
12.09.2008 109,91 0,52
15.09.2008 103,35 -6,35
16 09.2008 99,94 -3,41
17 09.2008 98,99 -0,96
18.09.2008 97,91 -1,10
19.09.2008 1 10,02 1 1 ,o i
Appendix D: 
Formulas, 
Variables, 
Results and 
Data of the 
event study 
method
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Appendix E:
Document
for
measuring 
the modified 
equlty-ratio
Modified Equity-ratio Analysis
Research period: 1.1.2008 to 31.12.2008
Determination of the modified equity-ratio as of January 1st, 2008 
Equity stated in the financial statements as of 31.12.2007 
excluding reserves for currency translation
excluding own shares for share based payment schemes and buy back programma 
excluding insurance related changes of equity (pension plans) and unspecified reserves 
excluding dividends paid and distributions to shareholders 
excluding issues of new share capital 
excluding for tax effects 
excluding for transactions among subsiduaries 
excluding shadow accounting 
excluding deeply subordinated debt 
Modified equity as of 31.12.2007 
Total assets as of 31.12.2007 
Modified equity-ratio as of 31.12.2007
B. Modified equity as of 1.1.2008 (identical to modified equity as of 31.12.2007)
excluding reserves for currency translation
excluding own shares for share based payment schemes and buy back programma
excluding insurance related changes of equity (pension plans) and unspecified reserves
excluding dividends paid and distributions to shareholders
excluding issues of new share capital
excluding for tax effects
excluding for transactions among subsiduaries
excluding shadow accounting
excluding deeply subordinated debt
Not excluded:
unrealized gains and losses from fair market value measurement of Financial instruments 
net income of the period 2008 
Modified equity as of 31.12.2008 
Total assets as of 31.12.2008 
Modified equity-ratio as of 31.12.2008
C. Change of modified equity-ratio due to the effid^^f the financial crisis in percent
Modified equity as of 31.12.2008 - modified equity as of 31.12.2007 / modified equity as of 31.12.2008
Appendix F: Clustering listed European insurance groups 2007
Analysis 2007 data
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Appendix G: Clustering European insurance groups 2008
Analysis of data 2008
40
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Appendix H: Guidelines for structured interviews with experts 
Guideline for a structured interview
Thank you for participating in this interview. Its focus is to explain, question and or verify the 
statistical results of the research performed by Ansgar Volker about the risk disclosure of 
international insurance groups and the capital market reaction. This interview is structured 
using questions about the three variables and their relationship that are analyzed in this 
research project.
1. Negative effects on equity ratios as a resuit of the financial crisis 2007-2009
2. Risk disclosure in group financial statements as of 2007 and 2008
3. Reaction of the capital market in a moment of financial distress
Data from foliowing international insurance groups have been used:
Allianz, Aegon, Aviva, AXA, CNP Assurance, Generali, Hannover Ruck, ING, Legal&General, 
MunichRe, Old Mutual, Standard Life, Zurich
The interview can proceed in English or German, person to person, by phone or in writing. The 
English manuscript of the interview will be sent to you in draft form. Only content that is agreed 
upon will be published. You can opt for anonymity in the research paper.
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis in 
comparison to other industries?
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of the 
analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or lower market 
valuation of financial instruments?
® Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid from 
governments during the financial crisis?
Risk disclosure behaviour:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been affected by 
the crisis by reading their group financial statements? Where you able to predict the 
effect the crisis had on an insurance group based on those annuai information? What 
information about the insurance group that proved important later on did you learn from 
the group financial statements first?
• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by international 
insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of risk 
disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might restrict 
them?
• is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome financial 
instruments (such as: ABS, CDD, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the crisis 
proceeded?
Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all information 
avaiiable in the share price? Do you support the theory of an efficient capital market in 
setting share prices?
• Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method of 
measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study method that 
measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share prices that are
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calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over a short period of 
time)?
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 2008 be considered 
the most threatening situation for international insurance groups during the financial 
crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected those 
international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most by the 
financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them before they 
disclosed detailed information about impairments and iower market valuation about 
critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that have 
been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones disclosed their risk 
timely and extensively, which ones didn't?
• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
• Do you think that internationai insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose "sensitive" 
information about other topics as they have been reluctant to disclose risk information 
about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during this crisis?
• Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion about 
fair vaiue measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance industry?
Thank you for your answers. Please state your name, job title, business responsibility or your 
link to the research topic, or opt for anonymity.
Do not hesitate to contact me via mail a.voeiker@surrev.ac.uk or phone 01605254139.
For organizational questions or ethical concerns please contact Professor Gilbert at 
d.qilbert@surrev.ac.uk or Professor Chen at i.Chen@surrev.ac.uk at the university of Surrey.
Ansgar Voelker 
(DBA-Student
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Appendix la: Interview Anonymous (2010)
Structured interview
Anonymous from a leading German investment company. The name and company 
cannot be disclosed due to internal governance regulations. Interview taken on 
December 27, 2010 by Ansgar Volker.
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis 
in comparison to other industries?
The insurance industry got through the financial crisis quite well. Single listed 
European insurance groups with banking subsidiaries or business in the US faced 
challenges. However, a key element of the crisis -  selling credit default swaps -  is not 
a core business of insurance companies.
The share price of listed European insurance groups suffered as a result of the 
financial crisis and the share price level is still lower than before the crisis.
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
AIG and SwissRe suffered most from the financial crisis because they have sold credit 
default swaps. AEGON sold variable annuities in the US market -  these are life 
insurance products which are backed by US-investments. These investments were 
only partially hedged against market risk. As a result AEGON had to cover losses that 
arose from the unhedged part. Allianz owned Dresdner Bank at the beginning of the 
crisis and suffered losses from their US-exposure.
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of 
the analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or 
lower market valuation of financial instruments?
Listed European insurance groups wrote down their corporate bonds due to an 
increase in spreads that lowered their fair values. This put the equity ratio of insurance 
companies under pressure. Single insurance groups with banking subsidiaries like 
Allianz and ING made losses in the baking segment that lowered their equity ratio 
additionally.
• Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid 
from governments during the financial crisis?
AEGON and ING received state subsidies. SwissRe (not included in the group of 
accounts because it reports according to US-GAAP, not IFRS) received financial 
support by Berkshire Hathaway an institutional investor that increased its capital, 
signed a reinsurance contract and bought a convertible bond.
Risk disclosure behaviour:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been 
affected by the crisis by reading their group financial statements?
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The disclosure of financial risk in the annual financial statements of listed European 
insurance groups is insufficient and non-specific. I would prefer risk information to be 
quantitative, specified to the situation of the company and more extensive.
• Where you able to predict the effect the crisis had on an insurance group based 
on those annual information? What information about the insurance group that 
proved important later on did you learn from the group financial statements first?
Yes, it was possible to evaluate the impact of the crisis on the insurance groups. In 
order to do this I have used the equity movement tables, the disclosure of investment 
fair value and of deferred acquisition cost in the notes as additional information for my 
forecasts.
• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by 
international insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
Yes, I believe that timely and extensive risk disclosure increases trust of investors. 
Right now this disclosure is not sufficient and should be timely and extensive.
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of 
risk disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might 
restrict them?
The management is hesitating to present the risk situation of their company. It prefers 
to present chances and success stories instead of disclosing risks.
• Is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome 
financial instruments (such as: ABS, CDO, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the 
crisis proceeded?
There is a positive development in disclosure about crisis related financial instruments. 
Disclosure about them has been more detailed and with more quantitative information 
in 2008 and 2009.
Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all
information available in the share price? Do you support the theory of an
efficient capital market in setting share prices?
In general the market is always right. However, in this crisis a few phenomena 
appeared: Shares of listed insurance groups suffered unduly. The capital market 
overreacted which can be explained by the complexity of the insurance business 
model and the interdependencies within the insurance market. As a result the capital 
market perceived too high a risk -  aside from US investments the insurance market 
continued to perform.
• Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method
of measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study
method that measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share 
prices that are calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over 
a short period of time)?
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This financial crisis has seen some extraordinary share price reactions. Three 
examples: The share price of AEGON increased after a rights issue has been 
announced. Such an announcement is typically followed by falling share prices. The 
announcement of a takeover of AI G A by MetLife has increased its share price, 
although it tends to fall after such an announcement. The presentation of negative 
quarterly results of ING has been followed by a share price increase. All these share 
price reactions are counter-intuitive and would need further research to be explained.
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 17‘ ,^ 2008 be 
considered the most threatening situation for international insurance groups 
during the financial crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
AIG has been the biggest test of the insurance industry within the last decade. It has 
been an unanticipated one-time disaster. Another test of trust has been the 
recapitalization of ING by the Dutch government. Owner of saving accounts issued by 
the bank branch of this insurance group always assumed their savings to be safe. 
They were shocked by the need to increase INGs share capital. (Explanation: The 
owners of saving accounts are concentrated in Germany at the ING Diba)
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected 
those international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most 
by the financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them 
before they disclosed detailed information about impairments and lower market 
valuation about critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
I am not surprised that the capital market developed according to the effect the 
financial crisis had on the European insurance groups. It has been public knowledge 
that AIG had a credit default swap exposure or that Generali did not have investments 
in the US. When it became apparent that credit default swaps and portfolio based 
financial instruments had been the drivers of the financial crisis during 2008, the capital 
market reacted based on this knowledge.
The publication of group financial statements in the first half of 2009 has been a non- 
event. It rarely happens that data from financial statements surprise the capital market. 
Investor days and conference calls provide additional information. However, insurance 
groups are prohibited to disclose market relevant information to a small group of 
investors only. They must be disclosed to the whole market via ad-hoc 
announcements.
Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that 
have been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones 
disclosed their risk timely and extensively, which ones did not?
ING has been significantly affected by the financial crisis. However this company has 
disclosed a lot of information. Its annual financial statements exceeded 300 pages and 
their quarterly financial statements 260 pages.
Allianz made an effort to be transparent about their risk exposure but they could have 
done more. Standard Life is not covered by our company.
MunichRe and Zurich have been fully transparent in their exposure during the financial 
crisis. AXA has been transparent but hesitated to disclose risk information as the crisis 
continued.
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• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
There should be a level-playing field approach. Institutional and private investors shall 
rely on the same kind of information.
• Do you think that international insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose 
“sensitive” information about other topics as they have been reluctant to 
disclose risk information about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during 
this crisis?
Listed insurance companies trade at a discount in comparison to other industries 
because investors perceive their accounting as incomparable and complex. Thus 
managers hesitate to disclose information that would further unsettle investors.
• Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion 
about fair value measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance 
industry?
Full fair value of insurance groups would be based on estimates due to the lack of 
markets for insurance liabilities. Updating these estimates would lead to earning 
fluctuations between quarterly financial statements. This would run counter to the long 
term business orientation of insurance groups.
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Appendix Ib: Interview Noack (2010)
Structured interview with Thomas Noack from WestLB, working as a Senior 
Equity Analysts (Director) on December 22, 2010
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis 
in comparison to other industries?
Yes the insurance industry has been hit harder by the financial crisis than other 
industries. Although banks were affected directly and had to balance bigger financial 
losses, insurance companies as significant asset managers were affected by the 
financial crisis indirectly and on a long lasting basis. During the crisis federal reserve 
banks increased liquidity in the market. This market influence lowered interest rates. 
This causes a decline in the return on assets that insurance companies use to pay for 
customer claims.
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
Among the analyzed companies AEGON and ING have been hit hardest by the 
financial crisis, and they received governmental subsidies to cover their losses. Both 
insurance groups were engaged in the US-market and invested in mortgage-based 
financial instruments there.
Aside from the group of analysis AIG and SwissRe suffered most from the crisis, 
because these groups both invested in mortgage-based financial instruments and sold 
Credit Default Swaps -  although each group on a different scale. (Explanation; Both 
insurance groups are not analyzed in this research study, because they apply US- 
accounting standards and do not comply with IFRS 7)
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of 
the analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or 
lower market valuation of financial instruments?
The equity ration of only AIG and SwissRe has been lowered directly by losses from 
Credit Default Swaps. The equity ratio of all analyzed European insurance groups 
have been affected indirectly. Defaults of corporate bonds issuers and higher risk 
spreads on governmental bonds caused the fair value of these assets to decline 
resulting in lower equity ratios.
• Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid 
from governments during the financial crisis?
Among the analyzed companies ING and AEGON received governmental subsidies. 
Additionally SNS (Explanation: A smaller insurance group in the Netherlands and 
Belgium) received money form the state, whereas SwissRe received money from 
Warren Buffet, an institutional investor.
Risk disclosure behavior:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been 
affected by the crisis by reading their group financial statements?
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The financial crisis has changed the way European insurance groups communicate 
with analysts. There is a tendency for explicit information disclosure during the fiscal 
year.
In 2009 and 2010 detailed information about the embedded value, the net asset value 
and the duration of investment categories have been disclosed by listed insurance 
groups. Especially the assumption that influence the embedded value and explicit 
information about asset allocation such as the character and extent of exposure in 
investments in Greece have been timely communicated to analysts. This is important 
for us, because our judgement about the value of a company differ when an insurance 
group is either invested in a Greek insurance subsidiary or is heavily invested in Greek 
sovereign bonds.
The press coverage and resulting public pressure forced listed insurance groups to 
disclose detailed information to analysts. Just remember when questions about the 
exposure to structured investment instruments were followed by questions about their 
corporate bonds exposure and finally their sovereign bonds exposure. This kind of 
explicit and timely information has not been available during 2007 and 2008.
• Where you able to predict the effect the crisis had on an insurance group based 
on those annual information? What information about the insurance group that 
proved important later on did you learn from the group financial statements first?
n.a.
• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by 
international insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
Yes, I believe that timely and extended disclosure creates trust in investors. Investors 
don't like suprise. They can -  up to a certain personal limit -  cope with bad news as 
long as they are prepared for them and appreciate a long term relationship. Investors 
lost trust in SwissRe when it delayed bad news in 2007 so that the management had to 
go. Insurance groups have to swallow the pill and communicate problems and failures 
because they will become public knowledge sooner or later.
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of 
risk disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might 
restrict them?
The management has to fulfill all accounting requirements. They can exceed them with 
discretionary disclosure. However the timing of disclosure has proved to be more 
important during the crisis. So disclosure of information during the fiscal year and not 
primarily in the financial statements is how management expresses themselves to 
investors. The financial crisis showed that managements have learned a lesson.
• Is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome 
financial instruments (such as: ABS, CDO, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the 
crisis proceeded?
Yes, the disclosure has improved along the financial crisis. At the beginning structured 
products have been disclosed as one amount. On enquiry the products have been 
subdivided into categories like CDO, RMBS, CMBS and so on.
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Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all
information available in the share price? Do you support the theory of an
efficient capital market in setting share prices?
The capital market proved quite efficient during the crisis. Whenever trouble arouse the 
share price moved correspondingly. The share price of SwissRe for example declined 
after its lagged risk disclosure.
• Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method 
of measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study 
method that measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share 
prices that are calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over 
a short period of time)?
n.a.
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 17*"^ , 2008 be
considered the most threatening situation for international insurance groups
during the financial crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
The near insolvency of AIG had a significant impact on the insurance industry. The 
stumbling of such an insurance giant arose fear among investors. However an 
insolvency would have affected not only the insurance industry but governmental and 
industrial financial contracts that had been “secured” by Credit Default Swaps with AIG 
as a counterparty.
Another event that affected the insurance industry has been the insolvency of Lehman. 
Although a bank its default led to write-offs in Lehman bonds that many insurance 
companies were invested in. For German insurance groups an insolvency of the later 
saved Hypo-Real-Estate Bank would have been significant because the Pfandbriefe 
issued by it are part of their asset mix.
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected 
those international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most 
by the financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them 
before they disclosed detailed information about impairments and lower market 
valuation about critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
It is no surprise to me, because information about toxic assets have been available to 
investors before the group financial statements were published. Alarmed by ad-hoc 
announcements analysts asked the management of all European insurance groups 
during conference calls and investor days about problems that one insurance group 
had to disclose. This created transparency in the financial market and share prices 
reacted correspondingly. This happened with SwissRe: The company made an ad-hoc 
announcement that their projected profits could not be met. A snap conference call 
revealed Credit Default Swaps as the troublemaker which has been hidden in off- 
balance vehicle before. SwissRe management had to explain itself and other 
insurance groups were asked the same questions as SwissRe during their gatherings 
with analysts.
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Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that 
have been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones 
disclosed their risk timely and extensively, which ones didn't?
How companies were affected by the financial crisis depends especially on where they 
were doing business. European insurance groups with business in the US invested 
more likely in mortgage based financial instruments. Generali as a European only 
insurance group praised itself as not being directly affected by the financial crisis.
How the companies handle information about such risk differs. Assuming that 
management knows about the risk portfolio of their insurance group some pursue an 
active and other a passive way to disclose risk. MunicheRe, HannoverRe, Allianz and 
Zurich pursue an active way. The national requirement for listed German companies to 
disclose forecast information might be a reason for that behavior. HannoverRe for 
example breaks down their goals and quantifies them in a matrix which is disclosed to 
analysts. AEGON does not sufficiently disclose the assumptions of their embedded 
value calculation.
• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
The internet provides transparency. Management presentations in conference calls 
and investors' days are place in the internet. They are accessible to all interested 
private investors. However, analysts have an advantage because they can place 
questions on such occasions.
• Do you think that international insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose 
“sensitive” information about other topics as they have been reluctant to 
disclose risk information about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during 
this crisis?
Some European insurance groups still hesitate to disclose risk information. Most 
groups have improved their communication on urgent risk topic. Among these groups 
is a preference to disclose and settle these risk topics by building reserves or writing 
down assets. Follow-up disclosure on risk topics once settled is not provided by 
insurance groups. An example of such preference is the asbestos risk of reinsurance 
companies such as MunichRe.
• Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion 
about fair value measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance 
industry?
Risk disclosure as well as fair value accounting can have a significant impact on the 
share price of listed European insurance groups. The financial crisis set limits in the 
disclosure of insurance groups regarding share price relevant information. The lASB 
allowed a recategorization of investments away from fair value when the financial crisis 
peaked and companies wanted to conceal drops in fair values. Or, MunichRe 
disclosed -  unlike other insurance groups -  a negative embedded value for its life
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segment, because it was of no relevance in the assessment of the overall performance 
of the group.
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Appendix le: Interview Seel (2010)
Structured interview with Alexander Seel from Deutsche Bank, Financial 
Institutions Group on January 24, 2011
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis 
in comparison to other industries?
Yes, the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis. Insurance groups 
are asset managers that are sensible to market volatility caused by the crisis. But 
insurance companies have been associated by the public with banks during the 
financial crisis, although they differ in their business models.
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
Insurance groups with bank business like Allianz or ING have been hit hard. As well as 
insurance groups with high leverage and a significant proportion of high risk assets in 
their portfolio suffered from the reduction of their equity.
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of 
the analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or 
lower market valuation of financial instruments?
The development of the equity ratio can be used as a proxy for the effect the financial 
crisis had on European insurance groups. Preferably a proxy should be based on 
several effects such as the change in IFRS accounting results, regulatory accounting 
results, the change in their rating status and the change in the disclosed market 
consistent embedded value. All changes should be measured from the beginning to 
the end of the financial crisis and then accumulated.
Such a modified proxy would consider offsetting effects. Example given: An increased 
market interest rate would improve the embedded value but would decrease the IFRS 
accounting results due to lower market values of their fixed interest assets.
• Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid 
from governments during the financial crisis?
European insurance groups with banking activities such as ING or Fortis received state 
subsidies as well as SNS a smaller insurance group in the Netherlands and Belgium 
that is not researched. Other than that US financial institutions such as AIG or Heartfort 
received financial aid.
Risk disclosure behavior:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been 
affected by the crisis by reading their group financial statements?
No annual financial statements offer plenty of information. However for an analyst it is 
necessary to compare this information with other insurance groups or other industries. 
To benchmark this information is almost impossible because of the complexity of the 
business models, assumptions that are made in order to calculate embedded values, 
different categorization of assets according to IAS 39 that lead to different effects in the
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profit & loss accounts. Additionally national regulatory requirements differ for insurance 
groups. Example given: Changes in the assets value based on increased interest rates 
can be deducted from regulatory capital requirements for life insurance companies in 
some European countries but not in other ones.
• Where you able to predict the effect the crisis had on an insurance group based 
on this annual information?
The insurance industry is far too complex in order to be able to make precise 
predictions about the effects such a financial crisis has on the results of single 
European insurance groups.
• What information about the insurance group that proved important later on did 
you learn from the group financial statements first?
Information about structured financial instruments have improved during the financial 
crisis. But the disclosure about sovereign bonds has to improve.
• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by 
international insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
Yes, I can support this theory. However, it is not the quantity of disclosed information 
that matters to analysts but its quality. The quality of the information depends on its 
comparability especially in benchmarking. Example given: Allianz disclosed plenty of 
information in a very structured way. As an analyst you cannot compare those data 
with other insurance groups.
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of 
risk disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might 
restrict them?
The management of insurance groups are restrained by international financial 
reporting standards that they all have to comply with. They can exceed these 
requirements by discretionary disclosure. In the long run the insurance industry 
influences the setting- of standards by involvement in lobbying. Example given: The 
current standardizing process of IFRS 9.
• Is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome 
financial instruments (such as: ABS, CDO, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the 
crisis proceeded?
The quality of disclosure about structured financial instruments has improved during 
the crisis.
Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all 
information available in the share price? Do you support the theory of an 
efficient capital market in setting share prices?
Capital market theories always assume efficiency and comparable information at a 
level playing field of all participants. These assumptions do not meet reality. Internal 
studies by DeutscheBank tried to compare new business margins among European
391
insurance groups. We found that every country has special regulations and every 
company makes differing assumptions. These factors restrict the efficiency of the 
capital market.
• Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method 
of measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study 
method that measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share 
prices that are calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over 
a short period of time)?
Not applicable
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 17“ ,^ 2008 be 
considered the most threatening situation for international insurance groups 
during the financial crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
I don't think about certain days but periods. The period between autum 2008 and 
spring 2009 has been characterized by extreme volatility. As negative information 
emerged from insurance groups investors found it hard to build up trust in these 
companies. A similar period has been the sovereign risk crisis around spring 2010. 
Although the information has been around longer and could not be considered by 
investors as unanticipated events they arouse similar fear of investors as the afore 
mentioned period.
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected 
those international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most 
by the financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them 
before they disclosed detailed information about impairments and lower market 
valuation about critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
No, I am not surprised that the capital market sorted out those European insurance 
groups that were affected negatively by the financial crisis although relevant 
information had not been disclosed in their annual financial statements so far. Investor 
calls, workshop, investor information ant other opportunities of the management to 
explain their current business results improve the understanding of these companies 
by analysts. Due to these activities the capital market gains an understanding about 
how the financial crisis affects European insurance groups.
Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that 
have been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones 
disclosed their risk timely and extensively, which ones didn't?
In general those European insurance groups with life-insurance activities have risks 
that are harder to explain and to disclose to investors. In addition to that insurance 
groups with banking activities such as ING or Allianz have experienced a significant 
decrease of their equity ratio.
MunichRe on the opposite had their main activity in reinsurance that has not been hit 
hard by the crisis and a more conservative asset allocation. After the crisis 2003 they 
have converted their business in a more risk sensitive company.
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• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
Private investors enjoy the transparency of European insurance groups the same way 
as institutional investors. However only combined with experience this information can 
be used beneficially in their financial decision making.
• Do you think that international insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose 
“sensitive” information about other topics as they have been reluctant to 
disclose risk information about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during 
this crisis?
n.a.
® Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion 
about fair value measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance 
industry?
Although I agree that additional and comparable disclosure would be beneficial for 
investors I doubt that the disclosure of fair value based measurement of both sides of 
the balance sheet (full fair value) would be practical and provide decision usefulness to 
investors. They would not understand the high volatility of earnings caused by the 
measurement process. The disclosed information would not be comparable by 
investors due to the different assumptions made that are necessary to estimate fair 
values when real market based fair values do not exist.
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Appendix Id: Interview Anonymous (2011a)
Structured Interview with Anonymous from a major Investment Bank
on January 28, 2011 
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis 
in comparison to other industries?
Yes the financial sector with banks and insurance companies have been hit hard by 
the crisis.
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
I don't want to mention single companies.
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of 
the analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or 
lower market valuation of financial instruments?
It is possible to use equity ratios as proxies for the impact the financial crisis had on 
insurance groups. However, a better proxy would be to measure the write ups on 
financial instruments after the crisis and market values increased. With such a proxy 
you could measure to what extend European insurance groups have written down and 
written up their mortgage based financial instruments. In addition to the effect of the 
crisis you could research to what extend these groups accounted true and fair. Those 
with the biggest write ups have shown the true value of the financial instruments at 
each point of time, whereas those groups without or limited write ups did not mark their 
assets down during the financial crisis.
• Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid 
from governments during the financial crisis?
n.a.
Risk disclosure behaviour:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been 
affected by the crisis by reading their group financial statements? Where you 
able to predict the effect the crisis had on an insurance group based on this 
annual information?
It has been possible to predict the effect of the crisis on insurance groups. Gathering 
all available information about an insurance group over a long period of time analysts 
can predict the effects of certain developments. But the group financial statements are 
not the only source of information used by analysts.
® What information about the insurance group that proved important later on did 
you learn from the group financial statements first?
n.a.
• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by 
international insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
I support the theory that timely and extended disclosure increases trust by investors. It 
is necessary that this trust remains in crisis situation because the business model of 
insurance companies is so complex. When investors do not receive timely and
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comprehensible information in a crisis situation they lose trust and assume the worst. 
This can lead to overreactions that we have experienced during the crisis.
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of 
risk disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might 
restrict them?
n.a.
« Is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome
financial instruments (such as: ABS, CDO, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the
crisis proceeded?
Yes, the quality of risk disclosure has improved as the crisis proceeded. Information 
about troublesome financial instruments has become more structured, more specific to 
the situation of the company and in a few cases related to the statutory capital 
requirements and the excess capital of European insurance groups.
Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all
information available in the share price? Do you support the theory of an
efficient capital market in setting share prices?
n.a.
Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method 
of measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study 
method that measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share 
prices that are calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over 
a short period of time)?
n.a.
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 17^ ,^ 2008 be 
considered the most threatening situation for international insurance groups 
during the financial crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
At this point of time private and institutional investors were shocked and fearful. This 
event has affected the whole capital market.
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected 
those international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most 
by the financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them 
before they disclosed detailed information about impairments and lower market 
valuation about critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
n.a.
Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that 
have been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones 
disclosed their risk timely and extensively, which ones didn't?
n.a.
• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
The transparency of how the industry accounts for their investments should improve. 
Categories of investment and the related measurements should be fully transparent or
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abolished in favour of a consistent market value related measurement of both sides of 
the balance sheet.
• Do you think that international insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose 
“sensitive” information about other topics as they have been reluctant to 
disclose risk information about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during 
this crisis?
They might hesitate but they are pressed by analyst to disclose them. When investor 
relation departments of European insurance groups do not comment on specific 
questions analysts assume the worst and act accordingly.
• Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion 
about fair value measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance 
industry?
I believe that European insurance groups should disclose the fair values of their assets 
and liabilities. This would lead to higher transparency. Although I think that insurance 
groups would hesitate to measure and disclose in that way. They would do so when 
they could afford it.
396
Appendix le: Interview Anonymous (2011 a)
Structured Interview with Anonymous from a major Rating Agency
on January 25, 2011 
Effect on equity ratio:
• Do you think that the insurance industry has been hit hard by the financial crisis 
in comparison to other industries?
In comparison to the banking sector the insurance industry took it well. There has been 
an impact on their balance sheets but not as intense as in the banking sector. This is 
because insurance companies have a longer liquidity position than banks. It enabled 
them to hold on to their investments until after the crisis. Banks instead had to fire sell 
parts of their investments and realized losses.
• Which one of the thirteen insurance groups analyzed has been affected most 
negatively by the crisis?
European insurance groups with an exposure to the US-life insurance market or with 
banking activities have been downgraded as a result of the financial crisis. The life- 
insurance exposure forced the companies to meet financial guarantees of the policies 
they have sold that could not be achieved with the actual return of their investments.
• Are you aware of confounding negative effects that lowered the equity ratio of 
the analyzed insurance groups and that were not based on impairments or 
lower market valuation of financial instruments?
To use the equity ratios as a proxy for the effects the financial crisis had on European 
insurance groups makes sense keeping in mind the measurement rules of IAS 39 that 
they all had to apply. Lower fair values of investments, fire sales of assets at a loss and 
negative operating results of the banking segments lowered the economic value of the 
insurance groups together with their equity ratio.
• Can you name international insurance groups that have received financial aid 
from governments during the financial crisis?
Fewer insurance groups received financial aid from governments than banks. AEGON 
ING and SNS (explanation: a Dutch/Belgium insurance group) come to mind as 
recipients.
Risk disclosure behaviour:
• Did you get a clear picture about how the insurance companies have been 
affected by the crisis by reading their group financial statements? Where you 
able to predict the effect the crisis had on an insurance group based on this 
annual information?
Sensitivity information in financial statements that disclose the effect of different 
scenarios on key business figures can be useful for rating decisions.
• What information about the insurance group that proved important later on did 
you learn from the group financial statements first?
Some European insurance groups disclosed their capital sensitivity. This information 
enabled investors to estimate how much loss the companies could take. It was useful 
for companies because it reassured investors about the capital position of these 
groups.
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• Are you supportive of the theory that timely and extended disclosure by 
international insurance groups increases trust that investors have in that group?
Timely and extended disclosure can be considered beneficial to investors. However, 
this disclosure is not exclusively provided by financial statements but in particular in 
investor presentations.
• Do you think that managers in the insurance industry can influence the extent of 
risk disclosure of the groups they lead in the financial statements? What might 
restrict them?
Managers of European insurance groups face the problem that the information they 
disclose its hard to get across, because investors do not really understand the industry. 
Therefore, it is their challenge to put information out that is understood.
• Is it your impression that the quality of risk disclosure about troublesome 
financial instruments (such as: ABS, CDO, RMBS, CMBS) has improved as the 
crisis proceeded?
Most European insurance groups have improved their transparency during the 
financial crisis because investors demanded the information. Investors assumed the 
worst and were assured by positive and negative information.
Capital market functionality:
• Are you convinced about the ability of the capital market to include all 
information available in the share price? Do you support the theory of an 
efficient capital market in setting share prices?
These are model assumptions. Investors as key figures of the capital markets often do 
not completely understand the insurance industry they are invested in. This is caused 
by the complexity of the business model and the variety of regulations that must be 
observed.
• Do you think that reliable conclusions can be drawn from the research method 
of measuring the capital market reactions on single event dates (Event study 
method that measures the deviation of actual share prices from predicted share 
prices that are calculated based on historic data of an industry share index over 
a short period of time)?
n.a.
• In your opinion can the near insolvency of AIG on September 17*^ , 2008 be 
considered the most threatening situation for international insurance groups 
during the financial crisis? Do other situations come to your mind?
The near insolvency of AIG has been a point of time of overall anxiety in the whole 
financial industry not just the insurance industry.
• Are you surprised about the research result that the capital market detected 
those international insurance companies whose equity ratio was reduced most 
by the financial crisis? Can you explain why the capital market detected them 
before they disclosed detailed information about impairments and lower market 
valuation about critical financial instruments in their financial statements 2008?
Annual financial statements came too late to provide investors with the necessary 
information about the financial crisis. This kind of information has been disclosed 
during investor presentations, road shows and conference calls. Investors rely more on 
this kind of sources during crisis situations.
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Overall questions:
• According to your judgement: What are the international insurance groups that 
have been affected most negatively by the financial crisis -  which ones 
disclosed their risk timely and extensively, which ones didn't?
European insurance groups with life insurance such as Aegon and ING have been 
downgraded more often than ones with property and casualty insurance like Aviva, 
AXA, Generali, HannoverRe, MunichRe and Zurich.
• What has to be done in order to allow private investors and analysts to be better 
informed about crisis relevant risk factors of insurance companies?
The transparency of the industry should improve in order to make it a more attractive 
asset class. Accounting rules like IFRS 4 that require measurement based on market 
values try that. However, it is unclear whether or not this will be achieved.
• Do you think that international insurance groups are as reluctant to disclose 
“sensitive” information about other topics as they have been reluctant to 
disclose risk information about “toxic” financial instruments that they hold during 
this crisis?
European insurance groups are reluctant to disclose this kind of information but they 
have less of a choice. They have to disclose the right information in the right way so 
that investors understand it better.
• Do you believe the results of this research might affect the ongoing discussion 
about fair value measurement/full fair value accounting in the insurance 
industry?
The financial crisis had an effect on the standard setting process of IFRS 4. It made 
clear that during a crisis market values do not exist despite pressure on the 
accountants to market value their assets. However, it would be beneficial having a 
consistent approach to measure the debit and credit side of the balance sheet.
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